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 MASKS AND SARTRE’S IMAGINARY: 




W. KEITH TIMS 
 




The use of masks in performance and actor training is often linked to the 
imagination, but there is seldom discussion of the nature of this imaginary link. Using 
the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (most especially his work The Imaginary) and the 
writings of modern mask theorists, this dissertation examines the relationship between 
masks and the imaging consciousness in both masked actors and the audiences who 
observe them. We discover that a mask is an analogon for an Other and that a mask 
authorizes games of identity which play out imaginatively in the performance milieu. In 
fact, generally speaking, a mask in performance is apprehended in a more imaginative 
way than a non-masked performance. Further than this, the mask illustrates the basic 
nature of the human consciousness and identity espoused by Sartre: that who we are is 
not a product of our psychology, but rather, the product of our imaginations and our 
choices. The dissertation concludes by suggesting that masks point to an alternative 
approach to character creation which likewise rejects psychology, and instead relies on 
physicality, abstraction, and ambiguity, all of which are essential to activating the 
imaging consciousness. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
A recurring theme in the literature surrounding masks and their use in 
performance is that masks are tied to the imagination. Some authors discuss how 
masks affect their wearers, inspiring new ways of using the body and new 
personae from the image of the new face. Others discuss how masks invite the 
audience to imagine; the performances are as much about the audience’s own 
ideas as those of the performers. But what does “imagination” mean in the 
context of performance? If masks indeed are tied to the imagination, what does 
this say about the nature of masks? And what do masks’ imaginary ties have to 
say about the nature of the imagination itself? 
 The writings of Jean-Paul Sartre offer one perspective on the imagination 
in the context of performance. Sartre was an existentialist philosopher and 
dramatist who wrote extensively about the nature of consciousness and 
attempted to echo his philosophy in his plays, art critiques, and essays on the 
creative process. Sartre’s best known work is Being and Nothingness, in which he 
outlines his ideas about the nature of human consciousness. However, an earlier, 
less well-known work of his titled The Imaginary deals with Sartre’s conception of 
the imagination and its role in human consciousness. Coupled with Sartre’s own 
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ideas on aesthetics and performance, Sartre offers a new perspective on mask 
theory. 
 By reading Sartre against existing major mask theorists one discovers new 
ideas about mask theory. The core assertion is this: Generally speaking, 
audiences and actors alike apprehend masked performances in a more imaginary 
way than non-masked performances. While there are many factors that influence 
the degree to which a particular performance can be described as “more” 
imaginary than another, and these factors make it admittedly difficult to directly 
compare one style of performance with another, there are certain elements of 
human imagination that Sartre defines which are called into greater play in the 
presence of a well-animated mask. As a result, we can observe how masks 
operate as objects that have connections to our imaginations and sense of identity 
and how these connections affect performances. In addition, masked 
performance can also offer a new perspective on Sartre’s concepts of the 
imagination in that masks illustrate the operations of consciousness. 
 Some questions arise: What would Sartrean philosophy have to say about 
the role of masks in character creation? What might Sartrean concepts have to 
say about how audiences apprehend a masked performer compared to an 
unmasked performer? What are the aesthetic qualities that make a particular 
mask/performance more effective from a Sartrean point of view? What is the 
relationship between existing mask theory and Sartrean ideas of the 
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imagination? How might Sartre’s ideas of the imagination be used to construct 
an aesthetic for masked performance? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, we will employ hermeneutics as 
a methodology, performing a close comparative reading of Sartrean philosophy 
against several texts on mask acting. Sartre’s The Imaginary served as the main 
work in this project. Some of Sartre’s other works (e.g. Being and Nothingness, 
Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, “On Intentionality,” etc.) as well as other 
authors’ writings about Sartrean concepts of imagination, aesthetics, and 
consciousness are added to Imaginary to form a body of Sartrean thought. Also 
included are Kendall Walton’s ideas of make-believe and the writings of select 
Gestalt aesthetic authors. This body of work becomes the primary text against 
which the role of the mask in performance was read as expressed in various 20th 
and 21st century mask acting texts.  
 
Sartre’s Theories of the Imagination 
 It is important at the outset to lay out Sartre’s philosophy which formed 
the core of the body of his thought, beginning with Sartre’s work The Imaginary, 
since this line of thought will be referenced throughout the dissertation. 
 As its title suggests, The Imaginary outlines Sartre’s ideas about imaginary 
objects, how they are understood by consciousness, and what is the nature of 
consciousness itself that humans can imagine at all. Sartre opens The Imaginary 
by identifying two different ways that an object can be given to us: via 
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perception or imagination. Perception comes from observation: our studying 
over time of an object in the “real” world. Perception is necessarily incomplete. If 
I look at a piano, for instance, I will only see the side at which I am looking. If the 
lid is closed, I do not see the strings inside. Where perception is incomplete, 
imagining is total. It is a synthetic act that links knowledge to elements “more 
properly imagined” (Imaginary 8-9). The piano in my imagination may have all 
sides of itself given to me, strings included, as well as sounds, memories, and 
emotions that I may have. 
 The synthetic act of creating an image does not rely on knowledge alone. 
Intentionality is another factor. By intentionality, Sartre means that feature of 
consciousness by which it aims at an other-than-consciousness; in other words, 
that characteristic by which consciousness focuses on an object. It is the “lens” by 
which we view that object, and it is a lens we create ourselves. Whatever object 
that appears to us in the imagination we already have an intention toward it—an 
expectation, idea, or determination—but in a properly imaginative way.  This is 
my piano, or that is the house where I used to live, we might say, if the piano and 
house are absent. Sartre cites Husserl that a consciousness is a consciousness of 
something (Imaginary 11).  “Consciousness and the world are given at one stroke: 
essentially external to consciousness, the world is nevertheless essentially 
relative to consciousness” (“Intentionality” 4). It is not only my knowledge of a 
piano that creates the imaginary piano for me, but my intention towards the 
imaginary piano itself. In my mind’s eye, the imaginary piano is given to me in a 
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“quasi-observation” attitude, but it teaches me nothing new. It is given to me as 
it is, and as I intend it to be, all at once. Objects never precede the intention, and 
consciousness never precedes the object (Imaginary 11). 
 By “quasi-observation,” Sartre means that imaginary objects may appear 
to us in a manner which seems to be like that of perception. It is an attitude of 
observation but is not observation itself. One can never learn anything new from 
an imagined object. If details in the object change, it is not because the imagined 
object had them all along; rather, it is because factors outside of the imagination 
have changed. New knowledge or new feelings may alter the imaginary object, 
but imaginary objects keep no secrets. With quasi-observation, we may 
somewhat deceive ourselves that the object in our imagination is before us, 
outside of ourselves, when in fact all that the object is comes from ourselves 
alone (Imaginary 10).  
 Because imaginary objects give everything that they have to us at once, 
poor, incomplete, or specialized images can have meaning for us without the 
need to decipher them. Perhaps I need only see a sketch of a few piano keys to 
synthesize a rich image of a piano within my imagination. I need only to see a 
few lines of sheet music (assuming I knew how to read them) to hear the piano 
playing in my imagination. Sartre discusses these in terms of caricature and 
schematic drawings. A caricature of a person certainly isn’t “realistic,” in terms 
of verisimilitude, yet a skillfully-drawn caricature can capture the “essence” of 
the personality in a way that a photograph cannot. The sheet music is no way 
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“sounds” like music, but for those who know how to read the schema of musical 
notation, the transformation from marks on a page to imagined audible sound is 
easy enough to accomplish (Imaginary 17-18). 
 Ultimately, what is necessary for the imaginary act to occur is what Sartre 
calls an analogon, that is, “an equivalent of perception.” It’s important to 
understand that ultimately, imagined objects are given to us as a “nothingness.” 
That is, though we may ignore the realization for a short time, any imagined 
object is given to us as not present, absent, somewhere else, or not existing at all. 
Thus, the synthesis of the imagination acts… 
… to “make present” an object. This object is not there, we 
know it is not there. We therefore find, in the first place, an 
intention directed at an absent object. But this intention is 
not empty: it directs itself through a content that must 
present some analog with the object in question. The 
analogon lose their own sense and acquire another. They 
are integrated into a new form without becoming absent 
(Imaginary, 19). 
 
Thus, the crude sketch of the piano keys is still a crude sketch of piano keys, even 
though in my imaging consciousness, I “see” a whole piano. I know that it is just 
a sketch; I do not suffer from a delusion. But the sketch no longer is “merely” the 
sketch. It is the analog for something larger, richer, more detailed, with meaning, 
which I realize within the image itself.  
The world of the imaginary is constituted by objects given to our 
consciousness by a spontaneous synthetic act which unites knowledge and 
intention through the content of an analogon (Imaginary 52). But what is most 
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important for Sartre is that ultimately the objects of the world of perception and 
the world of the imagination are the same. It is only the attitude our 
consciousness takes towards the object that differs (Imaginary 20). The piano in 
my imagination and the piano in my living room may be different, but they are 
both pianos in every sense important to consciousness. And they may be one and 
the same piano though “intended” in the imaginative and perceptual modes 
respectively. 
Imagination, therefore, is about making present something that is absent 
through a piece of knowledge, however small or degraded, that constitutes it. 
Imagination is an act, and an act that intends toward something with an 
expectation of what that thing should be. Imagined objects are what we want to 
represent to ourselves (Imaginary 57). 
Sartre also finds a link between movement and the imaginary. He argues 
that our consciousness expects visual elements, and movement itself becomes an 
analog for visual form. This movement could be the movement of the external 
analogon, or it could be movements within our own bodies—even something as 
small as the movement of our eyes in our sockets. When the movement is 
completed, it is retained by our consciousness as a visual impression (Imaginary 
77). In fact, Sartre suggests that there exists in us already a 
zone of semi-darkness where there glide around almost 
ungraspable states, empty pieces of imaging knowledge that 
are already images, symbolic apprehensions of movement. 
Let one of these pieces be fixed for a moment on one of these 
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movements and the imaging consciousness is born 
(Imaginary 82). 
 
Thus, not only can movement serve as an analog for an imaginary object, such as 
describing a figure 8 with one’s finger in the air, but the act of moving itself with 
a kind of intentionality behind it can create an image out of the “zone of semi-
darkness” within us. In fact, movement, Sartre says, constitutes the “very stuff” 
of the object. It is not a moving fist we imagine, but a movement that is “fist” 
(Imaginary 134). Make a conscious choice to walk about with one’s shoulders 
hunched, head down, feet dragging, and in one’s imagination one already feels 
“hints” of a change in personality or emotion: depression, weariness, or laziness. 
We have knowledge of how depression or weariness is expressed in the body. 
Simply moving in a manner that relates to that knowledge with intention behind 
it can cause the imagination to spring forth (Imaginary 137-138). It is not the 
movement that is a result of the emotional state. Rather, the movement is part of 
the state itself, the “very stuff.” They come at the same time. 
Sartre is also careful to warn us about what he terms the “illusion of 
immanence.” That is, because we are given imaginary objects in a “quasi-
observational” mode, we have a tendency to treat them as if they were “real” or 
perceived objects. We also have a tendency to transfer the characteristics of the 
thing to the analog that represents it (Imaginary 87). Thus, the sketch of the piano 
keys that reminds me of my real piano may, in turn, be endowed with all the 
various feelings I have associated with the real piano. If the piano is sentimental 
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to me, the sketch may also take on sentimental qualities. If I hate the piano, then I 
may hate the sketch.  But in truth the imaginary object is a “mélange of all past 
impressions and recent knowledge” (Imaginary 90). That knowledge aims at the 
imaginary object through the content of the analogon.   
The image plays neither the role of illustration nor that of support 
for thought. It is not something heterogeneous with thought… 
What one generally calls thought is a consciousness that affirms 
this or that quality of its object but without realizing it on it. The 
image, on the other hand, is a consciousness that aims at 
producing its object. It is therefore constituted by a certain way of 
judging (deciding) and feeling of which we do not become 
conscious as such but which we apprehend on the intentional 
object as this or that of its qualities. The function of the image is 
symbolic (Imaginary 97). 
 
 So, I may think that “my piano has a pleasant tone” without having to 
produce the piano or its tone in my consciousness. But when I imagine my piano 
its pleasant tone comes with the image, unbidden but realized then and there and 
at the same time. Again, the image can teach us nothing; therefore, comprehension 
of the object cannot come after the image is formed. It comes at the same time as 
the image does (Imaginary 103). 
 In fact, it is this notion of conception which is at the heart of the 
image/thought dyad. Sartre identifies two kinds of thought: reflective and 
prereflective thought. Reflective thought is self-aware; one is conscious that one 
is thinking. Prereflective thought is where one is not aware of oneself when one 
is thinking. Pure thought, i.e. “my piano has a pleasant tone,” comes to us on the 
reflective plane. But it is in the prereflective plane that the image comes to us. 
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Both of these attitudes bring us the “concept” of the object of our thought 
(Imaginary 114). But in the prereflective plane, thought is a kind of “possession.” 
We constitute our thoughts in “living reality” in order to possess them, to 
constitute them in a form, and to “consider this form to be their nature” 
(Imaginary 116). Thus imaginary acts are a way to make present as a thing the 
concepts of thought. “The act of imagination… is a magical act. It is an 
incantation destined to make the object of one’s thought, the thing it desires, 
appear in such a way that one can possess it” (Imaginary 125). This will have 
importance for us in the realm of performance as we see acting as a way to bring 
forth the presence of imaginary, absent Others in a performance context. 
Sartre thus has identified a kind of continuum along the lines of 
imagination, from pure perception to pure imagination (a dream state). This has 
ramifications for the dramatic world as well. Sartre points out that there is a 
difference between the analogon of a portrait and the analogon of an actor. The 
actor is engaging in a kind of imitation. The portrait is a near-likeness of the 
person depicted thus the audience need not work very hard to see the subject of 
the portrait. The actor, on the other hand, must rely on her body, which is “rigid” 
and “resists” transformation into the subject of the imitation (Imaginary 26). The 
audience always has a choice of seeing the object imitated, or the actor “pulling 
faces.” Thus, in imitation, Sartre says that we cease to perceive and begin to read 
(Imaginary 26). He discusses the actress Franconay impersonating Chevalier. In 
no way does Franconay resemble Chevalier—she is a short woman, he a tall 
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man. But her imitation of him relies on particular signs which capture the 
“essence” of Chevalier. We begin to read these signs and synthesize the 
“presence” of Chevalier in the body of Franconay. Of course, we are not deceived 
into believing Chevalier is actually before us. But Franconay’s incomplete 
representation is enough for us to imagine that he is present. Franconay is the 
analogon for Chevalier (Imaginary 25-27). 
Thus, watching a play, a kind of imitation, is already stepping away from 
pure perception along this continuum. If we read the signs the actors give us, we 
can imagine we are in the presence of the characters. The closer we are to a more 
imaginative state, the more “magical” the relations of the objects become. The 
viewer, “fascinated by the object, disengages himself further from the real” and 
can even form an imaginary ego to which the events of the imaginary world occur 
(Flynn 433).  To some extent, we allow ourselves to cede our “being in the 
world.” We allow ourselves to be “bewitched” by the image.  We can withdraw 
from the world in various degrees (Flynn 433). As we watch a play, for instance, 
there are times when we may be completely engrossed in the imaginary world it 
presents to us. There are other times when we may look at our watches, read the 
program notes or become annoyed with someone coughing next to us. It is at 
these latter moments when we have moved away from the imaginary state and 
closer to the perceptual state. We reclaim our “being in the world,” and we 
remember that it is a play we are watching. We perceive the theatre, the actors, 
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and the set and props as a theatre, actors, a set, and props. They no longer serve 
their function as analogon. They have reclaimed their own sense. 
It is along this continuum of perception and imagination that the events of 
a play, novel, or even a symphony unfold. An imaginary object can be something 
as simple as an absent friend or as complex as an “entire derealized world.” But 
no matter the complexity, the image is still a “transcendent correlate” of a 
particular bit of knowledge and attitude of awareness. It appears to us as we 
wish it to appear, exactly as we expect it, and in a manner like we expect it to 
appear (Flynn 434). 
Ultimately, Sartre argues that it is the capacity to imagine that gives us our 
freedom of consciousness. A consciousness that could not imagine, he points out, 
would be hopelessly mired in the “real,” incapable of any real freedom of 
thought or choice. In order to imagine, a consciousness must be able to posit an 
object as irreal—nonexistent, absent, somewhere else and it does so always from a 
particular point of view.  That we can imagine, he argues, shows that we are, 
ontologically speaking, free (Imaginary 182-187). 
For Sartre, human consciousness is a state of complete freedom of 
existence; existence precedes essence. Humanity’s “essence,” its nature, its 
purpose, its values, its reason for being, is not given by any force prior to a given 
individual’s existence. Instead, it is defined by the individual human being. “The 
essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom… Man does not exist 
first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of 
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man and his being-free” (Being and Nothingness, 60). This free state is the primary 
characteristic of the human condition. In an early essay, Sartre describes in 
colorful, almost macho language how this freedom shapes our way of 
understanding the world: 
Imagine for a moment a connected series of bursts which tear us 
out of ourselves, which do not even allow an “ourselves” the 
leisure of composing ourselves behind them, but which instead 
throw us beyond them into the dry dust of the world, onto the 
plain earth, amidst things. Imagine us thus rejected and 
abandoned by our own nature in an indifferent, hostile, and restive 
world—you will then grasp the profound meaning of the discovery 
which Husserl expresses in his famous phrase, “All consciousness 
is consciousness of something.” No more is necessary to dispose of 
the effeminate philosophy of immanence, where everything happens 
by compromise, by protoplasmic transformations, by a tepid 
cellular chemistry. The philosophy of transcendence throws us onto 
the highway, in the midst of dangers, under a dazzling light 
(Intentionality 5). 
 
This “philosophy of transcendence,” where consciousness transcends itself to 
realize itself, is at the core of both Sartre’s ideas of consciousness and 
imagination. Whatever it is we understand about an object, any object—a piano, 
a person, a virtue— our understanding of it comes solely from ourselves. It is 
true that we may have a bit of knowledge about the piano, person, or virtue; 
however, that knowledge is not “truth.” It is but one part of the imaginative 
synthesis that we use to understand and make sense of the world. We project 




 This is even true of our selves. Sartre writes, “The Ego is neither formally 
nor materially in the consciousness; it is outside, in the world (Transcendence 13).” 
Unlike Descartes, Sartre denies a “duality” of consciousness, a separation of 
psyche and body. To use Gestalt principles of “figure” and “ground,” human 
consciousness is not a separate thing that is apart from its situation, but rather is 
an “embodied totality whose meaning [is] given relative to the ground in which” 
it finds itself (Mirvish, 415). We constantly invent and reinvent ourselves based 
upon our being-in-the-world. Sartre believes that man, lacking in a given 
essence, is a constantly unfinished project. We imagine what it is we are because 
we have nothing else to refer to. The imaginary process helps constitute 
consciousness. Our perceptions of the world are, by nature, incomplete. We can 
accumulate knowledge over time, but we will never be able to perceive a totality, 
an essence. We can only imagine it. Even then, the image of our selves comes 
from the synthesis of knowledge and intentionality. Any “essence” we may find 
for ourselves still comes to us from our intention toward it. We constantly project 
ourselves into the future, never fully finishing ourselves, and always moving 
beyond our past (Jarret-Kerr 41). Thus: 
For a consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape 
from the world by its very nature, it must be able to stand back 
from the world by its own efforts. In a word, it must be free. Thus 
the thesis of irreality has delivered us the possibility of negation as 
its condition (Imaginary 184). 
 
A consciousness that has negation as its condition is capable of placing things as 
absent, missing, somewhere else. It is a consciousness formed on vacancy and 
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indeterminacy. It is capable of transcending the real to include details which 
cannot be seen by perception alone. It is free (Fritz 21). Sartre sums up the 
relationship between the imaginary and consciousness thus: 
… Imagination is not an empirical power added to consciousness, 
but is the whole of consciousness as it realizes its freedom; every 
concrete and real situation of consciousness in the world is 
pregnant with the imaginary in so far as it is always presented as a 
surpassing of the real. It does not follow that all perception of the 
real must be reversed in imagination, but as consciousness is 
always ‘in situation’ because it is always free, there is always and 
at every moment the concrete possibility for it to produce the irreal 
(Imaginary 186). 
 
With freedom comes responsibility, and Sartre does not absolve humanity from 
its own. Though Sartre never completed his work on an existential ethics before 
his death (despite three attempts at formulating one), he very firmly believed 
that it is a part of the human condition not only to be free but also to be totally 
responsible. If there are no psychological, biological, or theological elements that 
hold sway over the vacant and indeterminate consciousness of a human being, 
then that human has only him or herself to blame—or credit—for his or her 
choices (Fritz 21). 
 Sartre does admit there are certain limits to man’s freedom, but ultimately 
he identifies only two that are absolute: one’s death and other people. He admits 
that one cannot choose to be tall if one is short (Being and Nothingness 561). But 
speaking about ontological freedom, such commonly perceived limitations as 
“my place,” “my past,” and “my environment” are dismissed by Sartre as, at 
their roots, being choices. One chooses the degree of influence or significance 
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which one’s past has upon oneself (Fritz 38). Ultimately, though, it is others 
which are the primary limit on one’s own freedom. As Maxine Klein wrote about 
Sartre’s play No Exit, the play and existentialism are both about “the predicament 
of a being, deprived of general truths about his nature, forced to create himself 
through his activities in a world strange and dense, and in the company of 
Others whose projects will, of necessity, conflict with his” (59). We are born into 
a world of others, taught by them, defined by them, and come into conflict with 
them as we struggle to forge our own identities and purposes. Though others 
may limit us, Sartre is careful to point out that ontologically we are free and thus 
ultimately responsible for our existence. 
 Sometimes the responsibility of total freedom is too much, and Sartre says 
that we seek to avoid that responsibility by acting in “bad faith.” That is, we lie 
to ourselves, though are unaware that we are lying to ourselves, shifting the 
responsibility for our choices and behaviors elsewhere. Bad faith is “A lie to 
oneself within the unity of a single consciousness… [it] rests on a vacillation 
between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognize either one for 
what it really is or to synthesize them” (Barnes, 216). To act in “good faith,” then, 
would be to accept one’s own existential responsibilities for oneself and bear the 
consequences for the choices of one’s life oneself. To act in bad faith is to refuse 
to acknowledge one’s own intentionality in the imaginary process. One may say 
to oneself, “That man is evil,” or “My piano is pleasant,” as if these judgments 
were not functions of my way of intending the man or the piano. Bad faith is 
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removing oneself from the process of defining what “evil” and “pleasant” are. By 
pretending that the responsibility for the way things “are” lies outside oneself, 
one can in bad faith avoid one’s ultimate responsibilities of essence. 
 Thus, Sartre has laid out a theory of consciousness based upon freedom. 
He finds our freedom comes from the fact that we can imagine and that our 
imagination is a tool by which we attempt to possess the absent. We can both 
perceive and imagine. Perception gives us knowledge, and imagination 
synthesizes that knowledge with our own intentions. There is a continuum 
between the imaginary and the perceived, and all encounters with the world 
have the potential to activate the imaginary consciousness to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
 Sartre’s ideas of freedom are also expressed in his plays. Whereas much 
modern drama features characterizations that are consistent, rooted in 
psychological thought and shaped by external forces, Sartre’s plays often feature 
characters that dramatically change themselves, often without any seeming 
psychological reason for doing so. For example, in Death Without Burial, the 
character of Lucie spends most of the play refusing to give information to her 
captors—she would rather endure rape, torture, and death. Yet, abruptly and 
without a great deal of explanation, when Canoris makes a last-ditch attempt to 
change her mind, she agrees. This was Sartre’s reaction to what he believed was 
the “bad faith” of psychological determinism. If mankind is the product of 
“social forces, genes, political systems, Oedipus complexes, and the like,” he can 
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no longer act (Klein 42). But remove these forces, and mankind is once again free 
to act. 
 In fact, Sartre termed his theatre “Theatre of Situations.” That is, just as 
mankind’s freedom always comes from his situation in the face of the real, so, 
too, do his characters’ freedoms come from situations devised by the playwright 
(Fritz 53). Rather than a “theatre of characters” where the characters are 
psychological types, the “theatre of situations” focuses on moments when a 
particular character’s freedom is tested. For Sartre, the theatre of characters 
“entraps characters in a web of predicable psychology, while le theatre de 
situations leads the characters up to a defining moment in which they freely 
define themselves” (Fritz, 54).  
 Kathleen Fritz substituted the term “Theatre of Indeterminacy” for 
“theatre of situations” as more accurate for some of Sartre’s plays. Not only did 
these plays reflect the indeterminate nature of consciousness that Sartre 
espoused, but his plays often featured “radical conversion” scenes in which 
characters dramatically change their ideals or personalities. Often these 
conversions seem unmotivated; however, they reflect the character’s freedom to 
choose and reject psychologically determined limits (62). 
 Maxine Klein termed Sartre’s dramatic philosophy as “Theatre of Crisis.”  
For Sartre, “what a man is seen to be doing, or heard saying, where he is 
discovered to be living, whom he chooses to be loving, whom hating, all these 
appearances of a man and many more must be the measure of him” (47-48). 
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Humanity is thus shown in the present tense, free, and the audience approaches 
the character “to examine him in his acts of doing in order to discover what he 
would be” (49). The role of the playwright, then, is to place this man in moments 
of crisis. Like Fritz’s Theatre of Indeterminacy, what is compelling about this 
kind of drama is the discovery of how the character defines himself in situations 
where his freedom is tested. It is a theatre of “danger,” where the existential 
Other is the only real limit to freedom (55). 
 Thus, Sartre’s ideas of dramatic aesthetics are already founded on ideas 
which echo his philosophy of consciousness—indeterminacy and freedom. Sartre 
has other ideas about aesthetics as well, which will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this work. But for Sartre, the most aesthetically pleasing plays are those 
that shun predetermined ideas of identity. 
 
The Imagination and Mask Theory 
 Sartre’s ideas of imagination, consciousness, and dramatic aesthetics all 
have ramifications for mask theory. As we will see, a mask is an analogon for the 
imaginary object of the character. The notion of character identity in mask work 
is less about psychological exploration and more about imaginative synthesis. 
Masks also have a greater aesthetic value in Sartrean terms. 
 But what is meant by the term “mask?” A mask, at its most basic, is a 
facial disguise. There are many kinds of masking, from makeup to entire 
costumes that accompany the masks and headdresses. Masking can also refer to 
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more psychological states, such as the “mask” we present to the world. However, 
the more psychological aspects of the term “mask” will be avoided in this work. 
Sartre rejected most psychologically determined concepts of identity in the first 
place. Further, because this study is concerned with the imaginary nature of 
mask work, it is important that masks be viewed as an analogon—an object that is 
a correlate for something else. Thus, for the purposes of this work, a “mask” 
refers to a face covering used in performance designed to represent an “other;” 
someone else other than the person wearing it, be it a character, a divine being, 
or persona—in short, an analogon. Because performances can range from 
religious dances to formalized plays, the term “personage” will be used to mean 
the “Other” pointed to by the mask*. 
In the following chapters this dissertation will discuss how the imaginary 
process affects the masked actor and audience alike. The first part will focus on 
the relationship between the mask and the actor. First will be discussed the 
relationship between movement, mask, and the imagination in the actor. Next, 
the notion of “trance” in masked acting will be explored as an “imaginary state.” 
This will be followed by a discussion of how the use of masks and the imaginary 
process can be used as a form of character development for actors. The second 
part of this study will focus primarily on the relationship between the mask and 
the audience. We will begin with a discussion of Sartre’s aesthetic of sens and 
                                                 
*
 Though technically the term “personage” refers to a “person,” we will use the term to include characters 
which are not strictly people, such as animals, gods, ghosts, etc.  
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how it applies to masks. Then the section will conclude with a discussion of the 
idea of “purposeful ambiguity” as a means of engaging the audience through 
masks. The study will conclude with the suggestion that the use of masks in 
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Chapter 2 – Masks, Movement, and the Imagination 
 
A cursory survey of most mask acting texts reveals several common 
threads, one of which is that for a mask to truly become effective it must be 
animated; that is, it must be brought into motion by a performer. There is a great 
deal of discussion by mask acting authors about various techniques by which a 
mask may be effectively animated. However, what is often left undiscussed is the 
relationship between movement and the mask and why masks must be animated 
in order to achieve their greatest effectiveness. A mask at rest becomes a piece of 
art, still pointing to an “Other” but in a passive, fixed way. A mask in motion 
often seems to come “alive” with varieties of expressions, taking on a life that it 
did not have previously. So in what way does “movement” add this “life?” 
There is also discussion about the transformative power that masks seem 
to have upon their wearers. These discussions usually revolve around changes of 
both personality and body, with new postures, gestures, and kinesthetic qualities 
appearing in the body of the actor with the arrival of the mask upon the actor’s 
face. Where do such physical changes come from, and why are they essential to 
mask work? How is it that movement seems to add new qualities not only to the 
mask, but to the wearer as well? Why do so many mask exercises focus on 
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getting the actor to use his or her body in new ways? Why is movement so 
important to mask characterization?  
Mask work is physical because mask work is imaginary in nature. That is, 
working with masks is working with the imaginary state that Sartre outlined in 
The Imaginary. For Sartre, movement is a part of the synthesis of the imaginary 
process. As a result, working imaginatively means working with movement. This 
chapter will examine the theoretical relationship between masks, movement, and 
the actor. What we find in this examination is that not only can movement itself 
can be a trigger to a more imaginary state, but movement is essential to the 
creation of character, especially so with masks. We also find, then, that 
movement and the body are essential to the formation of identity itself. 
 
Movement and the Analogon 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, imagination is a synthetic act. The imagined 
object that appears to us is given to us through an analogon, but the analog alone 
is not enough. Not only must there be a piece of knowledge, but there is also an 
intention towards the object. But in addition to this, Sartre finds that movement 
is a key part of the function of the analogon in this process.  Thomas Flynn 
illustrates the process thus (434): 
 
 cognitive element (savoir, concept) 
CONTENT { kinaesthetic  with sensible residue (external image) 
 analogue (matter) { { 




Thus, the content of the image comes to us from the knowledge we have of it (the 
cognitive element) and its analog (the “matter”). There can be an analog with 
“sensible residue” such as a photograph, a painting, a sketch—something that 
remains behind after the image is formed— or there can be an analog that exists 
only in the mind of the imaginer: a mental picture. An object with “sensible 
residue,” logically has a stronger external character. Thus it tends to form a 
stronger image. However, in both cases, there are affective and kinesthetic 
dimensions to how the analog is apprehended by consciousness. The affective 
dimension “makes present the object in its deep nature (Imaginary 81).” It is our 
intention toward the object, our fundamental feelings and relations with it. But 
an imaginary object cannot exist without the kinesthetic element. Even if one 
relies solely on a mental image as the analogon, there is still movement involved: 
movement of the eyes, a tilt of the head, a small twitch of the fingers. Sartre 
describes a simple experiment: keep one’s gaze fixed on a page number in a 
book, and then imagine a moving swing. The eyes will move, even slightly, in 
order to constitute the image (Imaginary 81). The kinesthetic impression serves to 
“externalize” the image, giving it a kind of visual reality (Flynn 434-435). 
Flynn further states that the kinesthetic impression is “superficial, a 
schematic, surface presence (Flynn 435).” The affective content, he and Sartre say, 
is synthesized with the kinesthetic in a “complete image.” The kinesthetic 
dimension is incomplete in and of itself; it is a “schematic” waiting to be 
decoded. This “schematic” is decoded into a complete image by synthesis with 
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knowledge (the cognitive element) and the affective dimension (the intention 
toward the object). 
That is not to say that the movement predates the image: the movement, 
knowledge, and intention synthesize at the same time. But movement without 
knowledge or intention does not create the presence of the imaginary object. 
Nevertheless, the kinesthetic dimension of the imaging process is so essential 
that even small, absent, half-aware movements may trigger an imaging 
consciousness anyway. I may run my hand through my hair as I think, and the 
act of doing so may create a surface presence of something imaginary: a windy 
day at the beach, the feel of a loved one stroking my head, etc. Even though I 
may not have desired to conjure up these images, the act of movement may be 
enough to call them up—at least in a superficial way.  
In fact, Sartre makes the point that when an image is recalled from 
memory, it is primarily constituted by kinesthetic impressions. A subject is asked 
to recall the painting, “Soldiers Returning from the Crimean War” and does so 
by recalling the image in kinesthetic terms: “I mainly reconstructed it in 
accordance with the movement of the lines” (Imaginary 82). Memory is recalled 
by movement; movement can call up memory, and memory is a form of 
knowledge which is a part of the imaging synthesis. Thus, movement and the 
image are linked. The image is a synthesis, but it is a spontaneous synthesis: 






Training the Imagination 
So it would be fair to say that all physical theatrical forms—dance, mime, 
even to some extent more traditional realism—have elements of the imaginary 
within them. All of these forms rely on physical choices to express the text of the 
performance, and thus all have the ability to activate the imaging consciousness 
in those who receive the text. This includes audiences who observe the 
performance, and actors who enact it. Mask work is no exception—in fact, many 
mask practitioners and theorists understand that an actor wearing a mask must 
rely on his or her body for expressivity since he or she can no longer rely on 
facial expression. In turn, this attention to the use of the body activates the 
imagination of the actor, playing with the “zone of semi-darkness” that Sartre 
described as explored in Chapter 1. That is, by having students/actors move – 
especially in ways to which they are unaccustomed – the mask teachers hope the 
students will find their imaginations activated through movement. Every 
movement has the potential to connect to a bit of knowledge which, if the actor 
further engages, can create new imaginary objects spontaneously. 
Libby Appel is a mask teacher who sees a connection between masks, 
movement, and spontaneity in masked character creation. Appel recognizes that 
working with masks can stimulate a link between the body and the imagination 
in the consciousness of the actor. She states that working with masks results in 
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 stimulating the imagination, putting greater emphasis on physical 
actions, acting with the whole body, and ridding the actor of self-conscious 
mannerisms. (xii) 
 
Sartre would say this link between the physical and the imaginary already exists. 
Appel’s training, then, is teaching the actor to allow the spontaneity of the 
movement in the mask work to trigger the imagination uncensored. By 
encouraging movement, Appel encourages the imaginary state as well. But more 
than just movement work alone, Appel chooses to use masks because they are 
the “perfect tool” for an actor (xiv). “Because of the tremendous safety behind the 
mask, the use of [the mask] impels the actor to create [a complete, fully 
dimensional] character (xii-xiv).” The idea of the mask as a means of 
circumventing fear in identity creation will be explored more in depth in a later 
chapter. However, it is clear from the nearly exclusive focus on the physical 
dimension in her methods that Appel finds the mask as a tool to liberate her 
students physically. 
The results Appel cites above—a stimulated imagination, acting with the 
whole body, etc. – are a common theme among mask teachers. Appel’s exercises 
are all very physical in nature, determined to make the actor step outside of his 
or her physical comfort zone. Her exercises are designed to simultaneously strip 
away “old personal limitations” and “create new layers of experience” (4). By 
using their bodies in different ways, Appel believes the actors will experience 
new imaginary connections. The actors, forced to move in ways with which they 
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are unfamiliar, find new images given to them—images which existed there all 
along, but with which they were not reflectively aware. 
For example, Appel has actors explore a stage space while masked. The 
stage is set with ordinary objects: chairs, rehearsal cubes, simple props, etc. As 
the actors move about the space, she encourages them to “explore objects with 
other parts of your bodies besides your hands,” to move more quickly or more 
slowly than usual, to “hop, roll, or jump” to travel from one place to another, to 
approach objects in different directions, such as sideways or backwards. She 
concludes her list of sidecoaching suggestions for this exercise with the 
exhortation to the actors, “Keep your mind on your action!” (23). It is the act, not 
the thought, which is important. Appel’s exercise forces participants to move 
beyond their usual modes of movement. Exploring a broom with one’s hands 
can lead to familiar associations with the broom, such as what a broom is “for” or 
how it is to be held. But exploring a broom with one’s shoulder is a different 
experience. The exploration turns the experience of exploration into something 
unfamiliar. By doing so, the actor relies less on her own ideas about the physical 
nature of “exploration” and “broom,” and more on the immediate sensation of 
movement. It is not important that the broom be identified and used as a broom, 
but rather, that the actor’s body is used in ways that will activate his imagination. 




The involvement in the activities is a physical and sensory one; it 
is not an intellectual process… When the actor keeps moving, 
regardless of sore muscles or perspiration, there is no time or 
inclination to keep up or manipulate physical defenses. He truly 
gets past thinking. His body will submit to the image and take the 
risk with the movement, and he will suddenly find himself 
believing and doing things he has never considered before (25). 
 
In this way, the actors undergoing Appel’s exercises almost seem to be forced into 
a connection with the imagination. By making strong and unusual physical 
choices, Appel believes the actors cannot help but discover new characterizations 
out of their own imaging consciousnesses. 
 Further, these imaginary impulses which can generate characterizations 
can result in fully-developed personages. Appel’s ultimate aim is to have the 
actors experience new personae from their work with the mask and movement. 
She writes: 
 [the] mask characterization process, akin to the role creation for a play, is 
a long journey in and out of the imagination to create a whole person, 
discovering and refining the behavior of that person in countless 
situations and periods of his life (4). 
 
Thus, for Appel, it is the engagement of the imagination over and over that 
creates the new personage, and for Appel, such engagement is primarily a 
physical one. Movement, while not the sole component to masked character 
creation, is essential. The use of masks in character creation will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4. But Appel clearly sees movement as fundamental to 
mask work, and it is through movement that the “link” to the imagination is 
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stimulated. The imagination is engaged through movement; without movement, 
there is no imagination. 
Improvisation and mask teacher Keith Johnstone also recognizes the 
importance of movement in character creation. Johnstone, in his work Impro, 
spends an entire chapter discussing the nature of “status.” Johnstone does not, 
here, refer to social or economic status, but rather “status” is a physical 
dimension that human beings employ prereflectively to establish a kind of 
“pecking order” with others. Status is a physical choice which employs 
variations of posture and eye contact. It is a kind of physical behavior and can be 
used with masked performance or without it. For instance, “high status” bodies 
stand erect, with the vulnerable parts of the body exposed, and high-status 
people tend to make direct eye contact. “Low status” bodies, on the other hand, 
tend to be hunched, shifting, arms crossed, protecting the vulnerable parts of the 
body, and low-status people tend to use sporadic eye contact. Johnstone’s status 
is not something one is, but rather, something one does (36). That is, status is 
performed and not a result of any particular accident of birth, wealth, position, or 
title. Johnstone also acknowledges that one can demonstrate higher or lower 
status – from a pecking order standpoint—through dialog, but as he points out, it 
is important to remember that there is a difference between the status you play 
and the status you are. That is, someone of a low social status could still have a 
high physical status. Thus, it is possible to have master/servant scenes with a 
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physically low status master and high status servant—often to great comic effect 
(36). 
By choosing a particular “status” for a character, an actor can use the 
physicality of Johnstone’s status to create a character spontaneously. Johnstone 
points out that people usually have a “preferred” status they play in their 
everyday lives. He argues that status is a kind of “defense,” a way of protecting 
yourself, either by giving off non-verbal signals that read as “Don’t come near 
me, I bite,” (high status) or “Don’t bite me, I’m not worth the trouble,” (low 
status) (43). A person is likely to find a particular status that “works” as a 
defense and to become specialized in playing that status. The end result of this 
for actors is that when called upon to play a different status than what one is 
specialized in, the actor feels “wrong” or “undefended” (43). It is a “block” for 
the actors, a “boundary around the imagination” that Appel wrote about, above. 
The actor’s sense of security and self is tied up in his or her body.  
By altering one’s status, one begins to feel “different.” But status is not the 
only physical change which an actor can undergo to create a new sense of 
personage. Johnstone’s dimension of status can be used with other physical 
choices—such as movement center, kinesphere size, and Laban qualities of 
movement— to sculpt new “bodies” which seem to have sketches of new 
“personae” in them. 
The movement center is the place in the body where the individual’s 
movement has its root, where the lines of movement converge and radiate from, 
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where the impulse to move begins. Place the movement center in one’s chest, and 
the body seems to be pulled forward from the torso, shoulders back and square, 
the body erect. Place the movement center in the feet, and the body seems to 
shuffle, to lean backwards through space, the energy falling downward toward 
the ground through the legs. 
One can also change one’s kinesphere size, or “intensity”. The kinesphere 
is the amount of space that a person “takes up.” This not only includes their 
physical body, but the space around them that they claim. A person with great 
intensity seems to take up a great deal of space around them. A person with a 
small kinesphere takes up little space. Physical energy, intensity, and speed all 
play a role in a person’s kinesphere. 
Likewise, one can change Laban qualities of movement in one’s own 
body. The Laban qualities of movement effort were developed by Rudolf Laban 
and his students as a way to analyze dance. These qualities include dyads along 
scales of time (movements that are sudden or sustained), weight (movements 
that are light or heavy), direction (movements that are direct or indirect), and 
flow (movements that are free or restrained) (“Laban Movement Analysis” 
Wikipedia). 
What we see through all of these physical dimensions is that as an actor 
makes a choice to alter her physicality, she begins to alter the familiar, 
“comfortable” choices she makes on a day-to-day basis and feels “different.” The 
various physical changes activate the imaging consciousness and suggest new 
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patterns of behavior, new ways of interacting with the world, new feelings, all of 
which emerge spontaneously. By simply moving differently, the actor discovers a 
new personage—at least, the sketch of one. 
I have used these various physical techniques with students in acting 
classes. For example, instruct an actor to move “with high status, high intensity, 
center in your chest, with sustained, light, and direct effort,” and the actor creates 
a new body that moves through space. A different set of instructions produces a 
different body. Usually, the actor reports that he “felt” different in the new body, 
with “hints” of a new characterization implicit in the movement choices. He 
didn’t have to “think up” the characterization, but the movement itself created 
the sense of characterization. Because the imaginative process is spontaneous, the 
characterization emerged spontaneously. This also shows us that at least on a 
superficial level, who we are, how we feel, how we relate to the world is a 
product of how we move within it. 
What is at work here is the relationship between the kinesthetic dimension 
of the imaginary process and the content of the characterization. As one alters 
one’s own body, one begins to feel “suggestions” or “sketches” of new 
characterization—the “surface presences” that Flynn discussed above. As the 
actor alters her body, she engages with the “zone of semi-darkness” until the 
movement affixes on a piece of knowledge, and an image is created: this person 
is lazy, depressed, imperious, or wild. In practice, Appel and Johnstone 
encourage their students to further engage with the “sketches” or “surface 
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presences” to create full characterizations. Ultimately, this is an imaginary 
process. 
The image is given at the same time the movement is given. Because the 
image is a spontaneous synthesis of movement, knowledge, and intention, the 
use of movement alone is a way to activate the imaginary consciousness. Of 
course, it is possible for a movement to have little meaning for an actor. Perhaps 
the particular actor does not have any strong knowledge or intention associated 
with a particular movement. In this case, the image formed may be weak or the 
imaging consciousness may not form at all. But overall, movement is essential to 
the imaginary process. There can be no image without movement. Because we 
apprehend much of the world imaginatively, movement plays a far greater part 
in how we understand the world than is often believed. For the actor, 
characterization need not be about intellectual or psychological analysis: 
characterization can be physical in nature. The relationship between physicality 
and character creation will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. For 
now, let us remember that changes in movement can lead to changes in identity. 
 
Masks and Movement 
Of course, the introduction of masks to the work adds a new dimension to 
the process. Masks provide a “sensible residue” to the analogon of the 
characterization. Certainly making physical choices alone can provide a link to 
the imaginary with the movement externalizing the visual image; however, 
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adding a concrete analogon, such as a mask, causes the external quality of the 
image to be heightened (Flynn 435). Sartre states that consciousness expects 
visual elements. Movement itself can become an analog for visual form: not 
visual sense, but visual sensation (Imaginary 77). But the addition of the mask, and 
its reflection in the mirror or the contemplation of its face by the actor, adds a 
visual sense to the analogon of the actor’s body in motion. By unifying visual 
sensation and movement, the image pointed to by the analogon is stronger. The 
actor moves and the movements join with the image of the face presented in the 
mask. As a result, the mask presents a place where the movements can find a 
stronger external connection. When an actor stoops his shoulders forward, he 
may “feel” the sketch of a depressed person. Place a mask with a sad expression 
on his face, and now the “feel” of the stooped shoulders unites with an analogon 
that points to a “sad” personage. The image of the “depressed person” becomes 
stronger through this synthesis. 
This unity between mask and body is often seen as essential to effective 
masking. In his mask work, Sears Eldredge uses the term “bodymind.” It is a 
term for “speaking holistically about the unity of the physical, the emotional, the 
mental, and the psychological within the individual” (Eldredge 26).  For 
Eldredge, the masking process is one of changing the bodymind.  The body of 
the actor must be brought into “harmony” with that of the face of the mask; that 
is, the new face and new body must seem to “belong” together. 
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One of the first exercises that Eldredge has his students perform is 
“contemplation” of the mask. The actor, working alone, holds the mask before 
her and studies the face. She tilts it this way and that, animating it much like one 
might a puppet. “As they manipulate the mask,” Eldredge writes, “they should 
let the masks activate their imaginations, letting the masks come alive in their 
hands. They must be open to letting their imaginations play with all the sensory 
impressions” (44). Eldredge sees this process of contemplation as the actor 
seeking out life in the image of the mask, a sense of expressivity or personality 
within the “global impression” of the face before the actor. In this way, Eldredge 
begins to turn the mask from artifact into an analogon for a character in the 
consciousness of his actors. But what is important to note here is that the actor 
moves the mask while contemplating it in order to find its “life.” It is only 
through animation that a mask begins to take on the role of analogon, to lose its 
own sense and take on another. 
Eldredge later has his students place the mask on their faces and look at 
themselves in a mirror. He wants the actors to discover their new reflection and 
to “let the shock of that discovery affect their bodyminds” (45). He encourages 
his actors to find a new way of breathing, moving, gesturing in a way that suits 
the mask. Again, we see here that the imagination of the actor is activated by 
movement—but it is not merely any movement. It is a search for movement 
which unites with the analogon of the mask.   
38 
 
Mask characterization comes not from psychological study, but rather 
from spontaneous movement in finding the “harmony” of the mask with the 
body. By looking at the mask, the actor spontaneously generates knowledge 
about the personage the mask represents. Even if she has never seen the mask 
before, the actor will still have some small ideas about who the mask represents, 
and these ideas form the knowledge component of the imaging synthesis. Sartre 
would say that the “harmony” Eldredge writes about is where the actor’s 
movements “fix” on a bit of that knowledge. If the movements and face “suit” 
each other, then the imaging consciousness is born. The actor will feel a kind of 
“unity” or “rightness” about face and body together. The bodymind will have 
changed through the imaginative process. If the movements an actor makes do 
not connect with any piece of knowledge or intention within her, then she will 
not form the imagining consciousness. The actor will feel uncertain, awkward, 
artificial, or false. The characterization “isn’t right” because the actor lacks a 
strong image to connect with. This “rightness” or “falseness” is tested in 
movement. 
Character creation with masks, then, is about play: an engagement 
between the body and the face until the knowledge, intention, and analogon 
synthesize into an image. The image is, as stated before, an act attempting to 
make something absent as present so it can be possessed.  Jacques LeCoq, mime 
and mask teacher, found this play to be essential in theatre. He writes, “For me, 
mime is central to theatre: being able to play at being someone else and 
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summoning illusory presences constitutes the very body of the theatre” (21). The 
way an actor summons these presences is through the use of the body to create a 
“universal poetic sense” (46) – paring away all that is physically non-essential to 
expression. It is not enough that an actor identify psychologically with his 
character. She must also “play” physically with the character, engaging her body 
and also, Sartre would say, her imaginary process.  The concept of a “universal 
poetic sense” is problematic, but what is important is that LeCoq identifies 
clearly that in order to summon these presences, the actor must physically – not 
necessarily psychologically -- remove those excess traces of herself which do not 
belong. 
For example, an exercise that LeCoq has his mime students perform 
involves responding to colors through movement, expressing the internal 
qualities of movement the student feels and associates with a particular color. 
LeCoq observes: 
When the students are performing this kind of exercise I am particularly 
attentive to the quality of their movements. I can tell whether the 
movements arise from their own bodies, or from an external image, a sort 
of picture postcard which they are trying to illustrate, or again if they are 
doing a symbolic movement, giving an external representation of the color 
they are trying to describe to us. These movements have to be pruned and 
digressions restrained, so that the students may be taken gradually deeper 




Leaving aside for the moment LeCoq’s assertion that there is a “true” color that 
can be reached,* we see that LeCoq is seeking to eliminate symbolic and 
illustrative movements and instead find “essential” movements. These 
“digressive” movements that LeCoq seeks to restrain are the result of the actor’s 
interpretation of the color in the exercise. LeCoq understands that interpretation 
does not produce essence: it shows rather than is. LeCoq does not want his 
students to show “red” or “blue.” He wants the qualities of “red” or “blue” to be 
made present in their bodies. Anything that does not belong—physically—
interferes with making the presence of the qualities appear, be they intentional 
illustrations or unconscious mannerisms brought forth by the actor. 
LeCoq’s training technique acknowledges that there are historical forms 
that actors may know and have ideas about, and that an actor will bring 
something of those ideas to his performance. For instance, LeCoq does train 
actors in pantomime blanche, clowning, Commedia dell’Arte, etc. But LeCoq 
makes it very clear that whatever ideas actors have about these styles must be 
minimized.  
… there is always a danger that students will rely on the cultural 
references which comes with these dramatic territories… Beyond 
styles or genres, we seek to discover the motors of play which are 
at work in each territory, so that it may inspire creative work 
(LeCoq, 98). 
 
                                                 
*
 LeCoq’s belief in the “universal poetic sense” stems from his idea that all human beings have a common, 
shared experience with light, color, shapes, etc. Somewhat glibly, he dismisses the possibility of different 
understandings of these experiences: “Aside from differences of symbolism, everywhere in the world, the 
poetic sense is the same: blue is Blue!” (47). The essential problems with such a view and how LeCoq’s 
view affects mask work will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. 
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Again, LeCoq reinforces that it is not intellectual thought, but an understanding 
of physical play that creates meaning within the imagination of the student. 
Whatever an actor believes about Commedia dell’Arte, for instance, is less 
important than understanding how to play physically within the territory of 
Commedia. 
The term “motor” (in French: moteur) frequently arises in LeCoq’s work. It 
refers to the “dynamic principles underlying dramatic representation” (LeCoq, 
166). It is an understanding of movement, scale, and motivation. LeCoq seeks to 
teach his students the fundamental “motor” of a situation, that which drives it. 
Unlike more traditional realism concepts such as psychological motivations, such 
motors are expressed physically. There is a rhythm to them, an intensity, and a 
scale. A particular scene might have a motor that could be described as slow, 
smooth, and quiet, while another might be rapid and exaggerated, with lots of 
vertical movement. For example, in the territory of everyday life, if a person is 
afraid, he may draw back; but in the territory of Commedia, if Arleccino is afraid, 
he may hide under the carpet (LeCoq, 34). In the territory of Commedia, fear is 
not expressed by merely drawing back, but by large expressions of movement. 
The motor of the Commedia territory is different than the motor of everyday life. 
As a teaching technique, after an initial exercise, LeCoq and his students: 
… return to a stripped down version of the exercise. Ignoring its 
anecdotal interest, we turn the theme inside-out in order to 
discover the motor which drives it. In this way, other themes, 




Instead of trying to give the students a psychological background or identifying 
image around which to frame the exercise, LeCoq simply tries to find the 
dynamic structure of the scene as expressed through movement. The scene’s 
physical dimensions form the frame of the scene. Once the actors begin to 
understand this motor and move within its framework, then their own 
imaginations will provide the new themes, images, and situations. “Reduced to 
this motor, psychological themes loose their anecdotal elements and reach a 
status of heightened play” (33). The body is the center of how the motor is 
expressed, and also the primary means of developing character, story, and mood. 
It is in the play of movement that characterization and presence appear—
not just any play, but movement which is essential and expressive. “My method 
aims to promote the emergence of a theatre where the actor is playful. It is a 
theatre of movement, but above all a theatre of the imagination” (LeCoq, 98). 
Clearly, LeCoq understands that movement and the imagination are linked. But 
for LeCoq, training the actor is not about merely activating this link, but seeking 
to find the specific movements which “work” with the imaginary concepts or 
personages attempting to be made present. With masks, the personages are 
constructed imaginatively, with the masks serving as analogon for the personage 
and movement as a means of discovering the details of the personage in 
harmony with the mask. 
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But more than simply relying on movement technique, LeCoq also finds 
masks are essential tools for creating an expressive body. He writes about 
character masks: 
The expressive mask shows a character in broad outlines. It structures and 
simplifies the playing style by delegating to the body the job of expressing 
attitudes. It purifies the performance, filtering out the complexities of 
psychological viewpoint and imposing pilot attitudes on the whole body 
(53). 
 
LeCoq’s pilot attitudes form a “basic structure (53),” another frame around the 
performance. The mask’s image dictates a certain attitude or personality and 
imposes these attitudes in the performance in a physical way. It is difficult to 
agree with LeCoq here that merely donning a mask automatically produces these 
results; there is a process to masking. But the “delegating” of “pilot attitudes” is 
another way of saying that the masker seeks harmony between the body and the 
mask. For LeCoq, expressive masks are a means to help point the actor in the 
right direction (i.e. “pilot” him) towards this harmony and eliminate all that does 
not belong. Like movement can serve as a surface presence of an image, so can a 
mask serve as a basic structure of a character, expressed physically. What is most 
notable about LeCoq’s works examined above is his disinterest in the 
psychological elements of character creation. While he never outright dismisses 
psychology as part of the characterization process, for LeCoq, characters are 
expressed physically. This will become more important in Chapter 6, when we 
will discuss mask characterization in greater depth. However, for LeCoq, at least, 
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the physical dimension of character creation is enough for the actor to make 
present the personage she seeks. 
 
Subject and Situation 
Indeed, for Sartre, the body is at the center of our consciousness; rather, 
the body and its relations to the world are the place where our consciousness is 
formed. Hourantier asserts that "the body is the locus in space where all planes 
of existence converge and all lived experiences are structured and registered” 
(135). But it is not a separate thing from consciousness. Sartre writes: 
I exist my body and know it through the world that encircles it… I am 
neither in my body nor at the back of it, nor am I my body, but 
neither am I something other than it—I exist it (Notebooks on an 
Ethics, 316). 
 
A pure consciousness cannot exist in the world; it would be “nowhere.” But our 
bodies and perceptions always exist in “situation,” in relation to the world 
around us. To say we “exist” our bodies is a way to say that our bodies are 
largely transparent (Mirvish, 416). Thus, there is a constant relationship between 
the subject— the consciousness-in-body—and the situation surrounding the 
subject. The subject is a particular consciousness and the situation is the 
environment, circumstances, and other objects in the world—real or imagined—
that the subject encounters. But it is important to remember that the subject can 




For the mask theorists discussed in this chapter, the exercises suggest a 
change in “situation.” The exercises suggest a change in the way that the 
subject—a particular consciousness—must deal with the world. But the 
introduction of the mask as analogon invites a change of subject as well. Because 
the subject must understand the world through his body, there is a direct 
relationship between the body and the world. The play of mask work is not only 
about playing with the physical form and imaginary impressions that alight on 
meanings, but playing with the very relationship between subject and situation. 
Our understanding of the world is not merely fixed in our attitudes, but 
understood through our particular physical form. Change the form, and change 
how we understand the world, from very small ways to large ones. 
A good example is seen in one of Libby Appel’s exercises is “Riding a 
Subway Train.” In this exercise, the students, masked and in bodies appropriate 
to the mask, receive a series of instructions which involve waiting for a subway 
train to arrive, boarding it, then riding it through various usual and unusual 
situations (Appel 62-63). Most students have likely had to wait for a subway 
train before, or at least have waited for something in their lives. But the notion of 
“waiting” is tied up in the body. How one experiences waiting is determined 
through the body-subject. If one is late for an important appointment, one may 
pace, look repeatedly down the track, clench one’s fists, tap one’s foot, or sigh in 
frustration. But Sartre would say these movements are not a result of the 
impatience. They are the impatience (Imaginary 134). 
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The “situation” one finds oneself in—in a subway station, late, waiting – is 
experienced through a particular body. Two people tapping their feet would still 
have different experiences—their particular bodies would dictate different 
rhythms, intensities, variations, secondary gestures; even height and weight 
would have an effect. The movements of one particular body, a particular bit of 
knowledge, and a particular intention toward the objects of experience unite as 
one to constitute a particular world. Change one of these dimensions, and the 
world changes. 
In a different body, the masked actor in Appel’s exercise finds herself in a 
familiar situation but with a different body-subject. Her center is different, her 
movements have radically different effort, and she may have a totally opposite 
status than she is used to. The body-subject with which she is experiencing the 
situation is different. The situation cannot be understood in the same way. But if 
she gives herself over to the imaginary process, allows her bodymind to change 
to fit the mask, then she need not “think about” how “her mask” would deal 
with the problem of waiting for a subway train. Because she has altered her 
body, she has already activated the imagination and experiences the situation of 
“waiting” in a totally new way. The new body changes how the situation is 
experienced for her. This is the play of mask acting. The actor changes the body 
and instantly changes the relationship between subject and situation. 
Once again, we see how the physical body is integral to our consciousness. 
The subject—our sense of self, our identity, our consciousness – cannot be 
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separated from the body through which it understands the world. As we move, 
we activate our imagination, and in turn our imaginations create the world for 
us. 
When one speaks of a mask being “animated,” then, one is speaking of 
bringing the mask into motion in order to activate the imaginary state. Ron J. 
Popenhagen states that a mask must be “activated” by a trained actor. This 
activation requires specific movement choices that suit the mask, but the end 
result is “neither a fully human body nor a fully constructed form” (68). He also 
discusses how when one wears a mask, one inhabits a “partial body” atop ones 
own. The mask is animated from within, like a hand puppet, not at a distance, 
like a marionette (68). Thus, even though the aim of much mask work is the 
alteration of the body, the actor must still experience these alterations in his or 
her own body. The play of mask acting is play, but it is fundamental play. By 
altering the body, the actor is altering the very subject by which he or she 
understands the world. 
 
Sartre’s Suppositions on Movement and the Image 
Sartre in The Imaginary has four suppositions about the relationship 
between movement and the image. These suppositions have specific 
ramifications for mask work. They are: 
1. A succession of kinesthetic (or tactile) impressions can function as an 
analogon for a succession of visual impressions. 
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2. A movement (given as a kinesthetic series) can function as an 
analogon for the trajectory that the moving body describes or is 
supposed to describe, which means that a kinesthetic series can 
function as an analogical substitute for a visual form. 
3. A very small phase of the movement (for example, a very slight 
muscular contraction) can suffice to represent the entire movement. 
4. The muscle that contracts is not always the one that would come into 
play if the intended movement as imaged had really occurred (80). 
 
Sartre uses Supposition 1 as an explanation of how a blindfolded person 
can “see” shapes drawn on his palm with a finger. He “sees” the letter Z as it is 
traced on his skin. This is because the consciousness apprehending the image 
through touch has a more imaging quality, and less a perceptual one (Imaginary 
77). But this supposition has ramifications for mask work as well. An actor 
placing the mask on his face is given tactile sensations as well as visual ones. The 
lines of sight change because the eyeholes restrict viewing. Breathing is altered. 
The mask makes contact with the skin at various places. Further, as the actor 
plays with his posture, effort, and center, the body experiences tactile changes 
within itself. The actor “feels” different. The body is weighted differently, 
balance is off, there may be limbs that twist or cling in ways the actor is not used 
to. All of these tactile impressions contribute to the forming of the analogon for 
the actor. The play of the masking actor can create the visual impression of the 
character in the imagination of the actor himself. The use of a mirror will make 
the visual image stronger, but the act of masking and changing the body alone is 
enough to serve. 
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Sartre uses Supposition 2 – that a series of movements and their 
trajectories can substitute for a visual analogon – to explain how one may draw a 
figure 8 in the air with one’s finger and have the movement be understood to be 
representative of “8” when there is no physical analog present. This is possible 
because the consciousness that apprehends movement is an imaging 
consciousness (Imaginary 80). It is a consciousness that processes protentions—
predictions and expectations about where a movement is going— and 
retentions—retained impressions of where the movement has been—in order to 
synthesize them with knowledge and intention to create an image (Imaginary 
75)*. As before, movement becomes the analogon for form. The trajectories 
described by my finger become manifest in my imagination as the figure 8. 
In the case of the masked actor, Supposition 2 demonstrates how the 
movements of the body can create trajectories of form in characterization. Let us 
take as an example a masked performance by Michael Hickey of Atlanta-based 
Gateway Performance Productions known as “The Hawk.” In this performance, 
Hickey portrays two characters: a hunter, and a hawk. Rather than switching 
masks, Hickey has a two-part mask which depicts the hunter’s face on the front, 
over Hickey’s face, and the face of a hawk on top, forming a helmet over the 
hunter’s face. The practical upshot of this design is that when Hickey bends 
forward at the waist, the face of the hunter is minimized and the face of the hawk 
                                                 
*




becomes the focus. In addition to this, while performing Hickey carries a pair of 
wings. Held together, Hickey endows them with the quality of being a bow 
which the hunter uses to shoot at the hawk. Held apart and to the side, they 
become wings again. 
In performance, Hickey bends forward to allow the Hawk’s face to be on 
the visual plane with the audience. He extends his arms, holding the wings, and 
beats them downward as a bird in flight. He then seems to “coast” through the 
air. The tips of the wings seem to ripple in the breeze, though in actuality the 
effect is created by movements of his hands. Hickey’s animation of the wings, his 
body, the mask, all create a sense of trajectory, a movement that stands in for the 
form of a hawk. Hickey selects a particular series of movements, and in 
accurately performing them, the presence of the hawk is brought to the stage. 
Just as an inaccurately sketched figure 8 would not create the presence of the 
figure 8, so precision and accuracy in movement is necessary if the trajectories of 
the movements are to bring forth the presence of the personage. While a mask is 
not required for this supposition to be effective, again, the mask heightens the 
external quality of the image. The mask, the wings, and the movement all 
synthesize to create a stronger presence of the hawk than would the absence of 
the objects with “physical residue.” This supposition shows how movements 
point to something larger, something moving beyond the mundane objects of 
wooden mask and stage. This something larger is the image made manifest 
through the imaginary process and made stronger by the mask. 
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Supposition 3 – how a very small movement can represent a larger one –  
is best illustrated by the following example: Someone asks me where Jean is. In 
response, I make a small, quick, pointing movement with my finger over my 
shoulder in Jean’s general direction. I could have turned fully about and pointed 
exactly to Jean’s location. Instead, I use the “shortcut” gesture with a finger. But 
the finger gesture is understood to be a part of the entire arc of turning and 
pointing. The person observing me will not look exactly at where my finger was 
pointing, but understand that the gesture is representative of a larger arc of 
movement. The small movement is enough to represent the larger one. 
If, instead of pointing with my finger, I tilt my head and give a little nod 
in Jean’s direction, then I have illustrated Supposition 4: that a part of the body 
can be used to express movements normally be expressed by a different part. In 
this case, the head movement stands in for the pointing gesture which would 
normally be accomplished with the arm and fingers.  
For the masked actor, these last two Suppositions allow the actor to find 
characterization in the body through even the smallest of movements. A slight 
turn of a shoulder can suggest an entire arc of movement, which can, in turn, 
suggest a personality in the imaginative consciousness of the actor. The actor 
may see a drooping brow in the mask, which may prompt her to bow her head, 
which may, in turn, drop her movement center from her chest to her waist. The 
play of mask acting need not be writ large in the body. Even small movements 
can serve to create imaginative changes because the small movements suggest 
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larger patterns, even in parts of the body which are not immediately associated 
with the original movement intention. As stated above, such changes need not 
involve masks, but the mask, as analogon, serves to complete the imaginary 
process in a stronger, more externalized, way. 
 
Conclusion 
Movement is essential to mask work. This is because mask work is 
imaginative work. By engaging the body, the actor engages his imagination. The 
mask forms a “sensible residue,” an analogon which heightens the external 
quality of this image. The actor then plays with his body-subject and within the 
exercises as situation in order to find the “harmony” of body and mask-face. It is 
in the play that masked characterization occurs. It is an imaginary process 
requiring movement. But more than merely being a part of the imaginative 
process, we see that movement is an integral part of how we, as human beings, 
understand the world and constitute it to ourselves.  
As Sartre said, perception is necessarily incomplete. Imagination is total. It 
is an imaginative act to animate one’s body in a new way because we cannot 
completely perceive our own bodies. The bodies we inhabit, the “body-subjects,” 
are constituted to consciousness in an imaginary way. The totality of “me” as a 
body is an imaginary object. As stated in Chapter 1, Sartre believed that 
“identity” is indeterminate and ultimately an imaginary act (our “project” of 
ourselves); therefore, changes in physicality can lead to changes in identity—at 
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least “sketches” of new identities. Movement is part of the imaginary process, 
even the imaginary object which is our body-subjects. 
We experience the world as subject, be we are also part of this world. Our 
sense of identity cannot be separated from our physical existence. Physicality, 
then, is part of identity; identity does not exist merely “in our heads.” In the case 
of mask acting, the changes in physicality which are essential to the masking 
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Chapter 3 – Trance and the Imaginary 
 
 Many cultures often claim that masks have a kind of transformational 
power over those who wear them. John Emigh describes how in some Orissan 
performances of Prahlada Nataka he witnessed, actors wearing masks became so 
violently “possessed” by the spirits of the masks they wore that they had to be 
restrained and their masks removed before the performance could continue 
(Emigh, 60). He goes on to describe how in a performance of the Balinese Barong 
Ket, the traditional story of the performance is disrupted when the masks went 
“off script” and spontaneously rewrote the narrative so that Rangda, the evil 
witch, was the victor where she was not before. Those who witnessed the 
performance shrugged it off. “The Barong and Rangda needed to dance,” they 
said, speaking of the entities represented by the masks worn in the performance 
(Emigh, 64-66). 
 Emigh’s observations are not unique. The idea of “possession” by masks 
exists in many cultures. Even in American culture, the film The Mask starring Jim 
Carrey echoes the belief that masks have the “power” to transform. In the film, 
Carrey’s character transforms from a shy nebbish to a wildly flamboyant 
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supernatural entity when he puts on the mask, and even has to struggle at times 
to remove the mask to restore his original sense of self. 
 Not all cultures associate the supernatural with masks, but many do 
believe that the masks are conduits to spiritual beings. The wearer of the mask, 
for the duration of the performance, is no longer himself but becomes the other 
being. As an example, for the Hopi and Zuni nations the Kachina dancers are not 
pretending to be the Kachinas or imitating them; they are the Kachinas. Of 
course, this notion of “being” can be viewed in different ways. But by contrast, 
the commedia dell’arte tradition of masking generally views their masks as 
representing social “types” that are the subject of parody and ridicule. However, 
even an actor playing Pantalone of the commedia may report that when engaged 
with the mask, he finds that the mask informs his choices as much as he chooses 
them. The mask can be a source of imaginative inspiration rather than an object 
that obliterates and replaces identity. A performance can emerge from the actor’s 
engagement with the mask without the actor having active “control” over the 
performance. So, while the understanding of transformation can be different 
from mask culture to mask culture, common to most is a state of some loss of 
control, surrender of identity, or spontaneous, prereflective inspiration which 
comes from the masking process. 
 Called “possession” or “visitation” by some, this state—a “trance” state – 
appears frequently in modern mask acting literature. The authors describe in 
various degrees how a mask may seem to “take over” the body of the actor. 
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Often the actor seems to lose conscious control over the performance. Other 
times, the actor, once unmasked, has hazy or no memories of his or her actions 
while wearing the mask. That is not to say that working in masks always 
produces a trance state; however, it is generally acknowledged that when 
working with masks, trance states may occur. 
 What is it about mask work, then, that seem to have trance states 
associated with them? We have already explored how movement and masks 
work together to activate the imagination of the actor. Trance states, likewise, are 
imaginary states. They are states of consciousness where the actor surrenders 
some of her “being-in-the-world” and instead operates out of the spontaneous 
synthesis of her imagination. Terms such as “trance,” “possession,” and 
“visitation,” are admittedly loaded ones. But in truth, trance is nothing more 
than a basic operation of consciousness. We shall therefore keep the term 
“trance” because of its use in mask literature and to dispel some of the 
associations it carries. 
 In this chapter, we will examine the imaginary nature of trance states as 
they appear in the writings of Sears Eldredge, John Emigh, and Keith Johnstone. 
We will further discuss how trance states can be induced, created and 
maintained, and how these states are tied to masks and performance. What we 
will find is that trance in masked performance is a kind of imaginary state, a self-
sustaining synthesis which uses the mask as a functional analogon to define an 
extended game of make-believe with identity. Such states are possible not only 
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because identity is constructed imaginatively, but also because the idea of “bad 
faith” in identity can be exploited to further these transformations. 
 
Bad Faith 
 The Sartrean concept of “bad faith” was briefly outlined in Chapter 1. Let 
us examine this concept in a little more detail, here, as a preface to the discussion. 
To act in bad faith is to act in deception of oneself, but to do so seemingly 
unaware of the deception. In truth, we may be reflectively unaware that we lie to 
ourselves, but we are very much aware of the lie prereflectively. Bad faith is the 
product of the basic ambiguity of consciousness that both “knows” and “does 
not know.” It “does not know” in that it is prereflectively aware of being satisfied 
with “insufficient evidence” but it “knows” is that despite this, it reflectively 
believes it as sufficient just the same (Santoni). This can apply to many facets of 
human consciousness, but frequently we may believe that we “are” brave or we 
“are not” socially adroit when, in fact, these qualities are not fixed in our natures, 
but are things we tell ourselves about ourselves. In fact, the very notion of an 
identity which is “absolute” is, in itself, an act of bad faith. I tell myself that I am 
who I am and have little choice in the matter; that I am this and I am not that. 
While I certainly do not have the freedom to change certain physiological 
particularities of myself, I do have the freedom to construct an identity in any 
way that I please, though I may not realize that it is so. My history, my choices, 
what I have been taught about the world by others, all of these things may have 
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an effect on me, but ultimately if they do it is because I choose to let them have an 
effect on me—even if I am reflectively unaware of the choice. I construct the 
sense of who I am based on what I believe I should be. This is because identity is 
constructed imaginatively, with my own intentions toward myself guiding the 
construction. 
 But bad faith is a common human condition for good reason. To 
acknowledge that one has complete freedom of identity is to also acknowledge 
complete responsibility for that identity. “And what is the goal of bad faith?” 
writes Sartre, “To cause me to be what I am, in the mode of ‘not being what one 
is,’ or not to be what I am in the mode of ‘being what one is.’ (Being and 
Nothingness, 110). Bad faith is a “game of mirrors” where we constantly, 
unaware, assign or remove qualities to ourselves to match our idea of what our 
“selves” are, and believe these qualities to be true instead of facing the reality 
that we choose these qualities. 
 Ultimately, Sartre wished for human beings to take full responsibility for 
themselves, to move beyond bad faith into a consciousness based on “candor” 
and “authenticity” (Being and Nothingness, 101).  But such a goal is not necessarily 
useful for the performing actor. If the goal of the actor is to make present another 
being in the place where he or she stands, does that not, then, imply an absence 
of candor or authenticity on the part of the actor? One could say that the actor 
attempts to deceive the audience into believing he or she is a different person, but 
most actors would disagree. Acting as a process is not a conscious deception; it is 
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something else. As we will discuss later, despite this, the actor can find a way to 
behave truthfully in the fictional circumstances of the performance, and bad faith, 
then, instead of being a barrier to a candid consciousness, can be exploited as 
part of the acting process. In the case of mask acting, which is especially 
concerned with questions of identity, characterizations through bad faith can be 
remarkably transformative. For now, it is important to remember that bad faith is 
a part of the way that human beings create their sense of self, and, as such, play 
an important role in the actor’s creation of other “selves” in performance. 
 
Trance as Dual Consciousness 
 Let us return to the notion of “trance” and its frequent appearance in 
masked performance. In his work with students and mask acting, Sears Eldredge 
talks about trance in mask work as a kind of dual consciousness; that is, the actor 
surrenders some of his ego to the character of the mask, allowing the spontaneity 
of that surrender to guide the actor’s movements, actions, and speech.  At the 
same time, the actor retains his or her own identity as an actor, although 
somewhat distanced or separated. (35) Eldredge discusses this separation using 
Yuasa Yasuo’s terms of “bright consciousness” and “dark consciousness.” The 
bright consciousness is equivalent to the reflective mind: one is aware that one is 
thinking. The dark consciousness is the prereflective mind. Thus, as Eldredge 
writes, “the spontaneous action of the character (the participant) operates out of 
the actor’s ‘dark consciousness’ … and the dark consciousness has been trained 
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by the ‘bright consciousness’ … through the rehearsal process on what to do and 
say” (36). 
 Eldredge uses the example of driving a car. When one first learns to drive 
a car, that person must concentrate very carefully on everything he does. For the 
novice, driving a car is very much a reflective act: coordinating foot pedals, 
watching the road, the mirrors, signaling, remembering traffic laws, etc., all 
require the new driver’s full attention.  There is little else that the person can do 
but concentrate on driving itself. Eventually, however, with practice, the driver 
begins to learn to do these many tasks automatically without thinking of them. It 
is possible to even drive a long distance and, upon arrival, have little or no 
memory of actually traveling. In this case, the bright, reflective consciousness has 
trained the dark, prereflective consciousness to drive. The prereflective 
consciousness is not unaware. If there is a sudden change to the routine, the dark 
consciousness “will respond to danger before the bright consciousness, the 
reflective mind, can take control again” (Eldredge, 36). Eldredge continues: 
In making an analogy with acting, we can say that the actor’s bodymind 
in performance (memorized dialog, the pattern of the character’s mental, 
motivational, and physical activity, etc.) which has become scored, and 
therefore imprinted, through rehearsals, is like our habitual bodymind 
driving the car. The actor’s spontaneous, in-the-moment awareness of the 
nuances of change—in fellow actors and the audience – is the flow of his 
trained subtextual bodymind response, which conditions how he responds 
at any moment (36). 
  
Thus, if we equate, as Eldredge does, the bright consciousness with the reflective 
mind and the dark consciousness with the prereflective mind, we see that dark 
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consciousness is the source of spontaneity, but that it can be taught to be 
spontaneous within the parameters of the performance. Tapping into the dark 
consciousness is essential for vibrant performances. In fact, for mask work, and 
arguably for the performance process as a whole, an actor that operates 
completely out of his bright consciousness will not be able to respond to the 
spontaneous flow of the performance. For a mask actor, acting purely in the 
reflective mode is acting while constantly thinking about acting. The actor’s 
“critical voice” which comes from self-awareness serves to inhibit the performer 
(36). Such performances are flat: the mask is not animated. The actor is 
attempting to dictate what the mask should do and say in an effort to remain in 
control. In such a case, the actor is failing to engage with the analogon and his 
imagination; rather, he is reflectively demonstrating the personage of the mask. 
Rather than “becoming” the character, the actor demonstrates or, to use the term 
from acting theory, “indicates” the character. Indicating in acting is where an 
actor shows or demonstrates how her character feels or behaves, rather than 
acting on the feelings or behaviors as if they were authentic. Without a 
willingness to surrender to the spontaneous synthesis of the imagination, the 
mask is merely an ornament worn on the actor’s face. On the other hand, if the 
mask is incorporated into the imaginative synthesis, then its features unite with 




 Eldredge also points out that going to the opposite extreme is also 
undesirable in masked performance. Those who reside only in the dark 
consciousness have lost touch with reality. An actor in this state has no 
connection to the audience, to her lines, her blocking. She becomes an actor out 
of control. 
 What is ideal, Eldredge concludes, is a balance between the two states. 
This is similar to the acting theories of Stanislavski, who sought to create in 
actors a “creative state of mind” which was a simultaneous state of discovery 
and control in the moment of the performance, where the actor uses “conscious 
technique to tap the unconscious” (Daw 18). Eldredge further specifies how the 
presence of the mask-as-personage affects the approach of the actor. The actor 
should: 
be able to move freely back and forth between his multiple layers of 
consciousness. In this state he can allow himself to be led by the character 
without being overly aware of his participant-self… Conversely, when the 
actor becomes so aware of the divided consciousness that it begins to 
solidify into a barrier between his Self and the mask’s self, he must use his 
imagination and will to choose to enter the bodymind of the mask. He 
must let go of his Self and commit to the mask by attending to, and living 
in, the present and presences of his physical actions (37). 
  
This state of moving freely back and forth between layers of consciousness is, I 
believe, the essence of the “trance state.” Just as a trance may be when one drives 
a familiar road while caught up in other thoughts so that one has no memory of 
actually driving it, so too is this state of balance between “control” and “out-of-
control” a trance (37). In this state, the actor is letting his imagination synthesize 
65 
 
spontaneously and continuously, yet he is attending to the requirements of 
performance. 
 Of particular interest is what Eldredge says about willing and choosing to 
enter the bodymind of the mask. This is important because it indicates that a 
mask does not have power over the actor that wears it, but that it is a choice to 
transform. Eldredge’s point speaks to another essential element of masking and 
the trance state I wish to raise: belief. In order to bring about the trance state, the 
actor must be willing to engage with the analogon of the mask-character and 
further, must believe. That is, she must, to a greater or lesser degree, accept the 
analogon as a real object. As with all analoga, the actor is not deluded: she knows 
it is still a mask. But her willingness to engage with the mask represents her 
willingness to accept the character it represents in her imagination as a real, 
albeit absent, object.  
 Turning again to Jean-Paul Sartre’s ideas of the imaginary, we find that 
the trance state as outlined by Eldredge is related to the imaging consciousness. 
Eldredge’s characters come from  a spontaneous synthesis of knowledge (created 
by the “compelling image” of the mask), movement (finding a body to suit the 
mask), and a commitment to the imaginative consciousness. Remember that 
Sartre said that while real and irreal* objects have differences, they are both 
objects in every sense important to consciousness. The illusion of immanence tells 
us that we tend to treat imaginary objects as if they were real even when we 
                                                 
*
 Sartre’s term for the realm of the imaginary. 
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know they are irreal: we ascribe the qualities of the real, but absent, object to the 
analogon which represents it. But in order for those qualities to appear, we must 
first believe that the analogon represents something authentic, though absent. 
Thus, an actor can transform into the character in the mask if she believes in it.  
 
Making Belief 
 What is meant by belief in this context is a kind of “make-believe” that 
Kendall Walton wrote about. Walton distinguishes make-believe from pretense: 
the latter is deliberate and intentionally deceptive. Make-believe behavior is true 
inasmuch as it intersects and plays within the fictional world that is being 
pretended. It is not the behavior that is fictional, it is the irreal world. In fact, 
certain kinds of behaviors—Walton calls them games— are “authorized” for a 
particular work (Fictional Entities, 404). That is, given a particular context of a 
fictional world, certain elements such as props and mental images are allowed 
and thus can be used to produce truthful behavior in this fictional world. For 
instance, a child playing with a doll may play with the doll in the context of 
“caring for baby.” As such, the child holding the fake plastic bottle to the inert 
lips of the doll is, on the surface, engaging in a fictional act; however, for the 
child, the action is true because the act of feeding the baby is authorized for the 
context of the game. To use Sartrean terms, the prop of the doll and bottle are 
analoga for a real baby and real bottle, and the game of feeding the baby is an 
analogon for the real act. The child may have no practical experience feeding a 
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child, but has an imaginary understanding of the act. As such, within the context 
of the child’s imagination, the behavior is authentic. Again, it must be pointed 
out that the child knows that the game is a game and not reality. But because the 
child plays within authorized bounds of the game, the child’s behaviors are 
truthful. The child believes—or makes belief. 
 Within the game of “caring for baby,” the plastic baby bottle can be 
fictionally used in certain ways: it can be filled with (fictional) milk, cleaned, held 
to the baby’s lips, etc. It would not be authentic for the bottle to suddenly launch 
itself into the air and zoom around the room. This is because the former behavior 
examples are authorized for the game, where the latter example is not. But if the 
child is, instead, playing a game of “flying to the moon” then the child may 
choose the vaguely rocket ship-shaped bottle as the analogon for a real rocket 
ship. In this case, the behavior of flying around the room becomes authorized, 
and it would not be authorized for the bottle to be filled with milk until the game 
was changed again. If many children participate in the game, each is expected to 
play within authorized ways. As Walton wrote, “Appreciators are expected to 
play games of kinds authorized for the works they appreciate and, when they 
participate verbally, to make it fictional of themselves in such games that they 
speak the truth” (Fictional Entities, 407). If one group of children believes the 
bottle is a bottle, and a second group believes the bottle is a rocket ship, then 
conflict may ensue. Thus, belief in a fictional situation is about behaving 
truthfully in imaginary circumstances: the imaginary circumstances dictate the 
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context in which the behavior is authorized. It should be little surprise that a 
common definition of dramatic acting is “living truthfully in imaginary 
circumstances” (Daw, 12). But where mask acting and traditional acting differ is 
that the presence of the mask has a specific function to make fictional the 
personage within the mask. Writes Walton: 
A Japanese brush painting of a flower may be interesting not (or not 
merely) because of what makes it fictional, but because of how it makes it 
fictional, because of the manner in which the brush strokes work to 
generate fictional truths. To see how they do is to regard them in a special 
way, and regarding them in this special way is an important part of one’s 
aesthetic experience of the painting. It is the function of pictures such as 
the Japanese painting to serve as props in games of make-believe 
(Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe, 84).  
 
Like the painting, the mask has a specific function in generating the fictional 
world of the play and personage. How the mask is constructed and animated 
adds meaning and context to the game of play-acting, authorizing certain kinds 
of behaviors and disallowing others. We will discuss the aesthetics of masks in 
more detail in a later chapter; however, it is important to understand that a 
particular mask authorizes certain sorts of character games. As such, if an actor 
plays within the games authorized by the mask, then she makes-believe the 
personage of the mask. Playing outside of the authority of the game, and the 
mask does not behave as it “should”, much like the baby bottle full of milk 




 Thus, belief, here, does not necessarily mean religious faith, nor does it 
mean that the object must exist in the real world. Even though the satyr of Greek 
myth does not exist, the idea of a satyr exists. If the actor can believe in the idea of 
the saytr through, as Eldredge wrote, the “present and presences” of the analogon 
of the mask, then a satyr mask can stand in for the fictional being. Whatever 
knowledge the actor has about the idea of a satyr synthesizes with the mask and 
the actors movements to make present the character of the satyr, provided the 
actor believes. This ability of transformation through belief applies to all fictional 
characters, human or otherwise. Trance is an act of belief and imagination: a 
sustained game of a particular sort of make-believe.  
 
The Play of Trance 
 However,  some forms of make-believe are very reflective, where one is 
quite conscious of the play and intellectually chooses behaviors that fit the 
situation of the game. Most accounts of “trance” behavior describe an 
prereflective state. What, then is the difference between trance and make-
believe? Let us examine how the imagination and the prereflective consciousness 
are related. 
 We know the image is born on the prereflective plane, out of the dark  
consciousness. But the attitude of consciousness between perception and 
imagination is not a one-or-the-other proposition. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
there is a continuum between the two.  Even though Eldredge’s language tends 
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to suggest two “types” of consciousness, he states above that actors have 
“multiple layers of consciousness.” Sartre would say that there is only one 
consciousness, but there are differences in the attitude that consciousness takes. 
These attitudes are not layers, but rather, a continuum, a consciousness that takes 
different vantages to the object it apprehends with more or less perceptual or 
imaginary qualities. As the attitude of consciousness changes—moving along the 
continuum between perception and imagination—the subject surrenders some of 
his being-in-the-world.  The dual-consciousness of trance, as Eldredge sees it, is 
less a “dual” consciousness, but a change in attitude from the real world of 
perception and an acceptance of the irreal world of the imaginary. Trance comes 
from the actor moving along the continuum away from perception and towards 
imagination. When Eldredge speaks of an actor being “between” the bright and 
dark consciousness, he speaks of an actor existing between reflective and 
prereflective states, between perception and imagination, to various degrees. 
This is significant because it is not many consciousnesses that we as humans 
possess (as implied by the “layers” terminology) but a single consciousness with 
different attitudes toward the world. We are capable of apprehending an object 
in many different ways. In fact, in order to constitute the object to us, we may 
play with it in various degrees of perception and imagination. The piano in my 
home is sometimes a piece of furniture on which I collect my mail; other times, it 
becomes a reminder of music lessons I took as a boy; another time I may evaluate 
it as a part of the color scheme of the room it is in; yet again, I may see it and 
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think of a song that used to move me and in turn ascribe the emotional feelings I 
have to that piano. Through all of these ways and many more, at different 
degrees of perception and imagination, do I make real the object that is “my 
piano.” 
 The trance state, then, is a kind of prereflective, spontaneous play: the 
actor plays with the analogon of the mask to create images with which he or she 
then engages. In Chapter 2, we discussed the playfulness of physicality in this 
process. But as discussed, relying on physicality alone merely creates “surface 
presences” in the imagination. These presences are only sketches of imaginary 
objects. In order to bring depth to these characterizations, the actor must believe. 
In this case, the play is the play of the willingness to accept the irreal as real, at 
least, on some level, which is further reinforced by the truthfulness of the 
behavior within the fictional situation. 
 John Emigh is a mask theorist who studied traditional Eastern mask 
cultures (unlike Eldredge who wrote primarily about modern Western mask 
improvisation). Emigh would say that the play of a masked actor is a two way 
process: the actor plays with the mask, but the mask also plays with the actor. 
This playfulness is a willingness to engage in illusion, to accept the image as 
perception (or, as Sartre would suggest, a willingness to accept the “pseudo-
observation” of the imagination as true perception). For Emigh, trance occurs 
when illusion and perception invert—when a person plays with belief in the 
irreal to the point where it becomes real for a short time (29).  
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 Emigh acknowledges that this sort of play happens in various degrees all 
the time. Sometimes a person plays a role in her job, so she may take on a 
different set of personality modes, posture, and methods of dealing with the 
world at work than she may at home by herself. Other times, she may actively 
choose to pretend to have a different personality than she usually does without 
fully relinquishing her sense of self. An actor playing a role is even further 
removed than this, and a masked dancer “visited” by the spirit of the mask may 
seem to have his personality completely obliterated during the experience. What 
Emigh proposes is a scale of “me” to “not me”—a “continuum of experiential 
states” (22). He diagrams it thus: 
 
 performance in pretending acting in visitation 
 everyday life  character 
 “me”--------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------“not me” 
 
Emigh, like Eldredge, sees human consciousness as capable of maintaining 
“multiple selves”. For Emigh, who was attempting to describe the radical 
transformations he observed in certain Eastern masked performances, trance is a 
kind of “visitation” by an “Other” which pushes the identity of the performer 
more towards “not me” (22). The other could be a character or divine entity, but 
ultimately the performer gives up his sense of self—or in Sartrean terms, his 
“being-in-the-world”—in the process of the performance. In this way, points on 
the continuum of experiential states are roughly akin to points on the perception-
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imagination continuum. Emigh does not specifically call trance states imaginary 
states, but he writes: 
Possession or, as I have preferred to call it, “visitation”… takes the 
ambiguities inherent in the play frame and completes the inversion: … for 
the kavat or tubuan dancer and for those believers in the audience, the 
“illusion” experientially becomes “the reality.” Indeed, from the point of 
view of the entranced performer or convinced audience member, “illusion” 
is no longer an appropriate word. If character acting is ideally marked by 
“an awareness of one’s actions, but not the awareness itself,” then 
visitation involves a loss of “the awareness itself,” too (29). 
 
Emigh hints, here, at the difference between the reflective and prereflective 
consciousness. As one becomes less and less aware of one’s own actions, the 
more one moves into the prereflective plane. Note, too, that Emigh points out the 
function of belief in the trance process. Once again, the key to trance is belief, 
whether it is in the consciousness of the performer or the audience.  
 So, both Eldredge and Emigh state that humans are capable of multiple 
forms of consciousness, whether they are the “layers” between the bright and 
dark consciousness, or a continuum of “experiential states.” But implicit in their 
arguments is the notion of a “me”. Especially so in Emigh’s case, there seems to 
be an assumption of a core identity which the masks alter, affect, or transform. 
 On the surface, this seems like a reasonable assumption. After all, we all 
believe we know who we are, what we are like, and certain personality traits that 
we believe constitutes “us.” But this assumption tends to lead us into the realm 
of psychological determinism: that who we are is a sum of our past experiences 
and inner traits that influence us and over which we have only so much control. 
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If, as Husserl and Sartre assert, any consciousness is a consciousness of 
something, then personal identity does not exist in our heads, but in the world. 
Our sense of self is not created from within, but without, in our relationships 
with objects both real and irreal. In fact, our “self” is a consciousness of our 
“self.” Even that is not within, but without. Who we are is not a product of 
internal traits and tendencies but is the result of our knowledge and intention 
towards the idea of “self”. Our history, our choices and their consequences, the 
effects of others in the world on us over time, all of these shape our sense of self. 
But despite this, we still choose the degree to which these forces affect us. They 
are neither inescapable nor ordained. My concept of myself comes from what I 
imagine myself to be based on my choices, whether or not I acknowledge, 
consciously or unconsciously, my role in making those choices.  In short, the 
concept of “me” is imaginary to begin with. We construct our own sense of 
identity based upon our knowledge of ourselves and intention towards 
ourselves. 
 Thus it should not be so surprising that the kinds of transformations of 
identity that occur with masks are possible. If the very notion of identity is 
constituted imaginatively, then it is quite possible for entire new identities to 
“inhabit” the body of the actor through the imaginary process of masking. The 
transformations often associated with mask work are not rooted in mysticism, 
but rather, are part of the basic operation of consciousness. The mask-wearer’s 
identity alters to the extent that he accepts the irreal character represented in the 
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analogon of the mask. This acceptance is dependent on knowledge, intention, 
belief, and the analogon itself. While traditional non-masked acting works 
similarly, masks have the function of defining the “game” of acting in a specific 
visual way, which allows for clearer definitions of what personages are 
authorized and which are not. By removing the face of the wearer and replacing 
it with a functional analogon—the mask – the actor is encouraged to stop playing 
the game of “being me” and begin playing the game of “being someone else.” 
The mask provides the actor a greater chance of believing: of behaving truthfully 
in a fictional game. Peruvian mask performer Gustavo Boada said in an 
interview that the image the masked actor has of the mask is more important 
than the mask itself (168). Boada’s point is that it is the image which has power, 
not the mask. The transformational power of a mask is a function of the 
imagination, not the mask itself. 
 It should not be inferred, however, that just because one’s sense of self is 
constituted imaginatively that there is no self to transform. Remember, an 
imaginary object, even one’s sense of self, is still an object in every sense 
important to consciousness. The “me” that I imagine myself to be is akin other 
people that I imagine, albeit the “me” personage has a greater amount of sensory 
data and history to draw on in its creation. I imagine my father and all the traits, 
feelings, memories, and associations I have about him appear to me all at once. In 
the same way, when I imagine myself, all the traits, feelings, memories, and 
associations I have about myself constitute the image of myself to myself. 
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Because of the illusion of immanence I have the tendency to declare that the 
imagined me is the “real” me. But this so-called “real me” is not real at all. It is a 
synthesis of memories, recent impressions and, most significantly, my intentions 
toward how I view myself. But even though it is not real, I tend to believe that it is 
real. 
 Thus, it is not entirely accurate to say, as in Emigh’s scale, that there is a 
fixed “me” which forms the base from which I can measure greater degrees of 
“not me.” On the other hand, it is not entirely inaccurate, either, as we all tend to 
consider the imaginary sense of self as a real “me.” Emigh’s scale is an effective 
means of categorizing various performative situations, but it fails to explain how 
these various degrees of experience come about. So, let us return to the more 
accurate idea of a single consciousness with various attitudes of perception and 
imagination. 
 
A Heightened Imaginary State 
 The world of perception is the world of the real. It is also the realm of the 
reflective consciousness. It is the world of present objects in concrete and limited 
forms: this table, this chair, this piano of which I can only see the outside. When 
we think about ourselves reflectively, we also assign ourselves to this realm of 
the real. I may think of myself that “I am a decent pianist.” However, asked to 
play some music and I may begin to move out of the reflective mode and into the 
imaginative mode. If the piece is new to me or I am a novice piano player, I may 
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be forced to remain in the reflective mode—in the bright consciousness— as I 
concentrate on the music and the keys. On the other hand, if the piece is familiar 
to me, I may be able to become “transported” by the music, and express the 
moods and aural images of the piece through my performance; however it is not 
likely that in such a state I am reflectively thinking about the nuances and artistic 
choices. It is more likely that such nuances come to me more prereflectively, born 
out of the imagination: out of the spontaneous synthesis of my knowledge of the 
music, my intention towards it, the movements of my body and fingers, and the 
analogon of the music which is created first by the composer and more 
immediately by my very performance. That is, I will integrate the subtleties and 
variations of a given performance as they arise, provided I am not distracted or 
too busy focusing on the mechanics of playing to notice the nuances. The 
performance itself becomes another analogon for the imaginary object it stands in 
for, in this case the emotions and moods pointed to by the music. As I leave the 
reflective plane—as I cede my self-awareness – I begin to perform, interpret, and 
create imaginatively. There is a spontaneous synthesis of creation that emerges 
from my willingness to engage with the imaginary and leave the “real” behind. 
 This creative synthesis applies to acting as well. There is an apocryphal 
story* about Lawrence Olivier who, upon concluding a fantastic performance of 
Hamlet, is discovered by his co-star in his dressing room, despondent. She 
                                                 
*
 I originally heard this story, attributed to William Goldman, told among theatre practitioners; however, a 
version of it can be found at http://www.thestorynet.com/archive/Olivier.htm . 
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wonders why he is sad for his performance that night had been amazing. His 
answer: “Because I don’t know how I did it.” Olivier’s supposed dilemma here is 
remarkably similar to descriptions of trance and of the dark consciousness. The 
actor (in our story, Olivier) surrenders himself to the imaginary synthesis 
through the analogon of Hamlet (presented in the script) and in moments of 
prereflective creativity he creates the presence of Hamlet in a remarkably real 
way: he is transformed. And yet, afterwards, the actor cannot clearly articulate 
what he did or how he did it. He may have hazy memories of the performance or 
his actions; or, he may only recall that he was aware of the performance but not 
any conscious thought that he had about executing it. 
 For instance, Eldredge describes a student in a mask workshop who 
became dramatically transformed by his mask. Interviewed by Eldredge, the 
character created through the mask, “Jake,” related a story from “his” past where 
Jake accidentally killed a playmate as a child, the memory of which dramatically 
affected him. The actor playing Jake, whose name was Greg, found his body, 
mannerisms, and even personality changed. The story of the death of the 
playmate was not something Greg had thought up before; it came spontaneously 
with the characterization. Writes Eldredge: 
Greg, the actor in whom Jake became embodied, when quizzed afterward, 
had no idea where this personage came from. During the exercise Jake 
appeared to be in charge. No one was aware of Greg’s secret presence 
behind the mask making the situation happen. My interview with Greg 




This begs the question of who is “Jake” that he should be in charge. The answer 
is that Jake is an imaginary object synthesized by Greg spontaneously. Of course, 
Greg entered this exercise with no previous knowledge of who “Jake” was—the 
character was brand new to him, and emerged from Greg’s engagement with the 
mask he had been given. If the imaginary process relies on knowledge, 
movement, and intention to synthesize the imaginary object, then Greg’s 
knowledge comes first from the analogon of the mask: his immediate impression 
of the expression and expressivity of the mask itself and his own personal 
assumptions about what those expressions mean. Subsequently as Greg plays 
with the mask he accepts the fruits of that play as “facts” about Jake: his name, 
his habit of tugging at his collar button, his vocal patterns—all become added to 
the knowledge of “Jake”. Further, the movement choices he makes in seeking to 
bring the mask into harmony with his body create other images that Greg 
integrates into the “reality” of Jake. So long as Greg is willing to play the game 
authorized by the mask, and so long as he believes in the images given to him, the 
creative synthesis—the trance – is self-sustaining. Each choice supports and adds 
to that which has gone before, giving more and more depth to the 
characterization as more and more knowledge accrues. 
 Eventually, Greg is fully committed to the imaginary process at work and 
gives up much of his “being-in-the-world,” and instead lets Jake “be in charge.” 
But Greg is Jake; or rather, Jake is an imaginary object constructed spontaneously 
by Greg and made present through the performance. Greg has not completely 
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given up his original identity. He still perceives the stage, the instructor, the 
audience, even his own actions. But his commitment to the imaginary is stronger. 
So long as he believes, and so long as he can remain in a more imaginary mode of 
consciousness, Jake’s presence will endure. When Greg returns to a more 
perceptual mode, when he reclaims his being-in-the-world, when he finds 
himself once again in “his” body, then Jake will vanish. 
 Thus, trance is not something abstract and mystical. It is a heightened 
imaginary state, where the entranced willingly surrenders a degree of her being-
in-the-world— her perceptive, reflective consciousness—and instead plays with 
and believes in a more imaginative attitude of consciousness.  Emigh, in 
comparing topeng masked performance with others, states that in topeng trance is 
not a source of “possession” but a source of “inspiration” (116). This 
“inspiration” is really the flow of spontaneous, creative, prereflective thought 
which helps sustain the imaginative consciousness. The less the entranced thinks 
about her actions, the more likely it is that the trance will be sustained and the 
synthesis will continue. 
 
Permission 
 In fact, it is the self-aware, reflective, and perceptive consciousness which 
can be an outright barrier to the imagination. Improviser and mask teacher Keith 
Johnstone agrees with Emigh that working with a mask is a two-way process and 
asserts that a mask “dies” when it is completely subjected to the will of the 
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performer (Johnstone 172). Johnstone speaks metaphorically, here, but he means 
that as an actor exerts control over his performance and refuses to play 
imaginatively with the mask, much of the character presence that might be 
generated otherwise will fail. Johnstone’s book Impro deals in many ways with 
his attempts to tear down imaginative blocks in his students. In particular, 
Johnstone sees the “critical voice” as a major block that actors encounter. 
Johnstone uses masks as another way to circumvent these blocks. 
 When Johnstone writes about trance states, he uses the term “possession.”  
He does not offer an opinion about the nature of possession, but his techniques 
call for his actors to use a mirror and attempt a spontaneous engagement with 
the mask as it is worn. This does suggest a connection to the imagination, as the 
actor relies on the image of mask to serve as an analogon for the character it 
represents. It should be pointed out that Johnstone freely interchanges trance 
states with states of hypnosis and other “disassociated” states (155). Trances, for 
Johnstone, are moments when a person relinquishes his or her identity. 
Johnstone suggests that there is a “need” that we all have to maintain a sense of 
self. He also implies through his writing that included in this need for a sense of 
self is a need for a sense of decorum. Consequently, Johnstone spends much of 
his book and exercises discussing ways of circumventing this need for decorum.  
 One of the ways Johnstone gets around his students’ resistant sense of self 
is by playing with trance. Here, Johnstone diverges from Emigh and Eldredge, 
who place emphasis on belief. Rather than viewing trance as a state that the actor 
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enters into somewhat voluntarily, Johnstone asserts that trances can be induced 
from outside forces, namely, through movement, rhythm, and social pressure 
(154). Johnstone acknowledges that to a certain degree a person must be willing 
to be entranced; however, a person with sufficient authority—a hypnotist, a 
teacher, a priest—can be the cause of trance states in others. In short, Johnstone 
believes a person can be placed in a heightened imaginary state by being given 
permission to do so. He writes: 
The type of trance I am concerned with … is the ‘controlled trance’, in 
which permission to remain entranced is given by other people, either by 
an individual or a group. Such trances may be rare, or may pass 
unrecognised in [Western] culture, but we should consider them as a 
normal part of human behaviour. Researchers who have studied possession 
cults report that it is the better adjusted citizens who are more likely to 
become possessed. Many people regard ‘trance’ as a sign of madness, just 
as they assume madmen must be easy to hypnotise. The truth is that if 
madmen were capable of being under ‘social control’ they would never 
have revealed the behavior that categorised them as insane (156-157). 
  
So for Johnstone, those that are most susceptible to authority, to “social control,” 
are the most likely to enter trance states. If an authority figure grants permission 
for the trance, the trance is more likely to happen because the subject is used to 
submitting to outside control. A hypnotist uses high-status body language and 
an authoritative voice, for example, when hypnotizing her subject. Johnstone 
says that mask teachers and high priests in possession cults are similar in that 
they take a “high-status but indulgent” attitude toward those entranced by 
masks (157). That is, they remain in control but permit the entranced person a 
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degree of free rein. They do not contradict the entranced person or deny the 
trance, for that would end the trance by making the performer self-aware again. 
 Not only do singular authority figures have the ability to induce trance, 
but groups do as well. Johnstone, somewhat apocryphally, cites Voodoo cults 
who use drums and dancing, sometimes for hours before the ceremony, to help 
induce trances in the dancers. He theorizes that the repeated movements, the use 
of rhythm and music, the physical exhaustion of the event all play a part in 
altering the physicality of the dancer, which in turn invites a more imaginative 
state. Because the dancer is amid a crowd of like-minded people, it is easier to 
surrender his own identity. As Johnstone says, “Crowds are trance-inducing 
because the anonymity imposed by the crowd absolves you of the need to 
maintain your own identity” (156). Again, Johnstone asserts that we have a need 
to maintain a sense of identity, and that trance states are more likely to occur 
when a person is able to give up this need. Social pressure and authority figures 
can give the permission needed to surrender self-identity. 
 Where does this need come from? Sartre would say it comes from man’s 
existential condition. Our existence precedes our essence; therefore, any question 
of who we are cannot be identified with any certainty. Our essence, our nature, 
our purpose, our very selves: these things come after we exist in the world. They 
are assembled piecemeal by our actions, as well as from what others teach us, 
what we learn ourselves, and what of the two we choose to believe and reject. 
The sense of self is further defined as a way to separate ourselves from the 
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Others in the world who are the only true limitations to our freedom. This is 
because an Other has his own projects for his own sense of self, his own point of 
view on the nature of the world, and his actions will eventually come into 
conflict with my own. Sartre tells us that our sense of Self is “alienated and 
refused” by the Others who refuse to “play along” with our own ideas of the 
world (Being and Nothingness, 380).  So we construct our sense of Self as a 
separate object to differentiate from the Others. We are responsible for its 
creation. Although we create it from our own imaginations and intentions, it is 
nevertheless real. Sartre writes: 
Thus, my being-for-others—i.e. my Me-as-object – is not an image cut off 
from me and growing in a strange consciousness. It is a perfectly real 
being, my being as the condition of my selfness confronting the Other and 
of the Other’s selfness confronting me (Being and Nothingness, 380). 
 
So, even though our sense of self is constituted imaginatively we cling to it as if it 
were real. 
 In fact, it is this tenacity to which we cling to a sense of self that Johnstone 
believes is a primary obstacle to spontaneity and trance. For Johnstone, mask 
work is training the actor to move beyond his or her inhibitions and to allow 
creative thought and spontaneity to emerge freely and without censorship.  “I 
can’t act silly,” might think a student, “because everyone will think I’m weird.” 
“That’s not a proper way to behave,” might think another. A third might believe, 
“I’m not creative. I can’t do this.” All of these statements reflect the kinds of fears 
that students faced with masked activity might think. As a result, they may let 
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these fears and thoughts control their actions. They may censor what they say, or 
refuse to follow an imaginary impulse, or “act” in a way which is comfortable to 
them but which is not grounded in an imaginary engagement with the mask. 
 
Exploiting Bad Faith 
 But these fears are another example of Sartrean “bad faith.” Johnstone’s 
approach to masks is to attempt to work around the bad faith which puts up 
resistances to the imaginative state. He sees authority figures as a way of 
“tricking” people into trances. It is still the subject who must be willing to be 
entranced, but an authority figure can give permission for the subject to make the 
change. It is another kind of bad faith: the subject still does not feel responsible 
for his identity because it “no longer matters” that he maintain it. Someone “in 
charge” has told him that it’s permissible for him to act silly, or behave 
differently, or do things he would not ordinarily do. Therefore, the resistance to 
these acts is circumvented. 
 Johnstone’s thoughts on trance paint a picture of consciousness as 
struggling to maintain a sense of decorum and control much of the time and only 
by the substitution of one kind of authority (social pressure) for another (an 
authority figure) can imaginative states be created. But despite Johnstone’s 
somewhat pessimistic views on authority figures, his ideas point to a root issue 
in the nature of human consciousness related to trance and masks. The sense of 
identity is not only constructed imaginatively, but it also represents a sense of 
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security in an ambiguous world. To surrender this security is to risk the angst of 
responsibility in the face of the uncertain. Before an actor can enter trance—
before the actor can relinquish this sense of self – she must be willing to risk this 
sense of security. Johnstone tells us that this risk can be encouraged by 
permission from an authority. What we can take from this, though, is that the 
trance states which masks bring may seem to be strange, mystical, or even insane, 
but this is because we cling so tightly to the idea that the self is much more fixed 
and “out of our hands” than it really is. According to Sartre, the idea of self is 
quite mutable. Johnstone asks, “How do we stay in trance states? I would prefer 
to ask, ‘How do we stay out of them?’” (154). We stay out of them because we 
prefer the “bad faith” truth of our identity to the uncertainty and responsibility 
of our existence. We return to the world of perception, the world where we 
“exist,” but cannot “be.” 
 But if we look at the terminology expressed by Eldredge and Emigh, we 
also see how bad faith can be exploited to encourage or explain the functions of 
masked trance. Elredge’s “dual consciousness” or “layers of consciousness” 
implies that at the core of human consciousness there is a “self” which can 
distance itself from the new “selves” being brought forth in performance.  The 
account of “Jake” describes how the actor, Greg, claimed that the mask 
personage, Jake, was “in charge,” while Greg’s self was distanced from the 
events, watching and occasionally guiding, but otherwise staying out of Jake’s 
way. In this account, we see how Greg was ceding much control of the 
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performance to Jake, an “external” force; that is, because Jake is not Greg, it must 
be external to Greg. But this is fundamentally an act of bad faith. Jake is very 
much a creation of Greg’s, but because Jake emerges prereflectively and 
spontaneously, it seems as if it must come into being “on its own.” Just because 
Greg does not reflectively choose Jake’s behavior does not mean that Greg did not 
choose the behavior at all. 
 Similarly with Emigh, he describes a “me” from which various degrees of 
“not me” may emerge. For Emigh, trance states are highly “not me,” where 
another personage “visits” the body of the performer and obliterates his identity 
for the duration of the performance. But this terminology also cedes an external 
control of the situation—to the “being” which is doing the “visitation.” While it 
is true that those of that particular culture have a religious belief in the beings 
that performed the “visit,” if we look at trance phenomenon as a basic operation 
of consciousness we again see that the “visitor” is a product of the performer’s 
imagination. Nevertheless, Emigh is quick to point out that belief is essential to 
the trance state. Without belief, then the actor dancing in the masks is not 
behaving in an authentic or authorized manner. If Rangda appears to the crowd, 
it is only because the dancer and audience, on some level, believe that she has. 
 But while the ceding of control over the appearance of the mask’s 
personage to an external source is fundamentally an act of bad faith, it is an act 
which is often necessary to the trance state. Eldredge, Emigh, and Johnstone all 
agree that a reflective consciousness inhibits mask animation. But a reflective and 
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self-aware state is necessary for a person to acknowledge their own roles in 
identity creation. If one is aware that the responsibility for the creation of the 
masked personage is solely one’s own, one is more likely to approach the 
creation of that personage reflectively, acting out of that awareness and choosing 
consciously the kinds of behaviors one believes the personage should manifest. 
As a result, the mask may fail to be animated in the spontaneous and imaginary 
way that is desired. 
 Thus, many mask practitioners and theorists are finding ways to exploit 
bad faith for character creation. Johnstone offers permission from an authority 
figure. Emigh and Eldredge offer the reassurance that there is a “me” and a “not 
me” and that it is possible for the “not me” to dictate or control its own actions 
while the “me” stays back and observes. Ceding control to a seemingly external 
source is an act of bad faith; however, it is a way to encourage performers to 
move away from a reflective consciousness and into a more imaginary state—the 




 Sartre said that every encounter with the real world has the potential to 
activate the imaging consciousness. Trance states represent a very strong 
activation of the imaging consciousness. A mask is often used to effect these 
activations because it is a functional analogon for another identity. In a situation 
89 
 
where an actor believes in the identity pointed to by the mask and feels permitted 
to play with the mask, the actor may surrender his being-in-the-world and 
engage spontaneously with the mask to make present in his performance the 
personage of the mask. Belief, here, is a function of whether or not the mask and 
actor together can synthesize a strong image to which the actor can commit and 
play—an authorized game of make-believe. Permission is a measure of how 
willing the actor is to engage in this play at all. With strong enough belief and 
permission, the actor may enter an imaginary, self-sustaining, creative synthesis: 
a trance. Trance is neither something mystical nor aberrant in human behavior; 
rather, it is a basic function of consciousness. The idea of self is constituted 
imaginatively over time, even though we tend to assign it to the realm of 
perception. Therefore, changing identities is part of the human condition. 
 Masks have associations of “power” in them because of their associations 
with transformation. In truth, an analogon, such as a mask, has no “power” in and 
of itself. A mask’s ability to transform identity in the mind of a performer comes 
only from the imagination of the performer who wears it. It may be said that the 
“play” of masking is a two-way process; however, Sartre would say – in terms of 
character development and transformation of identity in the consciousness of the 
actor – the play is solely the responsibility of the performer. The character 
imagined is given to us as any other imagined object: in its totality, showing us 
everything that we expect it to be. If the actor believes in the image of the mask – 
that is, accepts the image as “real” -- then he or she is given a character 
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completely. But to “think about” a character is to fall into the psychological 
character analysis typical of modern realism with which Sartre disagreed.  
 Fundamentally, transforming identity as described in this dissertation is 
really substituting one sort of bad faith for another. Just as it is bad faith to 
assume that one’s identity is fixed, it is likewise another kind of bad faith to 
accept the game of masking and ascribe power to the masking process. While the 
transformations which occur can be remarkable and complete, ultimately it is 
still the actor’s responsibility. The actor engages with the mask and the same 
sorts of identity transactions that formed her identity occur to create the 
personage of the mask. Sartre would likely disapprove of a trade of one kind of 
bad faith for another, and the limitations of his ideas applied to performance will 
be discussed in greater detail at the end of this dissertation. But what we see is 
the masking process can exploit bad faith to performative ends. Masking takes a 
fundamental quality of consciousness and utilizes it to make transformations of 
identity in performance. In a sense, trance is a kind of surrender; a willingness to 
let go of the bad faith of “my” identity in order to allow another identity to 
emerge through the spontaneous imaginary process, albeit often through another 
kind of bad faith. Sometimes this surrender is very general, sometimes it is very 
deep. But the end result is a characterization that emerges from the imagination. 
Such a characterization would not, strictly speaking, be approved by Sartre, who 
wanted individuals to be reflectively aware of their responsibility for creating 
their identity. Nevertheless, the trance process in masking illustrates the kind of 
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Chapter 4 – Character Development through Masks and the Imaginary 
 
 Since the writings of Konstantin Stanislavski and Sigmund Freud in the 
early part of the 20th century, the predominant approach to character 
development in Western drama has been psychologically based. The basic 
assumptions of how a character is created by an actor begin with identifying who 
this character is, what forces are at play in that character’s life, and why the 
character behaves as he or she does. For example, one the most basic exercises 
described by Stanislavski is identifying the “given circumstances” of the 
character; that is, the various forces which affect the character’s life. Of Hamlet, 
we might say that his given circumstances at the start of the play include: he is a 
man in his early 20s, he is a prince of Denmark and used to a life of privilege and 
wealth, he is educated, his father has recently died under mysterious 
circumstances, his mother has married his uncle merely 6 months after his 
father’s death, and so on. 
 This psychological approach positions the actor in a particular 
relationship to the character. Nancy Kindelan writes: 
When Stanislavsky developed a process that aided the actor in 
systematically and logically developing characterizations, he positions the 
actor and director as interpretive artists capable of perceiving, organizing, 
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and physically projecting the complex psychological nature of the human 
condition (19). 
 
The actor and director, then, see character creation as a contemplative act. 
Characterization is a process that is based in perception and the organization and 
projection of those perceptions. Stanislavski’s ideas about the role of logic in 
character creation would change later in his life to encompass a more balanced 
and imaginative approach. However, such was Stanislavski’s influence (and 
perhaps more so those that followed him, basing their work on his early 
thoughts) that the assumptions of the acting process as reflective and logical 
became dominant. 
 The theory behind this process asserts that if the actor can properly 
analyze the clues left by the author in the text of the play, that the very nature of 
the character can be discovered. The role of the actor under this methodology is 
to embody this character by finding the various facts of the character’s life that  
make her who she is. “Who,” in this case, is a product of the character’s history, 
birth, life experiences, and recent events. All of these things add up to determine 
who the character is. The actor is encouraged to find the psychology of the 
character in order to embody her. All of the forces that have shaped a person’s 
life—biological, geographical, social—are believed to be who she is and a reliable 
compass by which to predict future behavior. To know the mind of the character 
is to know the character herself. 
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 There is an assumption with this line of thought: the various forces at 
work in the psyche of the individual are to a certain degree inescapable. Hamlet 
does what he does because of who he is; he could not do otherwise. He is 
intelligent and educated, therefore, he hatches schemes to discover the truth 
about his father’s death. He confronts his mother (some would say) in the throes 
of an Oedipal crisis. The actions Hamlet takes in the play are believed to have 
psychological causes and as such are unavoidable. They come from the core of 
who Hamlet is, and Hamlet is not merely a victim of his own desire for revenge, 
but a victim of forces over which he has no real control—his own psychology. If 
who I am is a product of the forces that shape my life, then I cannot act. I simply 
respond to the world as my condition dictates. 
 Let us recall Sartre’s theatre de situations that we outlined in Chapter 1. 
Sartre, in his dramatic writings, sought to free the character from this status of 
passive reaction. Sartre believed that human beings were free to act and that an 
individual defines him- or herself by his or her choices, always moving beyond 
his or her past towards an unfinished future. Rejecting psychological motivations 
as the essence of the human condition, Sartre sought to restore freedom and 
choice to his characters. Sartre would write characters not as the product of the 
forces that shape them, but as the product of their choices. For Sartre, there were 
only two forces over which an individual had no control: one’s death, and the 
actions of others. Everything else – family, culture, geography, history – was a 
choice. One could say that a man behaves a certain way because that person’s 
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culture taught him to behave that way; however, the man still has the choice to 
behave that way. Family, culture, etc.—traditionally viewed psychological 
forces—may influence how a character behaves, but only to the degree that the 
person chooses to allow them to do so. Consider what Sartre says about 
motivation and deliberation: 
… voluntary deliberation is always a deception. How can I evaluate 
causes and motives on which I myself confer their value before all 
deliberation and by the very choice which I make of myself? The illusion 
here stems from the fact that we endeavor to take causes and motives for 
entirely transcendent things which I balance in my hands like weights and 
which posses a weight as a permanent property. Yet, at the same time, we 
try to view them as contents of consciousness, and this is self-
contradictory. Actually causes and motives have only the weight which 
my project – i.e. the free production of the end and of the known act to be 
realized – confers upon them (Being and Nothingness, 581). 
 
To search for my motivation about a particular action as if it were something 
permanent (a weight held in the hand) is to miss the point: my motive does have 
weight, but only as much as I decide it does beforehand. My own intentions and 
desires affect that weight. How can a motivation be outside of me (transcendent 
forces which I have no control over) and inside of me (traits that make up “me”) 
at the same time?  To “step outside” oneself to deliberate on possible choices or 
motivations is to do anything but: the deliberations are completely “inside” 
because one weights the choices and determines what the choices are in the first 
place. Not only do I choose which of the actions I will take, I choose how I set up 
the deliberation to begin with. We discussed in the previous chapter how the 
nature of identity is plastic, formed in the imagination from my own intentions 
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toward myself. So, too, are my motivations are my own. Identity is not 
something fixed and unavoidable, written in the psyche. Identity is mutable, 
determined by choice, and found in the objects of the world as one encounters 
and relates to them. A person— or character—defines him- or herself by his or 
her choices. 
 If we are to side with Sartre and reject psychology as a methodology for 
defining identity, how then does an actor find the identity and motivations of a 
character apart from psychology? If not through the forces that shape her life, 
how can a sense of self be constituted? The answer is simply the same way that 
identity is constructed in ourselves: through the imagination. Masks, in 
particular, both demonstrate and encourage this sort of imaginary 
transformation. The use of masks to create characters point to an alternative 
method of character creation which is more in line with Sartrean thought, and 
more like the way our own identity is formed. 
 This chapter will discuss how actors can engage with masks and, using an 
“outside-in” approach to character development, can use movement, ambiguity, 
and their imaginations to develop characters in a more imaginative way than 
more traditional “inside-out” methods. By “more imaginative” we mean that the 
characterization emerges more from the imaginary process than reflective, 
psychological analysis, which tends to produce more “perceptive” attitude of 
consciousness. Mask theorists such as Libby Appel, Sears Eldredge, Jacque 
LeCoq, and John Emigh explore this alternative way of character creation 
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through masks in their writings. We will discuss their ideas in light of the 
physical dimension of the imagination discussed in Chapter 2 and the imaginary 
synthesis of trance discussed in Chapter 3, and we will discover that mask 
characterization achieves transformation of identity not through psychology, but 
though ambiguity, physicality, and imagination. 
 
Outside-In & The Neutral Mask 
 Psychologically-based approaches to acting generally work from the 
“inside-out.” That is, the actor attempts to find the interior life of the character 
first and then bring that life to the outside, in the body and voice. To know a 
character’s mind—his thoughts, circumstances, motivations, and psychology— is 
to be able to give form or presence to that character. The actor then may attempt 
to find a body to suit the mind: posture, a certain way of walking, gestures and 
mannerisms, etc. The mind comes first, the body after. 
 However, it is also possible to work “outside-in.” By this we mean that an 
actor can begin with making physical choices and let those choices inform her 
about the interior life of the character. A choice of posture might suggest an 
attitude or mood, a particular gesture might suggest an internal conflict, a 
mannerism might suggest something in the character’s past. As the actor plays 
with kinesthetic elements, she constructs the “who” of the character 
imaginatively. This sort of characterization is possible because, as we discussed 
in Chapter 2, movement is an integral part of the imaginative synthesis. As the 
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actor moves with intention, she gives birth to dozens of kinesthetic impressions 
which synthesize with her knowledge to create a character—at least, a “sketch” 
of a character—in her imagination. If the actor is able to engage with this sketch 
imaginatively through additional play, she can expand the characterization, fill 
in the gaps, synthesize a personage all from simply allowing her imagination to 
operate. This, then, is what is meant by working “outside-in”. “Outside-in” does 
not assume that the “mind” of the character is something which is essential to 
characterization. Rather, it is the imagination which constitutes the essence of the 
character through movement. 
 “Outside-in” approaches are typically associated with primarily physical 
performances such as mime and dance or in such theatrical approaches such as 
Grotowski or Meyerhold. We have already discussed the work of Jacques LeCoq 
and its reliance on the physical earlier in this dissertation. Another example 
would be mime artist Jacques Copeau, who sought to avoid character creation 
through the traditionally “linear” process: beginning with a text, moving to 
interpretation of that text, then creating an overall performance concept, and 
finally execution of the performance. Such a straight line heavily weighted the 
text as the primary source of the performance and Copeau believed that as a 
result the artistic result was more about “predetermined agendas” and less about 
artistic collaboration (Whitmore, 85). Copeau’s solution was to give equal weight 
to the text, the mise-en-scene and the actor’s expressive movement as an 
expression of the overall “rhythm” of the performance. In this way, the 
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physicality of the actor is informed by the text and mise-en-scene, the mise-en-
scene is informed by the movement and text, and the text could be informed by 
the movement and mise-en-scene.  Thus, the way to avoid the “agendas” of the 
text is to instead focus on the physical elements of the text—the rhythm—and 
allow a free play of actor, author, and director around this rhythm (Whitmore, 
85). Of course, Sartre would say that “agendas” are unavoidable as author, actor, 
and director each bring their own personal points of view to the performance 
process. However, Copeau was attempting to find way to express a more 
collaborative performance style which relied on physicality to express the artistry 
in the performance rather than a slavish devotion to the understanding and 
interpretation of the text. 
 Similarly, Jerzy Grotowski saw the practice of characters which are 
formed first in the mind and expressed later with the body as risking an 
accumulation of “clichés,” where the actor merely performs certain habitual 
physical and emotional responses to her intellectual understanding of the 
character. “As soon as one enters into the details,” he writes, “it must no longer 
be asked for, at the very moment of formulating it, one begins to create 
stereotypes and clichés” (Grotowski, 175). Instead, Grotowski relies on the actor 
stripping away all her artifice and instead baring her “soul” to the audience in a 
physical and emotional encounter with the text of the performance. The 
assumption that there is a “soul” which the actor can be reduced to is 
problematic from a Sartrean perspective, but what is important for Grotowski is 
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that the actor’s performance is not generated from an intellectual “formulation,” 
but from a “catalystic effect” that is expressed physically and emotionally from 
an “unencumbered encounter with the text” (Whitmore, 162).  
 But beyond the form of mime or Grotowski’s “poor” theatre—which 
frequently sacrificed the text for the actor’s experience – working “outside-in” 
can be used in conjunction with more traditional forms of theatrical performance. 
In his book The Invisible Actor, Yoshi Oida highlights the importance of physical 
work in all forms of performance—including more traditional approaches to 
character creation. Doing extended physical exercises prior to performance and 
during training is not merely to “warm up” or to teach the body to “move well,” 
but he believes the act of moving will teach the actor something beyond the act 
itself: a fundamental understanding of processes (29). Oida writes: 
 One of my masters said, “As an actor, you shouldn’t be a theorist. 
Don’t be too logical or rely on intellectual understanding. Learn through 
the body.” 
 Maybe even writing this book is a bad idea, since it is an 
intellectual exercise. The main thing to remember is that you need to 
understand acting with your body, not your brain. The act of performing 
is not the same as intellectual understanding or theory (28). 
 
Oida believes, though perhaps not in these terms, that the best performances 
come not from an intellectual understanding of the character, but from a physical 
expression of the character which is learned intuitively; characterization thrives 
not on reflective contemplation, but on prereflective imagination. 
 That is not to say that intellectual components such as script analysis are 
not useful to outside-in work. Script analysis provides knowledge, which is part of 
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the imaginative synthesis. We will discuss the role of script analysis in more 
detail later in this chapter; however, working outside-in does not consider the 
psychology of the character as essential, nor does it place strong emphasis on the 
reflective character analysis associated with “inside-out” approaches. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, implicit in Sartre’s assertion that movement 
constitutes imagination is that our own bodies play a part in constituting our own 
sense of identity. The idea of who we are is tied up in the body we exist within. 
Sartre writes, “… the body is the contingent form which is taken up by the 
necessity of my contingency…  we are a choice, and for us, to be is to choose 
ourselves” (Being and Nothingness, 432). So, not only is my sense of identity tied 
up in my body, but my body is the form of my identity. I choose the way I 
constitute my projects and I constitute my projects through my body. Not only 
does my body affect the point of view from which I view the world, but I express 
that point of view through my body as well. 
 However, we are often reflectively unaware of this relationship between 
body and identity. We sometimes take our own bodies for granted. We are often 
unaware of the everyday movements, postures, gestures, and mannerisms that 
we habitually use. For an actor, being unaware of these physical choices can 
become a block to transformational characterization. After all, if identity is 
constituted physically, then any lingering physical signs of the actor in the 
performance may be in conflict with the physical presence of the character the 
actor attempts to embody. In the worst case, the actor fails to transform at all, 
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and instead is very near to being “himself” saying preordained lines—the same 
person with a few extra trappings, not a transformed persona. If the aim of acting 
is making present another personage in the body of the actor, then the body of 
that actor must change to make the personage present. Before this can happen, 
though, the actor must be aware of his own physical tendencies—his own 
choices which express his own identity. 
 One way to accomplish this awareness is through the use of a “neutral 
mask.” Sears Eldredge and Jacque LeCoq, discussed earlier in this dissertation,  
use the “neutral mask” as an actor training tool. A “neutral” mask is one that 
projects a face with “no” expression or at least, one of profound calm and 
balance. One must ask whether a mask can truly be neutral. After all, do facial 
features carry with them ethnic identity associations and as such, can there be a 
singular human face that is “neutral?” Is it even possible for a face to have no 
expression at all? Apathy, calmness, serenity, detachment are all possible 
interpretations of a “neutral” face. Generally speaking, though, the concept of 
“neutrality” should be considered an ideal state, not truly obtainable. Writes Le 
Coq about the neutral mask: 
The neutral mask is an object with its own special characteristics. It is a 
face which we call neutral, a perfectly balanced mask which produces a 
physical sensation of calm. This object, when placed on the face, should 
enable one to experience the state of neutrality prior to action, a state of 
receptiveness to everything around us, with no inner conflict… When a 
student has experienced this neutral starting point his body will be freed, 




Why does LeCoq assert that a neutral mask “frees” the body? Or that it makes 
the actor “receptive” to the environment? Certainly it is not because the mask has 
some innate power. Simply donning the mask is not enough. What must occur is 
an engagement with the face of the mask. If the actor can bring his body into 
harmony with the mask itself, then like his face, the actor’s body will be in a state 
“prior to action.” It is a body of potential. It is a body which is not engaged in 
action, but exists in the moment just before action. If the actor removes the many 
unconscious movements present in his everyday body in order to bring them 
into harmony with the calm, balanced face of the neutral mask, then he is, in 
essence, removing those physical traces of himself from the body. 
 Eldredge, following LeCoq’s work, expands further on the concept of 
neutrality. He asserts that a neutral body has at least six characteristics: a neutral 
body is symmetrical, centered, integrated and focused, energized, relaxed, and 
involved in being, not doing (53). It is a body that is in balance, not engaged but 
not disengaged either. All of these characteristics seek to bring the actor’s body 
into harmony with the neutral mask, and in doing so, remove any traces of “self” 
from the body of the actor and bring them into a place where they can “become” 
nearly anything. An actor moving towards neutral not only eliminates her own 
bodily mannerisms, but also can subsequently transform into another body. 
Eldredge concludes: 
… it is easier to characterize the concept of neutral by describing what it is 
not. If any descriptive quality can be attached to a person’s stance, such as 
“imposing,” “empty,” or “stiff,” then the stance is not neutral. These 
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terms describe a physicalization that is not at the balance point of the 
seesaw, but already tilted to one side or the other. They are the beginnings 
of a characterization (54). 
 
Eldredge thus points out that it is the body which begins characterization. A 
physical choice is all that is necessary to make present a character, even if it a 
“sketch” of one. If a neutral body is “no” character, then any choice outside of 
neutral becomes a characterization choice.  
 Of course it is a choice to “be neutral,” and Eldredge acknowledges this. 
Paradoxically… at the same time the Neutral Mask depersonalizes the 
wearer it also essentializes the wearer. You discover more of what is 
uniquely “you.” On each wearer, in fact, the Neutral Mask adapts itself to 
that wearer. Therefore, what is elicited is actually your individual 
neutral (50). 
 
So again we should view the neutral state as an ideal state and one which, as an 
acting tool, helps the actor discover what personal physical attributes she brings 
to her own personal presence.  Both Eldredge and LeCoq see the neutral mask as 
a way for the actor to “depersonalize” him or herself, to pare away the 
unconscious physical choices of the self in order to find a neutral body that suits 
the neutral mask. This is important: moving the body towards neutral is a way of 
removing the presence of identity. That is not to say that an actor in a neutral state 
loses all sense of self—the neutral mask is still individually neutral. But the 
presence of that actor is diminished, even eliminated. In this body, the actor may 
begin to feel her relationship with the world change. She may begin to feel the 
“sketch” of the calm, balanced, potential character implied by the neutral mask. 
Once she reaches this state, she will be free to transform herself out of neutral 
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into a body that makes present the new character without any traces of the actor 
remaining. This is the essence of the relationship between the body and identity: 
that physicality creates presence.  
 The neutral mask illustrates how our identity can be constructed from 
physical choices by effectively removing those choices from our bodies and thus 
removing the presence of our self. Thus engaging with the imagination through 
different physical choices than one is familiar with can remove the “self” of the 
actor and allow another personage to “appear.” As Sartre has identified, the very 
nature of our “self” is tied into the imagination, which is in turn partly 
constructed physically. This is why working outside-in can produce the presence 
of characters for audiences and actors alike. A character must be made present 
physically.* An ideally neutral actor with a neutral mask has no identity, no 
characterization which can be identified, no traits which are made present—at 
least to the degree that actor and audience synthesize the image of the actor 
imaginatively. Without the body, there is no identity. Conversely, there can only 
be identity with physicality: our sense of self and expression of that self cannot 




                                                 
*
 In the cases of characters that speak but do not appear (such as a voice-over narrator), the 
physical “presence” is found in the use of the vocal apparatus in the production of speech. The 
relationship between sound and the imagination cannot be covered in depth in this document; 
however, sound can operate as an analogon as well as an image. 
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Bad Faith & Limitations 
 While the neutral mask aims at removing a sense of character from the 
body of the actor wearing it, character masks seek to transform the wearer into a 
different personage. Unlike neutral masks, which aim at “no” expression, a 
character mask is constructed with features that suggest a particular 
characterization or emotion. As discussed in Chapter 2, in performance the actor 
engages with the character mask imaginatively and attempts to find a body that 
suits the face. Thus, the characterization is made present physically first, and on 
further engagement, the characterization is expanded and given deeper, interior 
life. 
 But this begs the question: if our identity is mutable, based in physicality, 
why then do we retain any sense of self at all? Why do we not change day to day, 
moment to moment? Certainly, we do change, over time, and certainly, our 
encounters with the objects of the world can create changes within us at various 
levels. Yet, the sense of “self” persists. I may be a different person than I was ten 
years ago, but barring a major life event, catastrophe, or grand epiphany, I tend 
to think of myself as generally the same person from one day to the next. What 
causes our sense of identity to persist are two factors: knowledge, and Sartrean 
“bad faith,” which was discussed in depth in Chapter 3.  These factors, especially 
the latter, not only serve to retain a sense of self, but also can become obstacles to 
changing a sense of identity—an obstacle to the acting process. 
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 Let us remember that knowledge is an integral part of the imaginary 
process. What we know about a particular thing plays a part in how that thing is 
constituted imaginatively. This knowledge comes from many possible sources. 
Perception is one major source, but memory/experience/history is another. As 
we move forward through time, we remember some of the encounters we have 
with the world. The irreal objects of our imagination are retained and even given 
perception-like facticity because of the illusion of immanence. As we encounter 
the objects of the world again, our memory constitutes part of the knowledge, 
which means that our intention toward the object is likely to be colored by our 
knowledge of it. Each encounter with the object may add new layers of 
knowledge to it, which in turn affects our intention toward it further. Thus, over 
time, we come to “know” a particular object, even though a great deal of how we 
know this object is comprised of imaginative elements that are a reflection not of 
any empirical facts about the object, but a reflection of what we intend the object 
to be. 
 For example, every morning as I leave my apartment, I may pass by a 
large rose bush. Over time, I come to notice the roses more and more, smell the 
scent of their blooms, admire their colors. I may come to associate the rosebush 
with pleasant thoughts, with starting the day off happily. For me, the rosebush is 
a happy thing, something to be cherished, a reminder of good mornings past. But 
compare that experience with a neighbor in the same apartment building. One 
morning, on leaving the apartment building, her coat gets caught in the thorns of 
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the bush and tears. Now she begins to associate the rosebush with ruining her 
coat. She may come to loathe the rosebush, make sure to avoid it every time she 
leaves her apartment, contemplate digging it up. For her, the rosebush is a 
nuisance, something dangerous, and to be avoided. In this way, the same 
rosebush can come to be different things to different people. 
 It is the same process for the sense of self. Our identity is constituted 
imaginatively as well. Over time, we learn about ourselves through our 
interactions with the world. Each encounter adds another layer of knowledge 
and intention about ourselves. Eventually, we come know who we are by the 
results of knowledge and intention synthesized imaginatively. And because 
movement is a part of the imaginary process, it must be remembered that we 
develop our sense of self through the body that we inhabit. The world comes to 
us through our body. A mix of memory and intention is retained through the 
particular point of view that is our body from day to day and serves as the basis 
for our next encounter with the world. We come to believe our sense of self is 
fixed—or at least, something that is “within” us and part of our essence. In fact, 
our self is mutable and exists not in ourselves, but in our relationship to the 
objects around us. But we retain our “self” because we constitute that self over 
time, remember it, and use it as knowledge for further encounters with the 
world.  
 For actors, this continual retention of the self can become a barrier to 
character creation. Because we tend to treat our imaginary sense of self as “real,” 
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we have a tendency to assume that there are things which we “are” and things 
which we “are not”. Of course, this assertion does not refer to immutable 
biological elements. But in questions of identity, character, and essence as we 
encounter the world, we tend to believe that there are things we can and cannot 
do. We place limits upon ourselves, often unaware that these limits are self-
imposed. We may attribute other causes to these limits and behaviors: “I am this 
way because I am an only child,” “My family has always done it this way,” “I’m 
just wired to think this way.” But these statements, and others like them, are 
really attempts to avoid the responsibility that comes with freedom of self. It is 
“bad faith”*.  
 For an actor, bad faith can serve as an obstacle to character creation. It can 
limit perspective: an actor may only be able to approach a role from a limited 
point of view because other points of view do not occur to him. An actor may 
believe she “can” or “can’t” play a particular role because of how similar or 
dissimilar the role is to her own “nature.” But bad faith can serve as an obstacle 
physically as well. Because we tend to think of our bodies as fixed as our 
identities, we tend to apply bad faith to our movements as well. We may not 
even think about how we use our bodies, but we have certain ways which we 
habitually do things. If one were instructed to “sit down,” one would probably 
sit down in a manner to which one were accustomed. There is certainly room for 
some variations, but generally when we think of the act of “sitting,” we assume 
                                                 
*
 See my discussion of bad faith in Chapter 3. 
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we know what the essence of that act is. We sit as we have grown accustomed to 
sitting, in the body we have developed for ourselves, in the manner, tempo, and 
weight that we believe is sitting. In truth, there are thousands of different ways 
that one can “sit,” each with its own particular physical qualities; each, in turn, 
with its own attendant imaginary components; and each with its own physical 
presence associated with it. If one wishes to create the presence of Hamlet, one 
must sit as Hamlet sits, among other things. It is bad faith to assume that one 
knows the essence of “sitting,” inasmuch as one ignores how one sits plays a part 
in constitution of how one understands “sitting.”   
 The bad faith of physicality is generally understood by mask theorists and 
teachers, though perhaps not in Sartrean terms. In her mask training text, Libby 
Appel says that actors often “respond to stimuli in set behavioral patterns.” 
These are what she calls “boundaries around the imagination” (xiii).  She writes: 
When faced with creation of a character outside his immediate source of 
experience, the actor’s body may remain stiff and ungiving, his behavioral 
choices trite, stereotyped, or simply dull. This repetition of old patterns 
results in “personality acting” or just plain bad work (xiii). 
 
Appel clearly identifies the connection between the body and the imagination: a 
body that does not change limits the imagination. This is because movement and 
the imaginary are linked. The repetitive everyday body movements we assume 
are “us,” – often even unaware of their existence – can leave us hemmed in 
imaginatively. Appel sees mask work as a way to prevent what she calls this 
“atrophy of the imagination” (xiii). I would argue that the imagination does not 
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truly atrophy: it is always there, a constant part of how we create the world and 
ourselves. Rather, what Appel truly aims at doing is breaking down the “bad 
faith” which has restricted the actor into a particular body. Appel is more correct 
when she speaks of “boundaries around the imagination.”  It is the assumptions 
which the actor clings to that restrict her. She may so thoroughly believe in the 
fixity of her ontological position relative to the objects of the world that she is 
unable to express anything outside of it, emotionally, intellectually, or physically. 
 For Appel, working with masks frees the actor to make choices beyond 
him- or herself. In the first place, Appel believes masks provide a kind of 
“safety” for the actor: 
The masked actor represents someone other than himself, and this 
anonymity produces a miraculous sensation of freedom. With the mask 
acting as a “permission giver,” the actor can do anything, be anyone. He 
can plumb deep into his resources and tap his soul, imagination, and 
experiences (xiv). 
 
Donning the mask allows the actor to relinquish some of his anxiety about 
stepping outside his “boundaries” which hem in his imagination. After all, it is 
no longer him performing, it is the mask. This shift of responsibility is really just 
substituting one sort of bad faith for another: putting responsibility for the 
actions of the character on the mask. As an acting technique, this can be useful as 
a means to “open up” an actor and begin to remove the boundaries around 
imagination—exploiting the operation of bad faith for performance purposes. 
Ultimately, though, the actor must come to acknowledge his own role in the 
creation of the character through the mask. I believe this is what Appel means 
113 
 
when she speaks of the actor “plumbing” his resources—that the actor 
understands on some level that she brings her own knowledge and intentions to 
bear on the creation process. However, again, one must be cautious. To suggest 
than an actor has “resources” is treading close to the idea that there are things an 
actor can do (things within his resources) and things an actor cannot do (things 
outside his resources)—at least, from a character creation standpoint. Certainly, 
our experiences and histories may have an influence on us, but only to the 
degree that we choose to allow them to affect us. If mask training’s aim is to 
remove “boundaries around the imagination,” then its ideal aim is training 
actors who can truly create any character through their engagement with the 
imagination, not merely ones that come from the individual actor’s experience. 
 Appel also seeks to train her actors by pushing them to experience the 
world in a different physical way. Her exercises are often physically demanding, 
no so much from the tasks she assigns, but the duration of the exercises 
themselves—30 or 45 minutes – and her admonition that actors always stay 
focused on task and never rest. For example, her exercise “Digging Stones and 
Feathers with a Shovel,” Appel asks the masked actors, who have already 
discovered a rudimentary character to go with their masks, to: 
…imagine you are standing on a mound of earth. In front of you is a 
shovel. Pick the shovel up and begin to dig in the ground. Adjust your 
body to the weight of the earth. Use different parts of your body to exert 
pressure on your arms. Push with your shoulders, your back, your 




Over the next 30-45 minutes, the actors “dig.” Periodically, Appel sidecoaches 
changes in situation such as the earth getting heavier or turning into large stones. 
The actors are told to use a different part of their body to dig with to give their 
arms a rest. At one point, the stones turn into feathers and the actors must keep 
them from blowing away as they dig. Appel uses such varied and intensely 
physical exercises for several reasons: 
From the duration of hard physical labor and the necessity to get past the 
feelings of exhaustion, comes a sense of stamina and renewed confidence in 
the body’s power. The constant urgency to use the body fully and 
economically, in hitherto unimagined ways, triggers the sense of discovery 
of physical resources. The reliance upon and the specification of imagery 
enriches the sensory imagination. The actor no longer “indicates” inner 
and environmental sensory conditions. He has allowed the image to be set 
in motion and to simply respond to it (37). 
 
What Appel’s methods accomplish is a gradual wearing away of resistance to 
transformation. The long exercises eventually cause the routine movements of 
the actor to fall away as fatigue takes away her ability to maintain them. Instead, 
she moves with economy, using muscles in ways that she was unaware of 
previously. It is a systematic wearing away of the habitual and a means of 
expanding the possibilities of physical choices. Eventually, the actor stops 
thinking about her performance, and simply performs. She engages with the mask 
and her body and the character emerges from her imagination—from her 
response to the image. But such an emergence would not be fully possible if she 
remained trapped in the physical boundaries of the imagination.  
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 There is a relationship between an actor creating a character and our 
consciousness creating a “self.”  The problems that Appel identifies in actors – 
the boundaries around the imagination – speak to Sartre’s point about the nature 
of consciousness: we often assume certain ‘facts’ about ourselves, saying that 
certain patterns of behavior are in our “nature.” A person may attempt to 
sincerely confess to himself that he has a particular quality, but in fact, this 
confession is based on an assumption: that he is already what he has to be (Being 
and Nothingness, 110). But human consciousness is a never-finished project. To 
confess, even in apparent sincerity that “I am brave,” or “I am cowardly,” is to 
make an assumption that such a quality is already present. Our qualities come 
from our choices, not from our boundaries. In fact, these boundaries around our 
imagination with which Appel wrestles are changeable. Our consciousness is 
free, our identity is free, it is only we who put limits around it. Working with 
masks can create a character that is based in the freedom of imagination, not in 
the “bad faith” of psychological determinism. Admittedly, ceding external 
control of the character to “the mask” is another form of bad faith; however, 
because of the imaginary nature of the engagement with the mask, the personage 
is created more like we create our own identities. It is a more imaginary process, 
and less reflective and perceptual. The blocks that actors encounter are their own 
responsibilities. Engaging in the imaginary process is a way to transcend those 
blocks, just as the imagination is a consciousness that transcends itself to realize 
itself. The use of masks heightens this imaginative process as they provide a 
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physical, external analogon to trigger the imaginative synthesis. They define 
games of identity, and as such, the actor is encouraged to play prereflectively. 
 
Mask as Text 
 Working with masks in performance introduces many elements that do 
not exist in traditional, psychologically based, non-masked acting. One of the 
most significant of these is the implicit character created by the analogon of the 
mask. While good masks can have many varied modes of expression, no mask 
can by any character. A mask’s particular construction and appearance points to 
a particular character or range of characters. A mask which “works” for the 
character of Hamlet would probably not work for Polonius or Ophelia. By 
“work” we mean the mask successfully serves as an analogon for the character: 
the face of the mask is in harmony with the essence of the character being 
portrayed. To put it into Kendall Walton’s terms, a mask that “works” authorizes 
a specific game of identity that is also authorized by the performance text. The 
mask and the text play the similar games. If the actor and audience successfully 
synthesize the actor’s movements, the mask’s face, and their knowledge of the 
character, then the presence of the character appears, and the mask “works.” If 
these elements do not align, such as the face of the mask not being in harmony 
with our knowledge of the character (a young handsome face on old Polonius, 
for example), then the synthesis fails, the presence of the character does not 
117 
 
appear, and the audience is only aware of an actor wearing a mask. In such a 
case, the mask and text will seem to be playing different games. 
 This particular issue with mask work points to a broader issue within 
“outside-in” work: what elements of the performance serve as the “text” for the 
actor? If traditional, Western, psychologically-based realism places emphasis on 
knowing the mind of the character, then it stands to reason that the inside-out 
approach supports this emphasis. Outside-in work may require a different 
perspective to character creation and performance creation: using the character as 
the text, rather than the script. Like Copeau who gave scripts equal importance 
to movement characterization and mise-en-scene in the entire performance, often 
in outside-in work, the idea of a “script” becomes much more fluid, where the 
creative synthesis of the mask process may greatly change or influence the script 
itself. In fact, some forms of masked performance may have no need for a written 
text at all and are completely improvised. While this change in approach to 
character creation presents specific problems with texts written for 
psychologically-based characters, the character as text approach is more 
imaginative in nature than the traditional way.  
 In his studies of the masked performances of Bali, India, and similar 
cultures, John Emigh discovered a kind of inversion of methodology compared 
to traditional Western performance techniques. Emigh noticed that masked 
performance often inverts the typical psychological approach to script creation. 
He identified a triad of elements that play a part in character creation: actor, 
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character, and text. In most Western theatre, the acting process begins with the 
actor engaging with the text and mining it for details in order to create the 
character. However, in the cultures he studied, Emigh noted that the process 
begins with the actor engaging with the mask—the character—first and the text 
coming after. Rather than script-based characterization, it is character-based 
scripting. The performance evolves from the “encounter” between the actor and 
the mask:  
The text and mise-en-scene—the specific patterns of words and actions 
that emerge [in the performance]—will be shaped by this encounter and 
will often be improvised within the boundaries established by aesthetic 
form and social occasion. The ordering of the triad is different, but the 
essential process of finding a meeting ground for self and other remains 
the same; so does the need to negotiate playfully (and rigorously) the 
demands of experience, character, and text.(xix).  
 
This is a much more imaginative approach to character development. By this, we 
mean that the process of characterization occurs in a more imaginary way than a 
perceptual way. Certainly, imagination is called for in psychologically-based 
character development. The famous Stanislavski tool, the “Magic If,” is an 
imaginative exercise. In it, actors find the given circumstances of the character 
they are about to portray and ask themselves, “If I were this person in these 
circumstances, how would I act?” It requires the actor to imagine not only the 
circumstances, but the personality of the character being portrayed. Acting 
teachers since Stanislavski have thus placed the focus upon understanding the 
psychology of the character in order to understand the personality. However, the 
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process Emigh describes above operates in a more imaginative way because of its 
approach. Let us examine how. 
 We know an imaginary object gives everything it has to us instantly. 
Objects that are given to us via perception are incomplete. When an actor delves 
into the script searching for clues to the character’s psychology, he does so in a 
more perceptive attitude. He is more reflective. While his imagination may be 
engaged (as any encounter with the real world can trigger the imagination), he is 
nevertheless thinking about his character. If his objective is to find the essence of 
the character so that he can make it present in performance, then a more 
perceptive attitude of consciousness as it assembles the character from the “facts” 
will result only in a limited characterization. Perception is necessarily 
incomplete.  However, if the character is realized in a more imaginative way, then 
more of the essence of the character is given all at once, prereflectively. 
 For example, if I were to describe my friend’s traits to you, I might start 
with physical traits: he is about 5’10”, with blue eyes, short sandy-blonde hair, 
very pale skin. I may go on to talk about other qualities he has: he went to 
college, he enjoys reading, he works as a computer programmer, he collects Civil 
War memorabilia. I could even get into personality quirks and obscure trivia 
about my friend: one of his arms is slightly longer than the other, he laughs 
through his nose, he grinds his teeth when he is angry, etc. I could list many 
things about my friend, and you could attempt to assemble an understanding of 
who my friend is from these facts. Such an assemblage would be an admittedly 
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imaginary process. However, it would be less imaginary than other possible 
means of making my friend present in your consciousness, such as a photograph. 
This is because the information is given to you primarily through a perceptual 
mode. The facts listed are descriptions of perceptions. Even with an exhaustive 
list, one could not feel one knew my friend from hearing the facts alone. One 
would construct an image of the person from these perceptions but that image 
would be weak, incomplete, and greatly influenced by your intentions toward 
these perceptions. Without my friend present, or a picture of him to refer to, so 
much about your sense of his identity will be created by your own expectations 
and assumptions. 
 Let us say instead of listing my friend’s qualities, I show you a 
photograph of him. A photo, as an analogon, stands in for my absent friend. You 
view the photo and your imagination is instantly activated. You will 
immediately and unavoidably create a sense of who my friend is without having 
to think about him. Rather than having to assemble incomplete perceptions, 
everything that my friend is, for the moment, exists in your consciousness. Of 
course your own intentions still play a part here. You will immediately assign 
certain properties to him—or more precisely, the properties are already there as 
soon as you look at the picture. But those properties are the product of your own 
intentions toward the image of my friend. The photograph is a stronger analogon 
than the list of properties I may give to you. As a result, your image of my friend 
does not require as much of your own intentions to fill in the gaps of my friend’s 
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identity. Of course, looking at the photograph will not tell you about his 
computer programming career or his interest in the Civil War. In fact, it is very 
likely that your immediate image of my friend from the photograph will be very 
different from who he “is” in actuality—at least, who I believe he “is.” But at this 
point, what is important here is not accuracy, but process. Viewing a photograph 
invites a more imaginary state and in so doing the image created is stronger, 
more complete, and instantly formed. The saying “a picture is worth a thousand 
words” holds true here: the analogon of the photograph points to an overflow of 
data that is created through the imaginary process in a way that no listing of 
perceptions can approach. The question of accuracy is still at issue—and we will 
discuss it further below— but the process leads to complete characterizations 
without reflective thought. 
 Continuing with this example, suppose instead of a photograph I showed 
you a skillfully drawn caricature of my friend. The caricature abstracts my 
friend’s features in an attempt to capture a sense of his personality. Something in 
the way he is depicted standing, folding his overly-gangly arms, turning up his 
too-long nose, slyly looking askance, and so on, speaks to the artist’s 
understanding of the “who” of my friend. As you look upon the caricature your 
imagination is activated, just as with the photograph. However, there is more 
knowledge available in this abstract depiction of my friend. This knowledge comes 
from the artist’s choices in the depiction. In your imaginary process, this 
knowledge is added to the imaginative synthesis and shapes your image of my 
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friend. Again, this is not a process you have to think about—it happens on the 
prereflective plane. Further, the caricature is abstract. Abstractions are processed 
imaginatively, as Sartre pointed out. Even though the caricature of my friend is 
clearly not a realistic depiction of him, its capturing of the “sense” of him allows 
us to recreate him imaginatively. If we could not imagine, we would not be able 
to recognize abstractions at all, such as caricature and schema. So, we find that 
generally speaking, to view a caricature of my friend is to form an image of him 
in a more imaginative way than with a photograph, and in turn in an even more 
imaginative way than a list of perceptions about him. 
 So we then turn to masks. Certainly a mask is an analogon. Like the 
photograph, the image of an animated mask can generate a wealth of data which 
is given instantly to the person viewing it. Whether it is an actor viewing the 
mask or the audience watching it animated, a sense of “who” is instantly created 
in their consciousness—at least to the extent that the image successfully 
synthesizes in the imagination. Masks are also abstracted. There are some masks 
which are very realistic—such as life masks – and some which eschew dramatic 
abstraction for understated simplicity – such as some Japanese Noh masks. But 
even these masks cannot avoid being seen as masks, and this brings to them a 
level of abstraction. Ron Popenhagen asserts that a mask’s most theatrical feature 
is its mutable nature (74). “… mask presentations place an ambiguous object (the 
mask) upon an ambivalent thing (the body) within the paradoxical space of the 
theatre…” (73).  Popenhagen’s term “theatrical” here is somewhat uncertain in 
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meaning; however, his point is clear: the presence of an abstract or ambiguous 
object within a performance context invites the sort of imaginative identity 
associations associated with theatricality. Ambiguity invites the imagination. The 
role of abstraction in masks will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, but it 
is important to note that this quality of abstraction means that, generally 
speaking, masks tend to be apprehended in a more imaginary way. Like a 
caricature or schema, the skillfully abstracted mask conveys its sense to the 
viewer in a more imaginative way. 
 Thus, we find that when an actor approaches characterization with a 
mask, the truths of the character are given instantly, at the same time as the mask 
is given. The mask is a conduit to an instant, seemingly intuitive characterization. 
If the actor is able to commit to the imaginary process, to surpass her blocks and 
bad faith, to allow the imagination to express and create freely, then the actor can 
completely transform herself by negating the “reality” of her own persona and 
replacing it with the persona of the mask—the persona which the actor herself 
constructs out of her engagement with the analogon that is the mask. Perhaps this 
is why mask-maker Gustavo Boada stated that masks reject thought, but not 
spontaneity and freedom (168). Boada means that an actor who attempts to think 
about how a particular mask would act is not truly engaging with the mask. The 
mask must be animated through the imaginary process on the prereflective 
plane. The instant synthesis of character from the mask is the benefit of the more 




Reconciling Imagination and Psychology 
 Despite the benefits of the imaginative characterization process of masks, 
there remains the issue of “accuracy” in characterization. The method described 
so far is well-suited for performance environments such as Emigh discussed—
improvisation within a well-known framework. This method could also be 
completely open-ended, where entire performances could evolve spontaneously 
from the engagement between actors and masks. This would partially be 
successful because there would be no requirement to adhere to a script. The 
characters could be anything—at least, within the imaginative synthesis between 
the actor and the particular mask—therefore, any imaginative synthesis of a 
mask could suit the situation. Because there is no text in script form, the actors 
are free to use the masks as their text. 
 But suppose an actor is called upon to play Hamlet? How does one 
reconcile the specific characterization which exists within the text Shakespeare 
wrote with the huge range of possibilities offered in the engagement with the 
mask? How can an actor ensure his performance of Hamlet recreates the 
characterization in the text of the script in a Waltonian “authorized” way, when 
he begins with the text of the mask? 
 There are several possibilities here. The first seems simple enough: create 
a mask for Hamlet. That is, the mask-maker uses his or her skill to create a mask 
that is a suitable analogon for the character of Hamlet. This technique is used 
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frequently in cultures that have long masking traditions. For instance, in the 
Barong Ket, the character of Rangda has long been established. Rangda masks 
tend to have the same basic appearance, the curving fangs, the long hanging 
tongue, etc. There is room for individual variation, but the character of Rangda is 
implicit in each one. But in this process, the mask-maker must still have some 
knowledge of the character in order to depict that character in the mask. Just as a 
skilled caricature requires the “sense” of the person depicted within it, so too 
does the mask require the “sense” of the personage which is to be portrayed. We 
will discuss the aesthetics of masks in greater detail in Chapter 5; however, 
before there can be a mask for Rangda or Hamlet, there must be an 
understanding of the personage of Rangda or Hamlet. That knowledge comes 
from many sources: tradition, history, previous encounters with the characters, 
and, in the case of Hamlet, study of the script. In this case, the mask-maker must 
rely on some reflective perception to build up the knowledge required to make a 
mask that she believes will play in an authorized way in the performance game 
of “Hamlet.” If a mask-maker sets out to make a mask for a particular personage, 
then the mask-maker becomes a contributing author to the performance. In this 
manner, if a mask is accurately and purposely created for a particular 
characterization, then the actor’s imagination will more likely synthesize with 
the character in an authorized way. Of course, as with all imaging, the actor’s 
intention toward the character and mask will play a part in the synthesis. But if 
the actor has both script and mask to serve as texts, and if those two texts convey 
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similar information—if both play the same game— it is more likely that the 
ultimate synthesis will be authorized and “work.” However, custom-building 
a mask for each role would be problematic at best. Over a lifetime, an actor can 
play hundreds of roles. Designing (or paying a mask-maker to design and build) 
a mask for all of them would be time-consuming and expensive. There are other 
possible solutions for integrating masks into script-based work. 
 Mask teacher Keith Johnstone approaches this problem by further 
extending the imaginary state of the masked actors. When he wants the Masks* 
to work from a script, he tells the Masks that they will be participating in a play. 
In other words, the actors becomes characters, and the characters in turn become a 
new set of actors. He developed this technique to combat a particular problem: 
Masks don’t fit so well into “normal” theatre… The technique of 
“blocking” the moves has to be abandoned because the Masks move where 
they want to, and it’s no use getting the designer to work out which 
Masks are to represent which characters. The biggest problem is that 
Masks refuse to repeat scenes. Even when you tell them they are going to 
take part in a play they insist on being spontaneous. If you force them to 
act in plays, then they switch off, and you are left with the actors 
pretending to be Masks (181). 
 
What Johnstone is wrestling with is attempting to keep a state of trance in his 
actors. That is, to encourage the imaginary state in the actors, as far to the 
imagination side of the scale as possible. To help with this, Johnstone rehearses 
in two separate sessions: one with the actors as actors, working on their lines. 
                                                 
*The term Mask with the capital letter is Johnstone’s term for the personage of a particular mask 
made present by the actor in a trance state. He refers not to the actors, here, but to the characters. 
This means that when Johnstone gives direction to the Masks, he is speaking to the characters, 
not to the actors playing them. His assumption is that the Masks are separate entities from the 
actors and require separate instruction. 
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The second sessions involve work with the Mask, simply developing the 
character.  From these second sessions, Johnstone attempt to work out which 
Masks will best suit which roles. When it comes time to integrate the two—
spontaneous character and trained actor— Johnstone helps the actor to become 
the Mask, then feeds the Mask their first line (the line the actor playing the Mask 
has already learned at an earlier rehearsal) and the Mask usually cues off of the 
prompt and continues with his lines as normal. Key to this process, says 
Johnstone, is to tell the Masks that the scene has “never happened before” (181). 
Once a Mask can accept this, Johnstone says, then the problem of the reckless 
spontaneity of the Masks ignoring the script is solved.  
 What is at work here is that the knowledge of the lines possessed by the 
actor passes to the personage of the mask. This personage is another kind of 
knowledge which is created in the first rehearsal sessions. When Johnstone 
brings them together, the combined knowledge synthesizes with the imaginative 
state through the mask and a characterization that follows a particular script is 
born. Johnstone’s technique does address a particular problem with masks and 
acting in general: even though an actor has rehearsed and performed a particular 
scene dozens of times previously, saying the same lines over and over, at each 
performance he must say the lines as if the character has never said them before*. 
Likewise, Johnstone is attempting to ensure that the imaginary state is kept in his 
actors. A mask that is “switched off” for Johnstone is a mask which is no longer 
                                                 
*
 Unless the production aims at a style where the memorization of lines needs to be made apparent. 
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authentically “in character,” but rather, the actor is performing what he thinks the 
character should be. It is a movement away from the imaginative state into a 
more reflective, perceptual state. Instead of the characterization coming out of 
the spontaneous, effortless synthesis of the imagination, it is comes through the 
forced and preplanned construction of the actor’s perceptive consciousness. For 
mask work, at least, being more imaginative is better. 
 However, Johnstone’s pains are unnecessary. His error lies in the implicit 
duality of his term “switched off.” The imaginative and perceptual states of mind 
do not exist in an on/off relationship. Our consciousness is rarely just one or the 
other: there is a continuum between the two. Because of this, the integration of 
the imaged character and the lines of the script need not require such specific 
union. A division of time may be useful—most actors will spend time just 
memorizing lines without concern for character. But the fact of the matter is that 
because an actor (or anyone’s) consciousness can be more or less imaginative at a 
given time, it is to be expected that a masked actor may be more or less 
“inhabited” by the character she plays. Ideally, the actor’s consciousness will be 
more imaginative than perceptive because it is then that the synthesis of character 
comes at its easiest and most intuitive. However, there are often demands upon 
the actor that require her to have access to the perceptive attitude of 
consciousness: line cues, entrances and exits, stage movements, voice volume 
and articulation, awareness of the audience, etc. Johnstone dismisses these more 
technical elements or ignores them altogether. This dismissal demonstrates an 
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erroneous understanding of both the needs of performance and the nature of the 
imaging consciousness. Johnstone’s categorical placing of an actor that is either 
“inhabited” or not limits the possibility of an actor meeting the perceptual 
demands of the stage and meeting the imaging demands of characterization.  
 Perhaps Johnstone’s observations about his masked actor’s behavior 
comes from his own teachings of the masking process: actor’s were taught, either 
directly or indirectly, that they could not be “inhabited” and also maintain a 
degree of perceptive consciousness. As a result, this teaching shaped and guided 
the actor’s intention toward the process. 
 I assert that we can avoid Johnstone’s pains and still arrive at a 
performance style that encourages in the actor a more imaginative consciousness 
yet still meets the perceptual demands of performance, e.g. with a script. One 
possible solution to the problem of authorized characterization is to create a 
stock “company” of masks: a variety of personages represented in a variety of 
masks. Each mask would, ideally, be constructed in such a way as to provide 
certain “types” of characters with enough ambiguity in them to allow subtle 
changes or variations of characterization. As the actor or group of actors began to 
work on the production, they could then choose appropriate masks for each role 
based on their knowledge of the characters obtained from script analysis and 
their knowledge of the character potential within the masks. Traditional mask 
forms such as the commedia dell’arte and the Noh used such techniques: the former 
had types identified by name— such as Capitano the cowardly soldier and 
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Arlecchino the insubordinate servant—who would be recurring characters in 
most productions; the latter had specific mask styles for types of roles, like the 
onna mask for young women roles. It should be pointed out, however, that those 
authors writing for commedia or Noh were familiar with the form and characters 
available in the masks, and thus, likely tailored their texts to suit. The commedia 
especially relied on these stock characters and improvisation, with the scripts 
often being little more than a central idea and a series of comic gags that frame 
the narrative. However, despite the historical tendency to write specifically for 
the mask*, a stock of masks can still be useful in approaching masked 
performance for scripts that were not necessarily written with masks in mind. 
Each mask in the stock has the potential to “work” for a particular range of 
characters, and can thus serve as an analogon for a particular character as 
presented in the script. 
 An initial concern is that a mask would be limiting to characterization. 
After all, if a mask is chosen to play both Hamlet and, say, Biff from Death of a 
Salesman, does that not mean that whatever personage is pointed to in the mask 
will appear in both roles? Hamlet and Biff are very different characters. How can 
the same personage play both roles? In truth, though, is that even though the 
mask as analogon points to a different persona, the mask is only one component of 
the process that creates that persona. Whatever the actor knows about the 
                                                 
*
 Writing specifically for the mask is still worthy of consideration. However, due to the broad scope of this 
topic, I will not attempt to discuss it in this dissertation, instead focusing on how to integrate masks and 
more traditional text forms. 
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character will shape and guide the synthesis of that character through the mask. 
Whatever the actor expects or intends about that character will be made present 
in the actor’s imagination as she engages with the mask. A mask suggests a 
particular interpretation in its appearance, but the actor is not slavishly bound to 
that appearance. Rather, the actor synthesizes all the elements at her disposal 
through the mask to create the persona. The mask that could be chosen for 
Hamlet and Biff has elements within it which could suggest either Hamlet or Biff: 
a young man, light skin, with melancholia and anger that are present in both 
characters, etc. As the actor engages with the mask, those elements guide the 
synthesis of the character. The actor, having studied the script, bring the 
knowledge of the character to bear, as well as whatever intention he has about 
the nature of Hamlet or Biff: Hamlet is this or that; Biff is this sort of person. As a 
result, the final characterization is not as fixed as the features of the mask. 
Rather, the character that emerges is different from other characterizations 
because the overall imaginative synthesis is different. A given mask cannot be 
any character at any time, but there is certainly room for a particular well-made 
mask to express a range of characterizations. This range allows a stock of masks 
to be used for a variety of characters. 
 As we see, then, knowledge is key to the creation of the character with a 
mask. Whether that knowledge comes from a mask-maker designing a mask for 
a particular role, or from an actor studying a script in preparation for the role, it 
is a key part in how the character is created. What makes masked 
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characterization different from traditional, psychologically-based 
characterization is that it relies less on reflective, perceptive knowledge and more 
on prereflective, imaginative synthesis. Script analysis is important to the 
masked actor. But script analysis is not the prime source of the characterization. 
Rather, the knowledge serves as a guide, along with the mask and other 
imaginative elements, to create a character intuitively and completely. Rather 
than attempt to cobble together a character from pieces of psychology and 
knowledge, the actor committed to the imaginary process of masking transforms 
into the character in a more prereflective, spontaneous, and intuitive way. 
 It is possible to approach script-based performance with masks. What is 
required is the understanding that the consciousness can be both perceptive and 
imaging at the same time. As a result, the knowledge of the actor and the 
awareness she has of her “being-in-the-world” as she performs is not 
annihilated; nor is it the primary basis for the creation of the character. Instead, 
the reflective consciousness is reduced, surrendered to and used by the imaging 
consciousness that synthesizes the personage of the character anew. It is a more 
imaginary process. As a result it is more intuitive, complete, and transformative. 
 
Conclusion 
 Thus far, this chapter has attempted to lay out an approach to acting 
technique that is an alternative to more traditional, psychologically-based 
methods, usually associated with the realistic style and the theories of 
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Stanislavski and, to a greater extent, his followers. However, it is important to 
point out that even though the methods are different, the desired outcomes are 
similar. 
 Stanislavski sought nothing less than the transformation of the actor. In 
Building a Character, the actor Kostya, applying cold cream to his face, suddenly 
notices a smear of colors that inspire him to transform his whole face and hair 
with makeup. Thus “masked,” Kostya finds himself quite certain of this new 
character, physically and internally. 
I glanced in the mirror and did not recognize myself. Since I had looked 
into it the last time a fresh transformation had taken place in me. “It is he! 
It is he!” I exclaimed… Quite unexpectedly my twisted leg came out in 
advance of me and threw my body more to the right. I removed my top hat 
with careful exaggeration and executed a polite bow… Can I really say 
this creature is not part of me? I derived him from my own nature. I 
divided myself, as it were, into two personalities. One continued as an 
actor, the other as an observer (qtd. in Johnstone, 146). 
 
This is an example of the masked state that Johnstone and others have witnessed, 
even though the “mask” in this case was smeared makeup and cold cream. But 
the elements are there: an analogon which points to an “other,” a spontaneous 
understanding of that other, expressed physically and intuitively. What 
Stanislavski, through his character Kostya, expresses as “two personalities” is 
really the divided attitude of consciousness: one perceiving, one imaging. In this 
example, Stanislavski expresses the “creative state” which he sought as the core 
of his acting system: the ability to use “conscious technique to tap the 
unconscious” (Daw, 18). Though Stanislavski uses the psychoanalytical terms of 
134 
 
his time— conscious and unconscious— Sartre’s assertion that consciousness 
instead takes on attitudes of perception or imagination more accurately describes 
the “creative state.” One might say instead that actors use perception to tap the 
imagination. But the process of acting is not in the perception, but in the 
imagination. Actors may use perception to teach them the ‘facts’ – the authorized 
truths of the game. But the playing of the game is imaginary even if the behavior 
in that game is truthful. An actor beholds the mask and perceives. But the “who” 
of the face—the knowledge—is already caught up in the imagination before the 
actor has time to reflect upon it. The mask analogon invites through ambiguity; it 
authorizes games of identity and sets certain “fictional truths” on the playing 
field. The actor does not need to think about these things. Already, the actor 
“knows” this character through her imagination—at least, the beginnings of this 
character. What remains is the playing of the game and the physical expression 
of the presence of the personage. By allowing one’s imagination to create the 
characterization freely through the knowledge provided by text and technique, a 
complete intuitive physical transformation is possible. This, I would argue, is 
what Stanislavski wished: not that a character be brought to life in a 
psychologically valid way on the stage, but rather, the truthful “sense” of the 
personage appears before the audience. Such a sense can only be found in the 
imagination and be brought to existence physically in the body of the actor. From 
an audience’s perspective, the psychology of a character is irrelevant: what is 
important is the physical presence of the internal life of the character. From an 
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actor’s perspective, the psychology of the character need not be the focus of the 
characterization process. It can provide needed knowledge to shape and guide 
the characterization, but the essence of the character is in the imagination. 
 The goals of transformation are the same for outside-in work and inside-
out work. What differs are the core assumptions. Those that favor psychological 
realism tend to believe that a character has psychologically determined traits that 
determine who he “is,” and that they can be teased out by the actor through 
script analysis to create a characterization. But for Sartre, character is 
indeterminate, rooted in the imaginary. There is no “truth” to be found within  a 
person, be it a real person or a fictional character. There is only a collection of 
facts which only have any relevance if the person chooses to allow those facts to 
affect their free will. We are what we choose to be, and even then, we are never a 
complete project. A more imaginative method of constructing identity in acting 
technique will allow an actor to create a character in the same manner that he 
constructs himself: intuitively, imaginatively, and intentionally.  
 Working with masks is not primarily about working with facts and 
suppositions, boundaries and determinations, but with ambiguity. Ambiguity 
invites imagination, for both the actor and the audience. Thus, while the end 
result of the masked characterization process – transformation – is like that of 
more traditional, psychologically-based processes, the use of the mask in 
character development is fundamentally a more imaginative process. It is, 
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Chapter 5 - The Mask and Sens 
So far in this dissertation we have discussed the imaginary nature of 
identity and how this nature informs and affects the acting process. In particular, 
we have examined how masks and masked work illustrate or heighten this 
imaginary quality. We have identified two properties of masks that make this so: 
a mask is an analogon in the Sartrean sense, and it is a functional object of play in 
the Waltonian sense. That is, masks point to another, absent identity and invite 
playing certain kinds of games with that identity. But all masks are not created 
equal. The kinds of identities and games which can be played vary from one 
mask to the next and one context to the next. 
It is generally acknowledged in the mask literature that some masks are 
better than others. By “better,” the authors usually mean that the mask is more 
expressive, better constructed, with a greater range of characterization—in short, 
with a better sense of “presence” that makes the mask seem alive when 
animated. On the other hand, some masks are “dead.” They are unable to project 
much of a sense of presence, or the performer may have a hard time identifying a 
character of any depth within them. For example, LeCoq advised that his masks 
should always be larger than the face to give the actor “room” to play with 
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characterization (36-37) (Fig. 1). For LeCoq, the play of the actor with the 
character is essential to his sort of work. Yet, one could argue that a small half-
mask could be as playful in a different style of work, or that a large helmet-style 
mask, such as Rangda (Fig. 2) from the Barong Ket, would not play very well in 
LeCoq’s exercises. There are many possible differences between masks which 
seem to defy any sort of aesthetic codification.  
  
 
One can, of course, point to certain elements in masks that are obvious 
marks of quality. A skilled carver may be able to make a far more expressive 
mask than a novice, or a particular mask may be ill-fitting, causing issues in 
performance. But beyond these technical elements, one mask can still be “better” 
than another. A master carver may create a mask which is very valuable as a 
piece of art, but ineffective in a performance. An untrained artist may create a 
simple, primitive mask out of papier-mâché that can end up being wonderfully 
expressive in performance. So, how does one articulate what makes a mask 
effective or ineffective? 
Fig. 1: LeCoq’s “Jesuit” Mask 
(57). 
Fig. 2: A Rangda mask 
(Hartley Film Foundation). 
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Further complicating this aesthetic question about masks is the notion of 
personal taste. Not everyone will react to a given mask the same way, and what 
is a “living presence” in performance for one person may be merely a performer 
in a mask for another. But rather than dismissing mask effectiveness as a “matter 
of taste,” it is possible to discuss an overall aesthetics of the mask which can 
account for the variations in effectiveness beyond subjective opinion. Such a 
discussion must be framed not only by examining qualities of the mask itself, but 
also by the performance context in which the mask appears. 
Part of the question of context can be examined through Waltonian terms: 
what games are authorized by the mask, what games are authorized by the 
performance situation, and who is playing the game. But because a mask serves 
to encourage the imaginary state in the consciousness of its viewers, any 
aesthetic discussion of masks should include the nature of how the imagination 
contributes to the overall impression of the mask in the consciousness of the 
viewer. For that, we will turn once again to Jean-Paul Sartre who wrote about 
aesthetics using the term sens (translated from French as “sense” or “meaning”). 
In this chapter we will discuss how the idea of “belief” in masks 
introduced in Chapter 3 will extend to the audience as well. As such, we will see 
that part of a mask’s effectiveness is the context of its use in performance and 
how the total synthesis of mask, movement, and performance contribute to a 
particular mask’s aesthetic quality. We will explore the Sartrean notion of sens (or 
“totality”) and how it can be applied to masks. We will also discuss how a 
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mask’s aesthetic value improves the better it, as an analogon, invites and plays 
with the imagination. What we find is that in masks, expression is more important 
than mimesis, and that elements of ambiguity and abstraction are essential to 
mask aesthetics. 
 
A Game of Performance 
 Some masks are better than others, but great deal of what makes a 
particular mask better in performance than another has to do with the context in 
which that particular mask is used in performance. That is to say that a mask 
with a particular style, a particular construction, and certain aesthetic qualities 
might be quite effective in one performance mode and yet fail to be effective in 
another. But that is not to say that the performance makes the mask, either. I 
would argue that there are some masks which would fail to “work” in almost any 
performance circumstance. By “work” here we mean that the mask successfully 
fulfils its partial role in the whole of the imaginary synthesis as a functional 
analogon which creates the presence of an otherwise absent character. A mask 
which works is part of the process that creates a believable presence in 
performance. There may be certain performance styles which intentionally draw 
attention to the artificiality of the performance itself (e.g. Brecht) but even so, 
there are some masks which would serve this purpose better than others. 
 In Chapter 3, we discussed how an actor can enter into a “trance” state 
when working with masks: a self-sustaining imaginative synthesis. Required of a 
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trance is belief: the actor must be willing to believe that her actions in the fictional 
circumstances of the performance are, nevertheless, truthful. While this trance 
state is useful for the actor, it is likely irrelevant for the audience*. However, belief 
is very much relevant. Just as an actor plays a “game” of identity which is 
authorized by the performative elements of the acting process (e.g. script, mask, 
mis-en-scene, movement, etc.), so, too, does the audience play a game with the 
entire performance. In fact, ideally, the audience and actors are playing the same 
game, though each has different roles and perspectives on the game as a whole. 
It is what Kendall Walton called a “collective imagining,” an experience where 
... not only do the various participants imagine many of the same things; 
each of them realizes that the others are imagining what he is, and each 
realizes that the others realize this. Moreover, steps are taken to see that 
the correspondence obtains. And each participant has reasonable 
expectations and can make justified predictions about what others will 
imagine given certain turns of events (Mimesis as Make-Believe, 18). 
 
Of course, not everyone in the experience imagines all things in the same way. 
Nevertheless, there are commonly shared imaginings which are similar in at least 
some fundamental ways. It is in this context that we will examine the 
relationship between audience, performance, and props such as masks. 
 Before looking at masks in particular, let us return to the example I put 
forth in Chapter 3 about the toy baby bottle which is used alternatively in a game 
                                                 
*
 One could argue that moments when the audience becomes “caught up” or “entranced” in the story and 
surrenders their being-in-the-world to the fiction of the performance as a kind of trance. This has relevance 
inasmuch as the audience participates imaginatively in the constitution of the performance, and this will be 
explored in more depth in the next chapter. However, the use of “trance” terminology in the mask literature 
is generally restricted to the acting process upon which trance has a much more direct impact. 
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of “caring for baby” and “flying to the moon.”* Let us assume a child, Chris, is 
using the bottle as a prop for a game of “caring for baby.” Chris picks up the 
bottle and approaches the doll. Chris speaks in a soothing voice, saying to the 
doll, “Are you hungry?” Chris’ body movements might be described as careful, 
concerned, or parental. Chris picks up the doll with care, mimicking how one 
might pick up a real infant, and places the bottle to the doll’s lips. Chris, we 
know, is playing the game “caring for baby.” We know this without having to 
ask Chris for an explanation of the events: we believe them, and we do so 
spontaneously. Chris, in playing the game of “caring for baby” has certain 
behaviors and choices which are “authorized” for the game, and certain 
behaviors which are not authorized. Chris makes physical self-alterations to 
reflect parental concern.  The props are treated as they would be were this not a 
game, i.e., the bottle is held to the lips, not the foot. In fact, the bottle is held like a 
bottle, even though it is only a plastic toy replica. Chris’ vocal choices are also 
those permissible within the “game” of “caring for baby.” In short, Chris performs 
the game of “caring for baby,” and Chris’ actions are truthful within the context 
of that game. 
 But suppose instead of a toy baby bottle and doll, Chris only had a pillow 
and crayon with which to play. Chris could still play the game of “caring for 
baby” by endowing the pillow with the qualities of being a baby and the crayon 
with the qualities of being a baby bottle. This is accomplished in the same 
                                                 
*
 Examining children at play is also fundamental to Walton’s approach to make believe. See Walton, 11. 
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manner as described above by treating the props of the game as if they were real. 
That the baby doll looks like a baby and the toy bottle looks like a real bottle may 
make it easier for Chris (and us, watching) to identify what the doll and toy are 
standing in for; however, the process is still the same. After all, the toys are also 
not the things they stand in for. Chris could hold up the crayon and tell us “This 
is the baby bottle, okay?” However, such a revelation may not be necessary. As 
Chris plays the game, we can see how the pillow is held as if it were a baby and 
the crayon is held as if it were a bottle. That the pillow is close in size and texture 
to a baby and the crayon is cylindrical like a bottle suggest their analogs. This 
may be why our Chris chose these two objects to be analoga for the baby and 
bottle in the absence of a toy which more definitively captures the sense of 
“baby” and “bottle.” If we were to observe Chris bring the tip of a crayon to the 
surface of a pillow, we might be confused—what is Chris doing? But if Chris 
continues to play the game with all of its elements including physical choices and 
speech, we can likely make the imaginative connection that Chris has already 
made: the pillow is a baby, the crayon is a bottle. This is because in an 
ambiguous setting (an absence of more “realistic” representation of the play 
items) we rely on the imagination. Chris’s movements and words are knowledge 
which is used to spark the imaginative synthesis for us. Chris need not give us 
this knowledge explicitly. We overcome the ambiguity of the pillow-as-baby 
because we can synthesize the transformation imaginatively. 
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 But suppose we encountered Chris bringing a legal pad of paper to the 
metal face of a red wagon? Would we then, know, what game is being played? 
“Are you hungry?” Chris asks the wagon, and carefully brings the corner of the 
pad of paper to the surface of the wagon. We may figure out from the other play 
elements what the game is, but we are more likely tempted to ask, “Chris, what 
are you doing?” Chris could then answer that the wagon is a baby and the legal 
pad is a bottle, and then we would have the knowledge we need to complete the 
imaginary synthesis and understand the game. But it is unlikely that we would 
discover such knowledge without explicit assistance from Chris. This is because 
even if Chris’ movements and words are authorized for the game of “caring for 
baby,” a wagon and pad of paper are not—at least, it is difficult to authorize them 
as such because they make a poor baby and bottle. This situation is too 
ambiguous; or, there are elements of the analoga which are in conflict with the 
objects they represent. A wagon is hard, cold, metal, and painted red; babies are 
soft, warm, fragile, and flesh-colored. A pad of paper is flat, rectangular, and can 
be awkward to manage if held so the pages fall open; a baby bottle is cylindrical, 
smaller, and self-contained. Given a choice, one might choose a pillow to be an 
analogon for a baby because the analogon and the object have at least certain 
things in common. It is less likely that one would choose a wagon to stand in for 
a baby because the aesthetic qualities of a wagon are too dissimilar to the 
aesthetic qualities of a baby. While it is possible that we could discover Chris’ 
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game with the wagon and legal pad, it is much less likely than in the previous 
examples. 
 Does this mean, then, that in the third example, that Chris is “bad” at 
playing the game? I doubt Chris believes so, especially if Chris doesn’t consider 
the involvement of others in the game. For Chris, the imaginary transformation is 
already made. However, if it is important to Chris that we watch and understand 
(and thus, participate in) the game, then it behooves Chris to select game props—
analoga – that will more accurately point to their objects. Barring that, Chris may 
feel compelled to present us with the knowledge we need beforehand: “The 
wagon is the baby and the pad is the bottle, okay?” Chris’ verbalization prior to 
play is an expectation that we will “play along;” that we will play the same game 
that Chris plays, and the utterance is made to ensure that the nature of the game 
(and its attendant authorized behaviors) are understood. 
 But Walton points out that when Chris does seek to coordinate our 
collective imaginings by making plain the props and their representations, we 
have sacrificed the spontaneous quality of the imagining. We must decide to 
imagine that the wagon is a baby. As a result, we must start from a more 
reflective attitude of consciousness, sacrificing the “vivacity” of a more 
spontaneous (and thus, more imaginative) game (Mimesis as Make-Believe, 18-19). 
 But even if Chris does not verbally provide the “rules” of the game, all of 
the other games actions are also an invitation to “play along.” That Chris moves 
and speaks in a certain way in relation to the props, space, and others, is an 
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implicit (and possibly even prereflective) invitation to participate or appreciate 
the game which authorizes those movements and speech. We become 
“participant-observers;” we observe, but we are not separated from the game. By 
observing the game, we participate in it, as part of the collective imagining. And 
as we are invited, our role as participant-observers is to, like Chris, imaginatively 
transform the doll into a baby (and Chris as a caregiver) within the context of the 
game. As Walton said, those who participate or appreciate a particular game are 
expected to behave in a manner which is authorized for that game (“Fictional 
Entities,” 407). In order for this behavior to happen, the game must be 
understood. Without this knowledge, then we are confused—is the wagon a 
baby? What is the legal pad supposed to be? In short, lacking knowledge or 
being presented with ambiguity or contradiction which we cannot overcome 
imaginatively we fail to join in the game. 
 It should be pointed out that when we speak of knowledge, we do not 
necessarily mean information which is processed reflectively. Chris carefully 
brings the crayon to the pillow with a posture of parental concern and we may 
reflectively think to ourselves, “Oh, Chris is feeding a baby.” But it is possible 
that awareness of the game will come to us intuitively. This is because our 
imaginations are activated and imaginary syntheses occur on the prereflective 
plane. Where we are likely to find ourselves resuming a more reflective (and 




 But choice of game props is not the only factor in constituting the 
believable behavior that is the game. Say instead that Chris does not handle the 
props with particular care. If Chris handles the doll roughly or recklessly, then 
the idea that the doll is an analogon for a real baby may be diminished or lost. 
Chris may “shorthand” the play, picking up the doll like it were a doll, not a baby 
(and thus, capable of withstanding a good deal more careless and rough 
handling), doing likewise with the toy bottle, and then briefly and perfunctorily 
touch the bottle to the doll’s lips. In such a case, Chris’ behavior, while 
authorized for the game, is not truthful. Chris indicates that the fictional baby is 
being fed fictionally, but does not do so in a manner in which suggests that the 
behavior is authentic. Admittedly, Chris may not have ever fed a real baby and 
thus, Chris’ imagination may be limited because of a lack of knowledge. But 
there is still a difference between indicating the behavior in a fictional situation 
and behaving truthfully in a fictional situation. If Chris engages with the props in a 
strongly imaginative way, Chris will act in an authentic way despite any lapses 
in knowledge which we, as more experienced observers, might have to constitute 
our understanding of the act. This is Chris’ “caring for baby,” and it is authentic 
inasmuch as Chris behaves in an authorized and truthful manner within the 
fictional game. 
 If, on the other hand, the play is approached in a more reflective mode— 
more aware of the game being played— Chris may “go through the motions” of 
the game. Chris may reduce the act of feeding the child to certain (and somewhat 
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arbitrary and personal) basics and indicate to those playing the game (Chris and 
us) that the doll is a baby, the toy bottle is real, and the baby is being fed by 
simply hitting these basics. In this case, Chris plays in a fictional situation, in an 
authorized manner, but not in a truthful way. We watch, and we may 
understand reflectively Chris’ actions, but it is unlikely that we believe in them as 
co-participants in the game. The actions are fictional because Chris indicates 
them, but does not do them. 
 That the doll and toy bottle look very much like their analogs makes it 
easier for us to understand the actions of the game, even if we don’t believe in 
them. But consider the example of pillow and crayon, above. If Chris indicates 
the actions of the game with these more ambiguous analoga, will we then 
understand the game? Chris picks up a pillow as a pillow, picks up a crayon as a 
crayon, and briefly touches the tip of the crayon to the pillow. What has 
happened? Chris knows, of course. But it is unlikely that we understand the 
nature of the game and as participants, we may feel confusion and uncertainty 
about our part in the game. It’s even less likely with props of a wagon and a legal 
pad. We have no frame of reference to imagine a wagon as a baby. We don’t 
know the rules as Chris does, therefore, we cannot imagine as Chris does, the 
transformations that occur. We must fall back on perception and observe. 
 Of course, a prop that suits one game may not suit another. Suppose a 
second child, Pat, wants to play a game of “flying to the moon.” The toy baby 
bottle bears a slight resemblance in basic shape to a rocket ship; Pat may elect to 
150 
 
use it for the game in the absence of a more “realistic” toy. Pat then can launch 
the bottle, which is now imaginatively a rocket and fly it about the room while 
held in the hand. In this case, the toy bottle has enough aesthetic similarity to a 
“real” rocket ship that will allow us, along with Pat’s other game behaviors (the 
zooming movement of the rocket, Pat’s accompanying sound effects, etc.) to 
make the imaginative leap along with Pat as we participate-observe the game. 
But suppose it becomes time for the rocket ship to land? A wagon can make a 
serviceable analogon to the surface of the moon: it’s flat and wide and hard. The 
same could not be said of “landing” the rocket on the doll: we see again the 
problem of too much ambiguity for us to make the imaginative transformation. 
Thus, while a wagon may be a terrible analogon for the game of “caring for baby,” 
it suits the game of “flying to the moon.” A doll makes an exceptional analogon 
for a baby, but is difficult to accept as standing in for the surface of the moon 
upon which a rocket may land. 
 It may be easy to conclude from these various examples that the more 
realistic an analogon is the better. That is, the more an analogon looks like the real 
thing—mimesis or verisimilitude— the less confusion we will have about what 
the analogon represents. Certainly, a wagon is not a baby where a doll is almost 
always understood to be a baby. But consider that Chris’ doll is very lifelike. The 
skin has a particular tone, the cheeks are particularly chubby, the fingers curled 
in an angelic gesture, while the doll’s clothing is very detailed, with buttons and 
shoes and a particular pattern on the clothes. There is little question that this doll 
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stands in for a baby; however, this doll is also standing in for this particular baby. 
This baby has so much detail that it would be difficult to imagine this baby as 
anything but this plump-cheeked, cherubic child which it so carefully represents. 
It is not impossible, as Walton points out, just as is it is possible to imagine a 
steamy exotic jungle while in the midst of the city looking at tall buildings and 
cars.  “What is not so easy is imagining this vividly while glaring evidences of 
civilization dominate one’s consciousness” (Mimesis as Make-Believe, 15). So if we 
are to see Chris’ highly-detailed doll as, say, a penniless orphan child, we may be 
able to do so— but only by once again sacrificing the spontaneous and vivid 
quality of the imagining. 
 On the other hand, consider that Chris had a featureless rag doll: abstract 
arms and legs but no hands or feet, no face, a baby’s size and shape, a simple 
dress, colored in a neutral tan. Such a doll lacks the detail of the first example, 
but it is still understood to be a baby. In fact, it could be many babies, 
imaginatively speaking, inasmuch as because it does not make a definitive choice 
about certain qualities, the ambiguity which is left by these absences invites the 
imagination to fill in the gaps in a manner appropriate to the intention we have 
towards the doll at a given moment. We will discuss in greater detail the role of 
ambiguity in analoga shortly; however, it is important to note that a more realistic 
doll does not necessarily mean that doll is superior in all game situations. If the 
baby is to be a penniless orphan, then the richly-clothed doll may not be 
authorized for the game. Chris may make this authorization, but if we are 
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participant-observers in the game, the fine clothes may seem out of bounds, and 
the cost of this violation of the rules is the vivacity of the image.  The rag doll, 
however, could be authorized. And so long as the rag doll is not shabby, but 
simple and ambiguous, it could stand in for that orphan child or a rich baby—at 
least, such a transformation would be easier without aesthetic elements in 
conflict with the rules of the game. 
 Thus, we see that from a participant-observer’s vantage in a game of 
make-believe a particular analogon can be better or worse not only depending on 
the game being played, but also on how the analogon is used in the game, and 
certain aesthetic qualities the analogon shares with the object it stands in for.  Of 
course, each of us comes to the game with our own particular point of view. 
Chris’ version of the game will be different on many levels from our individual 
games. However, Chris’ performance of the game will provide the knowledge that 
will spark our own personal imaginative syntheses. The performance and its 
apprehension define the game. Further, with the right props, the right context, 
and the right behaviors, Chris’ performance of the game can invite us to 
participate in an imaginary, prereflective, and spontaneous way. 
 Our act of observing Chris and Pat play with toys is, of course, very much 
like our role as spectators watching a play. The play is a game of make-believe, 
there are certain behaviors which are authorized and certain which are not, and 
we, as participant-observers, are expected to “play along.” In the case of masked 
performances, the mask analogon takes on similar sorts of properties as the toys 
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used in the previous examples. We know a mask stands in for another 
personage. We also know that how a mask is used by the actor, i.e. “animating” 
it, plays a part in how the performance game is understood. We can also begin to 
see that how a mask is constructed will impact the believability of the actions in 
the game, and we can surmise that certain masks will be better in certain 
performances and worse in others. 
 But what is meant by the “Other” of the mask? We know that the other is 
an imaginary object, a personage, which is meant to be made present in the game 
of the performance. Does this mean, then, that masks should be very realistic, 
bringing as much detail as they can to the face in order to recreate this “other?” 
Like the rag doll example, detail can be limiting. Too much ambiguity, though, 
and we fail to imagine as we fall back on perception to find the knowledge we 
need. What is needed in a mask, then, is neither an exact replica of the face of the 
other nor a blank slate devoid of expression. Rather, a mask should capture the 
“sense” of the personage being made present. To further explore this idea of 
“sense,” we will turn to Sartre’s aesthetic, sens. 
 
Sens, Mimesis, and Expression 
Masks, like other works of art, are more effective the better they capture 
the sens of the character which they represent. Sens is the ability of an analogon 
to capture the “totality” of the object it represents (Flynn, 436). Sartre aligns 
himself with gestalt theory in that he believes a given object has properties that 
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cannot be found in the sum of its individual parts (Wertheimer). A piano has a 
certain shape, a certain color of wood, a certain tone, certain memories associated 
with it, and thousands of other details that constitute the object of the piano; and 
yet, none of these things individually or in combination can capture the 
wholeness that is the piano. This wholeness is the piano’s sens.  
Sens captures for the viewer the essence of a particular thing. This essence 
or totality can only be possessed in the imagination. Totality here cannot be a 
perception, because perception is by its very nature limited. Totality then is a 
quality more properly imagined. Thomas Flynn writes: 
The bond between object, sens, and image is intrinsic. They are co-
constituting. So the production of a work of art, though Sartre 
calls it a generous act, retains a certain narcissistic character 
owing to its imaginative rather than signifying form. For the 
relations between means and ends in art is the reverse of what it is 
in communication via signs: it is the audience which acts as means 
for recreating the aesthetic object through its sens (436). 
 
The viewer’s intention, here, plays a significant part in the constituting the sens of 
the object, though it is not the only part—i.e. it is not merely a matter of taste. A 
photograph of a sunflower may not be as effective in capturing the sens of 
“sunflower-ness” as Van Gogh’s paintings (Fig. 3). Perhaps there is, for the 
viewer, something about Van Gogh’s paintings which are a more accurate 
analogon for the “essence” of the idea of “sunflowers” in his imagination. The 
paintings are not “realistic,” but they may, in the imagination of the viewer, be 
more truthful about the nature of sunflowers.  
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When we discuss the aesthetics of an 
object, especially an art object, we tend to think 
of such a discussion in terms of “beauty.” But 
the sens of sunflowers is not merely a question 
of their beauty. Likewise, Van Gogh’s 
Sunflowers have more qualities than beauty 
which constitute their nature in our 
consciousness. It is easy to say that Sunflowers 
“is” or “is not beautiful.” This is a statement on 
the painting with the assumption (not uncommon for aesthetic discussions) that 
its role of the artist is to present a beautiful object, a role which is less and less 
held as important among artists and aestheticians (Behrens, 318). Rather than 
simply ask if a work of art (such as a mask) is beautiful, we will consider, as 
Sartre does, beauty as a property of the object. And more than beauty, other 
properties which we can say an object “has” – including emotional states – are 
placed there by our consciousness through the imaginative constitution of that 
object. We look at the painting and may find the flowers to be beautiful, the color 
to be hot, the brushstrokes to be feverish. These properties are placed there by our 
consciousness from our own knowledge and intention, but are not done so 
arbitrarily. The properties are also constituted through the analogon itself. For 
Sartre, then, the apprehension of beauty, hotness, loneliness, sadness, horror, or 
any other aesthetic quality is ultimately an imaginative act in the consciousness 
Figure 3: Sunflowers, Van Gogh. 
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Figure 4: The Thinker, Rodin. 
of the viewer. Beauty is, truly, in the eye of the beholder, but it is not a 
completely subjective process. Because aesthetic appreciation is an imaginary act, 
it therefore shares the qualities of spontaneous synthesis of other imaginary acts, 
i.e., any appreciation comes from a simultaneous synthesis of knowledge and 
intention (which assign certain aesthetic qualities to the object), and the analogon 
that carries the sens of the object itself. Thus, when we discuss the aesthetics of an 
object, we are discussing all properties of that object which appear through the 
imaging synthesis. We have mentioned that 
these aesthetic properties include emotion. An 
expanded discussion of Sartre’s notion of 
emotion will appear in the next chapter. For 
now, it is important only to remember that an 
emotion vis-a-vis an object is a property of that 
object. (Emotional behavior, on the other hand, is 
a related but different matter.) We can say that 
Rodin’s The Thinker (Fig. 4) appears to be 
“brooding,” and such a statement is an aesthetic 
evaluation of the imaginary object of The Thinker of which the actual statue is an 
analogon. The shaped bronze statue does not literally “brood.” But the shaped 
bronze statue points to an overall totality which only exists in the imagination 
and it is this totality which can be said to “brood.” When we look at the statue 
itself, we can then discuss how Rodin’s technique skillfully guides us to discover 
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this brooding quality as we apprehend the statue. But Rodin’s technique is the 
means by which the “brooding” is expressed. Expression, then, is a different aim 
than replicating an object as it appears in life, which is termed mimesis. 
The difference between mimesis and expression is important for any 
discussion of aesthetic “wholes,” such as sens. Tomonobu Imamichi argues that 
the idea of mimesis has been the traditionally valued aesthetic of Western (his 
term: Occidental) cultures, while in Eastern (Oriental) cultures, traditionally 
expression is more valued, though in modern times the values have reversed 
(145). In the West, mimesis emerged from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, 
with the ideal goal of art as “imitative representation” (141). Imamichi points out 
that the goal of mimesis is not, as many misinterpret Plato to mean, to represent 
a “concrete thing” which is already one step removed from the ideal thing, 
presenting the “shadow of a shadow” of the thing; rather, mimesis is a 
representation of the ideal thing itself. The role of the artist, if he is talented, is to 
imitate the “divine truth through his imitative, representative skill” (142). For the 
less talented artist, he must do his best to imitate the object itself, which is 
already one step away from the divine, ideal totality. Nevertheless, the emphasis 
is on imitation, presenting as closely as possible, the ideal thing being represented 
in art. 
Compare this to expression, which Imamichi finds as the root of Eastern 
aesthetic tradition. Imamichi cites Sheh Hua, an 8th century Chinese aesthetician, 
who outlined, in order of importance, six qualities of painting (144). Hua’s first, 
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most important quality of painting was that the painting expresses “the spirit of 
nature.”  This means an attempt, by the artist, to express the ultimate, 
transcendent nature of the thing itself. For instance, capturing correct color is not 
as important to the artist as other elements because the color of, say, a landscape, 
only occurs at a given time, for a moment. “If the art of painting wishes to reach 
the essence of the universe,” writes Imamichi, “we may not cling to its 
phenomenal, limited appearance. Hence, colour must be negated in order to 
approach the reality of nature” (144). This means that if one wishes to express the 
totality of the thing itself, one must diminish the mimetic details (e.g. color) so 
that the transcendent quality can emerge. This diminishment will prove 
instrumental as we continue to discuss sens. 
There are, of course, parallels between Eastern and Western mask 
traditions and these ideas of mimesis and expression. However, because mask 
cultures are far too varied to classify as merely “Eastern” or “Western” and 
because of the enormous differences in the assumptions and uses of masks 
within these discreet cultures, we will not attempt to draw specific parallels here. 
We can acknowledge that in modern Western theatre, specifically, despite the 
work of theorists such as Brecht, Grotowski, and Brook, the majority of acting 
theory and performance today continues to rely on mimesis as the core aesthetic 
value: representing on the stage or screen that which is like life as it appears to 
us. But as we see from the idea of expression in Eastern thought, can the ideal 
whole of a thing be expressed through mimetic elements? Sartre believed it could 
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not, and found that through ambiguity and abstraction, a object’s sens could be 
revealed. 
 
Ambiguity, Abstraction and Sens 
In his book Sartre and the Artist, George Howard Bauer discusses Sartre’s 
ideas on art, aesthetics, and art criticism as they appeared in Sartre’s writings 
over the years. Bauer describes Sartre’s aesthetic approach in terms of “being” 
and “existence.” To exist is to have consciousness of the world: to have a body 
that intersects and interacts with the real objects of the world. One need no 
reason to “exist;” one simply does. But, by contrast, “being” is a purposeful state; 
to exist for a reason and to know that reason. Man has a body which “exists” but 
existentially cannot “be.” For example, a piano both exists and is. It has a purpose 
which was defined by its creator: a reason for being. It is itself and nothing more. 
But because Sartre believes that the essential state of man is one “suspended in 
his freedom,” (Being and Nothingness, 25) he has no purpose other than that 
which he creates for himself. Man certainly exists, but he cannot “be.”  
Consequently, there is a void in man which must be filled (Bauer, 4). An aesthetic 
property, such as beauty, then, “is a being which cannot be given to perception 
and that, in its very nature, is isolated from the universe” (Imaginary 189). We 
look at Van Gogh’s Sunflowers and we find there qualities which do not exist in 
perception. As Gestalt theory would point out, we could look at Van Gogh’s 
choice of color palette, the missing petals, the arrangement of shapes in the 
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picture, and on and on. Yet, while such an examination might help us 
understand how Van Gogh created the painting he did, we would still not be 
able to account for the overall “sense” of the painting which only exists in our 
imagination. Each of these elements (the gestalt “figure”) becomes the object of 
our perception one at a time, but we still only imagine the whole (the gestalt 
“ground”). For Sartre, works of art hold great attraction for us because they point 
to, or express, the essential nature, the “being”, which does not exist in 
perception. We want to fill the void caused by our lack of “being,” and we 
sometimes try to fill that void with the “being” of aesthetic objects. 
This essential being, this idea of being what one “is” as a fundamental 
nature, is expressed in the idea of sens. A person views Van Gogh’s sunflowers 
and perhaps she sees in the painting the true essence of what sunflowers “are”. 
The sens of “sunflower-ness” is present in Van Gogh’s painting. Our viewer may 
be tempted to confuse the real and irreal. She may transfer the idea of 
“sunflower-ness” as aesthetic object to real sunflowers in the real world. But 
aesthetic appreciation is an imaginary act, and as such, her own intention and 
knowledge play a part in constituting the object through its sens.  
Sartre says that all works of art are irreal (Imaginary 188). By this, he does 
not mean the analogon itself, but rather, the imaged object the analogon points to. 
While a sculpture is real, in the imaging process, the analogon loses its own sense 
(as a piece of shaped bronze called The Thinker) and acquires the sense of the 
object which it represents (a totality given all at once which is The Thinker), 
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which, in turn, exists only in the imagination—and as a specific object which is 
particular to the individual consciousness apprehending it (my Thinker will be 
different than your Thinker, though it is likely there will be things in common to 
both Thinkers). But if a continuum between perception and imagination exists it 
follows that a particular analogon may be apprehended more or less 
imaginatively than another. We have already outlined how a prop in children’s 
play can be more or less effective given the prop’s aesthetic elements, context, 
and use in play. But Sartre believed, as we will discuss below, that even in a 
broad variety of contexts, abstraction was more aesthetically pleasing than realism. 
Sartre had a particular set of biases which influenced his ideas on the purpose 
and beauty of art; these will become more apparent as we discuss them. 
However, his observations will have specific ramifications for masks and their 
uses. 
Let us assume a photographer is going to take a picture of a sunflower. 
We might consider a photograph to be “realistic;” at least, more “realistic” than 
an abstract painting. By realism we mean the analogon carries with it a high 
degree of verisimilitude to the object it represents as it would appear in 
perception. I stand in front of a (real) sunflower, raise a camera to my eye and 
take a picture of, more or less, what exists for me in my field of perception. My 
aim is to capture a photograph which is visually similar to how I see the 
sunflower in reality. Admittedly, there is much that is missing from the resultant 
photo compared to the perceptive experience that just preceded it—sound, visual 
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elements which are beyond the frame of the camera, movement caused by the 
wind, etc. Nevertheless, this photograph could be said to be “realistic” inasmuch 
as it represents the perceptive experience within the limitations of the medium. It 
is taken from my eye level, the lighting is natural, and filmic representations 
usually have a high degree of detail which is very much like life. It is a mimetic 
attempt to present the sunflower. 
There is, however, more than one way to take a picture. The photographer 
could use different camera angles, lighting, photo effects, etc. to manipulate the 
final photo; however, in each of these choices, the photographer as artist is 
making choices which move the analogon away from perception and towards 
imagination. Instead of taking the photo from my standing eye level straight on, I 
might, instead, crouch down and take the photo from a vantage below the 
blossom, with the sun brightly illuminating the petals from behind. While the 
photograph still has the high level of detail that is typical of film, my choices as a 
photographer have changed the resulting analogon. The colors are brighter, the 
background is nothing but the sky streaked with sunlight from a lens flare 
caused by my positioning. I have, in some sense, abstracted the image of the 
sunflower. If we compare the simple, perception-like photo with the more 
abstracted, artistic choices, we may find both to be beautiful; however, the 
abstract second photograph is more likely to invite us to imagine and in doing 
so, we are more likely to synthesize the totality of “sunflower-ness” though the 
analogon and our own intentions. We look at the first photo, we imagine through 
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the second. The closer an object is to the “perception” side of the perception-
imagination scale, the more difficult it is to be “beautiful,” because one cannot 
perceive beauty. One can only imagine beauty. 
This is not to say that a photograph or “realistic” analogon is incapable of 
carrying the sens of beauty. A photograph of a sunflower is still an analogon and 
as a result, it carries with it the potential to activate the imaging consciousness. A 
particular person may find a photograph of a sunflower to carry the sens of 
sunflowers more than Van Gogh’s paintings. As Flynn wrote above, it is the 
viewer that creates the imaginary object out of its sens. But consider Imamichi, 
here writing about the value shift from mimesis to expression which occurred in 
the Western visual art world with the advent of the camera: 
Even a photographic machine of the best quality cannot have insight into 
the human being. Art concentrates on exposing this inner landscape of 
human feeling. To bring out the human feeling from its secret interiority 
into the domain of visual form, to express the inner man which is invisible 
to the outside world, became the modern principle of art (143). 
 
One might take issue with Imamichi’s implication that no photo can capture “the 
interior landscape of human feeling.” But I think we can agree that such hidden 
interiors, essences, and truths about the human condition can only be 
apprehended imaginatively. So, it is fair to conclude that generally speaking, the 
further an analogon is from representing its object in a realistic way, the more the 
imaginary state is invited. As a result, Sartre believed that abstraction was more 
aesthetically pleasing than realism. 
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This abstraction will prove important to masks as sculpted forms, which 
Bauer also discusses from Sartre’s aesthetic viewpoint. Sartre disliked traditional 
sculptural forms because of their realistic nature and their choice of “sacred” 
materials such as marble and gold (95). He felt that they froze the image of man 
in such a way as to make a definitive statement about man’s nature (93). Thus, 
they failed to capture the ambiguous nature of man’s existence. They are 
“corpses,” dead bodies. They represent an attempt to give man a “being” 
essence. As Bauer observes, “In [Sartre’s] creative works, the art object—
particularly those that are anthropomorphic in character—represents a continual 
attraction for those who confuse the real and imaginary” (4). Abstract forms were 
more appealing to Sartre, partly because they denied the “fixed” or “realistic” 
mode he detested. As Sartre said, “Beauty is a value that can only be applied to 
the imaginary and carries with it the nihilation of the world in its essential 
structure. This is why it is stupid to confuse the moral and the aesthetic” 
(Imaginary, 193). This last point indicates that Sartre also approved of abstraction 
in art because abstract aesthetic forms were more imaginative in nature. After all, 
if it is because we can imagine that we are free, then more abstract art is more 
reflective of the nature of mankind as it encourages imagination and denies a 
fixed “being” or “nature.”   
Sartre likes David Hare’s sculpture (Fig. 5), for example, because Hare can 
express the human form without turning it into a ‘corpse.’ He does this by 
removing the human form from the space within which the viewer exists. By 
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Figure 5: Hare’s 
Moon Cage. 
abstraction, a different reality or representation of movement, the sculpture steps 
outside the world with which the viewer is familiar (Bauer, 101-102). This is 
moving away from a perceptual mode of apprehension and toward an imaginary 
mode. Just as caricature is not realistic but can capture the 
“essence” of a person better than a photograph, so, too, can 
abstraction capture the sens of a subject in a more 
imaginary way.  
If we look at a mask as a sculptural form whose aim 
is to serve as a functional analogon of a particular personage 
in a performance play situation, it would seem prima facie 
evidence to suggest that more abstracted masks will work 
better than realistic ones. However, it is possible to go “too 
far.” Hare, in Bauer, talks about how if a piece of 
sculpture has strong elements of symbolism in it, the 
piece risks the viewer turning it into an “anecdote” – a piece about the symbol, 
not about the work itself (100). In this case, the work of art is drawing attention 
to itself as a work of art. The viewer no longer apprehends the work as an 
analogon, but as a means of communication.  This change in attitude brings the 
viewer out of the imaging consciousness and into a perceptual one—a reflective 
consciousness where the work of art is studied and analyzed. For Sartre, a work 
of art should not be a symbol: it should not have communication as its aim. “The 
colors of painting and the sounds of music, in Sartre’s opinion, are not used as 
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language” (Bauer 7). Rather, the function of the art object is to transform an 
essence into an object. It is not a question of morality—of the artist making a 
statement – but beauty (and other aesthetic elements). Artists use their skills, 
imaginations, and insights into creating an aesthetic object which stands in for an 
absent object. The skilled artist learns how to capture the sens of the absent object 
within the analogon she creates. The artist should not “talk about” his subject 
within his art, she should present it. Sartre valued this “uncommunicative” style 
of art because when an artist attempts to spell out or define something about her 
subject, she denies the inherent ambiguity of that object and attempts to affix it 
with a “purpose.” Such a denial removes the life from the subject by removing its 
freedom. 
Sartre’s personal agenda about the role and function of art aside, his ideas 
on aesthetics have very useful things to say about masks in performance. If a 
given mask is to make present a particular personage, then it behooves the mask-
maker to attempt to capture the sens of the personage in the form of the mask. 
Often it is tempting for the artist to use deliberate signs to indicate the 
personality of the personage in the mask. But while very ornate construction, 
decoration, or design can heighten the initial impact of a mask’s appearance, the 
audience will have a tendency to tire of watching it sooner (Popenhagen, 21). I 
believe this is because choices of symbolism or ornate-ness deny the ambiguity of 
the masks, which is, as Popenhagen said, their most theatrical feature. Such 
choices are attempts at creating symbols rather than sens, and thus invite a 
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perceptive attitude rather than an imaginative one. Masks which have a very 
strong choice end up being solely about that choice. 
For example, a performer wearing a mask that is exaggeratedly angry in 
its facial construction will have a difficult time finding any other traits in the 
character outside of “angry.” Likewise, an audience that observes such a mask 
will find it hard to find any other sens in the performance than “very angry”. Of 
course, the performer could attempt to perform other emotions, like melancholy; 
but if the face is too specific in its anger, the sens of melancholy will not appear. 
This is because the behavior of melancholy is not authorized for the game of 
identity which is suggested by the mask. The angry face is so strong that only 
anger seems authorized by the mask. The very angry mask cannot be an analogon 
for a melancholy character in this example. Masks with very strong, symbolic 
choices are more limited and run the risk of pushing the audience out of an 
imaginative attitude into a more perceptive one. 
On the other hand, masks which suggest, rather than make plain, 
emotional states or characterization, invite the imagination. A mask that only 
hints at anger in its expression may also hint at other emotions, qualities, or 
ideas. As the actor animates the mask with her body, the audience synthesizes 
the various signs of the performance imaginatively. If there is ambiguity in these 
signs, then the performance gives the audience room to synthesize sens in ways 
that their imaginations intend. The mask can appear angry at one moment, 
melancholy another, and pensive a third because the construction of the mask is 
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not so specific as to limit the imaginative possibilities. Without this ambiguity the 
mask loses its potential for variety. 
It is also possible to be too ambiguous. Neutral masks, for example, 
attempt to deny any character at all. Without some choice of characterization, 
style, or emotion, there is no sens for the imagination to synthesize. However, it is 
important to remember that neutrality is an ideal condition, and not one which 
can be achieved in a mask (Eldredge, 54). As discussed in Chapter 4, most 
neutral masks do have some sort of character in them, even if it is merely a sense 
of profound calm. However, like a mask that is too strongly constructed, a too 
ambiguous mask limits imaginary choices as well. 
 Masks cannot be purely realistic, in any case, even if one wanted to 
construct a mask that was. Even the most carefully constructed and lifelike mask 
(a life mask, for instance) cannot avoid being seen as a mask; at least, not for long. 
A mask’s reality does not come from how lifelike it is; rather, a mask’s 
verisimilitude comes from its “presence in moments of play” (Popenhagen, 21). 
The play is a part of the imaginative process: the actor plays with the mask to 
create the character, the audience plays with the observed performance to create 
the presence of the character through its sens. Evaluating a mask’s aesthetic value 
then is evaluating how well the mask embodies the sens of the character. Sens is 
synthesized in the imagination, and masks that are abstracted and ambiguous 
invite the imaginary state. The best masks seem to make suggestions of character 
without completely illustrating them. A mask that is too ambiguous gives little 
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Figure 6: An Appel 
mask (111). 
sens for the audience’s knowledge to fix upon. A mask that is too strongly 
constructed ends up being too limited and risks drawing attention to itself as a 
mask, pulling the viewer out of the imaginary state and into a perceptual one 
(Popenhagen, 106). 
  The choice of expression, generally speaking, is a stronger aesthetic choice 
than mimesis by Sartrean standards. The imagination is stronger than 
perception: stronger because it is complete, though degraded; stronger because 
the image carries with it everything that we expect it to carry; and stronger 
because only in the imagination can we find sens. Thus, aesthetic objects which 
are apprehended in a more imaginary way are stronger than those that are 
apprehended in a perceptual way. 
 
Ambiguity in Practice 
Several mask theorists have explored this dynamic of ambiguity and the 
imaginary in their work. We have already mentioned 
the actor training programs of Libby Appel and her use 
of masks to help break down “boundaries around the 
imagination” in her students. Appel has designed her 
own masks for such a purpose (Figs. 6, 7, 8). They are 
intentionally contradictory and ambiguous. They are 
somewhat grotesque, but their inherent contradictions 
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Figure 7: Another Appel 
mask (87). 
Figure 8: Many Appel masks 
(95). 
allow for more possibilities of expression. They “provide the maximum 
inspiration while imposing few limitations” (Appel 4). 
Appel’s masks cover the entire face and are larger than life-sized. This 
largeness creates “an immediate need for the actor to meet the size and depth of 
the mask, and decipher the ambiguity of 
personality” (Appel 5). Appel wants the actors to 
make large choices in their encounter with the 
masks. That the masks are larger than a normal 
face encourages broader, larger 
characterizations. Further, she is careful to 
make sure there are contradictions built into the 
expression of the mask: “… one side of the mouth may droop, while the other 
moves upward, the brow is worried and the chin is defiant, etc.” (Appel 4). In 
this way, Appel’s masks take on an 
ambiguity in their contradictions which 
allows “a great width in interpretation for the 
actor and prevents the development of 
character “types” or “stereotypes” (Appel 4). 
Appel states that each mask she uses 
in her classes is different but is crafted in the 
same style as the others. This, she says, 
ensures that the masks feel like they belong “to the same world” (5). By this, she 
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is finding a common sens for all the masks to share. That is not to say that all the 
masks have the same sense, but rather, there are elements that each of the masks 
shares with the others, and in this manner the masks as a group authorize similar 
sorts of games of identity. In this way, the students using the masks in exercises 
are less likely to be drawn from their imaginary state by the presence of a being 
who “doesn’t belong,” aesthetically speaking. In addition, the common style 
provides a unity of characterization among the masks. They belong to the same 
fictional world. As we watch them, we feel they belong together because of their 
shared elements of sens.  
Appel’s masks use contradiction as ambiguity. Instead of a “hinted at” 
characterization, Appel’s masks are made with large, grotesque choices. 
However, it is their inherent contradictions which keep them from becoming too 
limited in expression. The end result is a mask whose sens is larger-than-life, 
primitive, sometimes brutal, sometimes naïve. They are characterizations painted 
with broad strokes, but no particular mask is limited to a particular emotional 
state. These masks provide particular personalities when animated, and because 
of their inherent contradictions, these personalities can develop into three-
dimensional characters. 
Appel’s masks illustrate well how ambiguity allows for variety in 
characterization. Nevertheless, Appel’s masks are designed for the context in 
which she uses them: students performing exercises which are personal and 
physically demanding, designed at stripping away pretense and manner and 
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Figure 9: Eldredge’s 
“simple character 
mask” (86). 
encouraging a more primal and raw state. To this end, Appel’s masks are 
effective. To other ends, though, the masks may or may not “work.” But her 
masks are an example of capturing a particular sens for a particular context and 
for making aesthetic choices which authorize a particular kind of game that is 
shared by all the participants. 
Appel shows us that ambiguity is important. But that does not mean to 
say that a fixed-choice mask cannot provide transformation—it is more a 
question of the depth of the character produced. Sears Eldredge has found that 
even simple line-drawing masks (Figs. 9 & 10) can have transformative effects on 
the actors (180-189). Eldredge uses these line-drawing masks—he calls them 
“beginning character masks” – as part of his exercises to get students to play 
with transformation. Many of these masks have strong emotional choices in their 
expressions. As a result, students who first put on these 
masks will likely find themselves responding to this 
very basic and limited sens: a character ‘type’.  
However, these masks have a simplicity to them 
which works in their favor. Unlike, say, a fearsome 
latex Halloween mask which may be baroque in its 
expression of terror, Eldredge’s paper and marker 
masks in their plainness find a different sort of 
ambiguity: ambiguity of detail. Just as in caricature 
where a few lines can capture the “essence” of its subject, these masks distill the 
173 
 
Figure 10: More “simple 
character” masks (86). 
sens of the character down to the minimum. This ambiguity of detail invites the 
imagination to play with the initial, strong choice. 
 Admittedly, even with this ambiguity, some of the caricature masks are 
limited in their expressivity. Still, it is often possible to find variety where there is 
ambiguity. So, while students will, most likely, identify with the obvious, strong 
choice in the caricature masks, Eldredge encourages them to engage with the 
masks further to find depth beyond this initial impression. He instructs the 
students to play a “counter-mask,” that is, visually fix in their minds the image of 
a mask face which is completely opposite in personality from their main mask. 
The student can then switch back and forth between one visual identification and 
another. Eldredge has students think of these as inner and outer faces of the 
characters (indeed, he recommends students wear two of the paper masks at 
once!) and use the identifications as inner and outer lives of the character 
(Eldredge 97-98). 
The problem with this approach is that the 
sens of the inner mask as expressed in the body may 
not connect with the sens of the outer mask. It is 
possible that it will, but this inner mask is an 
identification with an analogon which only the actor 
can see. There is a real possibility that any audience 
observing this character will not find unity between 
the body of the actor and the face which they can see. This is fine for exercise 
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purposes but would be less likely to work for performances where an audience-
participant is expected to “play along” in an authorized game. 
Still it is possible to find a counter-mask within the same mask. In my own 
exercises with caricature masks (based on Eldredge’s designs), I have had 
students find the obvious identification of the masks, then asked them to play 
with the masks further and find a second or even third body that is in harmony 
with the same mask. For instance, a very sad mask initially inspires a very “sad” 
body which is in harmony with the mask: shoulders slumped, head bowed, a 
loss of energy, etc. However, on further prompting, an actor may discover that a 
body that is “pensive” also is in harmony with the mask: the mask authorizes 
this sort of play as well. Other characteristics, often expressed as emotional 
states, might be found through experimentation with the body, movement, and 
the image of the mask. This is physical play, finding the boundaries of the game. 
The students engage with their bodies and their imaginations to find a sens 
beyond the obvious, initial one. As expected, some caricature masks are better 
than others at creating this depth. But the end results are characters that can have 
a second or third “personality” which comes from the sens of the same mask. In 
performance, the actors will have found different postures, physical energies, 
and movement efforts that reflect the different moods of the mask and which are 
in harmony with its sens. Even with a simple mask, this admittedly sketchy 
depth allows the masked actor to express different attitudes and feelings as part 
of the same persona in an authentic manner: arising from the sens of the mask. 
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Figure 11: Benda’s 
“Golden Beauty” 
mask (72). 
Of course, there are masks which look very realistic that can be very 
expressive. Illustrator and mask-maker W.T. Benda made masks of papier-mâché 
that could be startlingly realistic. His masks tended to fall into three categories: 
beautiful women, caricatures, and grotesques. While all of Benda’s masks reflect 
the maker’s great skill, not all of them are suitable for a performance which seeks 
character depth. 
 Benda’s beautiful women masks (Fig. 11) 
resemble the Japanese Noh masks of the various onna 
styles. That is, they are comparatively realistic in their 
representation of the human female face and painted in 
human skin tones. Their expressions, at first, seem 
somewhat neutral, but there are small hints of 
characterization that, upon animation, are capable of 
expressing a range of emotive qualities. Benda’s 
women, like the Noh masks, find ambiguity not in abstraction or caricature, but 
in subtlety.  In performance, these masks suggest. These suggestions are brought 
into a larger sens with the movement of the actor. But it is not merely the 
performance that creates meaning in the mind of the audience. Like all imaginary 
acts, the audience’s knowledge, intentions and expectations recreate the 
character through its sens as presented by the actor. These subtle masks provide 
just enough knowledge for the audience to connect with and then invite the 
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Figure 12: Benda’s 
“Beelzebub” mask 
(75). 
imagination to fill in the gaps. True for all masks, these masks especially 
illustrate how the audience sees what it intends to see in the face of the mask. 
Benda’s caricature masks are similar in function to the Beginning 
Character masks of Eldredge, discussed above. That is, the sens is writ large. As a 
result, the masks tend to express more limited 
possibilities. These limitations become more and more 
restrictive the more ornate or strong the mask. Some of 
his grotesques are too fixed in their expression to be 
useful in a performance which requires their personae 
to behave beyond one or two manners. For instance, 
Benda’s “Beelzebub” mask (Fig. 12), while striking in 
its initial impact, is so strongly characterized that when 
the mask is brought into motion, i.e. transformed from a static art object into an 
analogon for a personage, the mask cannot “do” but so much*. It expresses a sense 
of a particular brutish anger, which authorizes a game of brutish, angry 
behavior. But it is unlike “Golden Beauty” not only in overall sens, but “Golden 
Beauty’s” more ambiguous or subtle expression authorizes games ranging from 
coquettish flirtation, embarrassment, serenity, wistfulness, and so on. Golden 
Beauty could not “do” brutish anger. No mask can carry every sens. But we find 
that masks which have very strong characterizations become more limited. Like 
                                                 
*
 A very rare and very short film of Benda wearing the Beelzebub mask exists and was shown by Sears 
Eldredge at the 2005 “Masks of Transformation” conference at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. 
Having seen this film, it is my personal feeling that seeing the mask in motion, albeit briefly and in only 
one manner, supports my claim that the mask, while striking, is limited in its expressive possibility. 
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masks which are made to hang on a wall, they become more sculptural forms—
interesting to look at, but incapable of allowing the imagination to give them a 
deep life. Thus fixed, they lack a sense of dynamism as part of their sens. 
 Sartre responds aesthetically to an event: to the suggestion of motion 
(Bauer 95). Fixed forms, art objects that express “being” do not interest him. A 
sense of movement and abstraction in the form was pleasing to him. This is not 
surprising considering the ties between imagination and movement that Sartre 
saw (See Chapter 2). Benda himself suggested that masks should have “rhythmic 
continuity,” a repetitive theme or lines of movement throughout (Benda 22). For 
example, if there was a sharp “V” shape in the chin then that same shape should 
be echoed in the forehead, cheeks, nose, etc. This rhythmic continuity is to lend a 
sense of “movement” to the fixed face that serves to externalize the imaging 
form. Benda’s technique creates masks that have a very expressive and 
harmonious sens. It is easy to find the personality in these masks because their 
sens is given external form by Benda’s use of line and rhythm. This is one of the 
reasons Benda’s masks are critically admired: their appearance is infused with 
the sens of their respective character. By comparison, Appel’s masks, with their 
misshapen and contradictory lines, lack this sense of harmony. However, within 
the contexts of their respective uses, Appel’s masks have a greater range of 
expressive possibilities, while Benda’s caricatures and grotesques remain limited.  
Thus for Sartre it seems that the two elements which create deep, 
expressive sens are ambiguity and abstraction. Ambiguity leaves “spaces” in the 
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appearance of the aesthetic object which invite the imagination to fill in the gaps 
according to the viewer’s intention. Abstraction removes the aesthetic object 
from the world of the viewer and keeps the object from becoming a “being,” 
fixed, dead, and false.  
 
Performance and Mask Aesthetics 
It is true that a mask, as an analogon, is already one step abstracted from a 
real face. However, one cannot create sens by merely constructing a mask and 
putting it on. A mask, no matter how skillfully made, must still be animated. 
This brings the mask into motion, which more strongly links it to the imaginary 
state. Ron J. Popenhagen says that masks do not “talk about” emotions but 
“project and evoke” them (130). He means that effective masks do not “show” 
emotion, but rather the mask transmits its emotive qualities (one part of sens) to 
the audience. This is not entirely accurate. As Sartre has identified, it is not that 
we see the mask and respond to it subsequently. Nor does the mask have an 
innate power of some sort. Rather, we respond instantly to the animated mask—
mask and performer together—through the synthesis of the imaginary process. 
The mask does not truly “project” as Popenhagen claims. The emotions which 
are “evoked” through the mask come when an audience member reconstructs 
the character through the sens as expressed in the mask’s construction and the 
actor’s performance. The better the mask and performance, the stronger the sens. 
But it is not the mask which projects emotions, it is the actor that animates it to 
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bring out its sens and it is the audience which constructs the emotions from the 
performance. 
But Popenhagen is correct to say that masks do not “talk about” emotion. 
Consider the masks of comedy and tragedy often associated as symbols of the 
theatre. As a static image, these masks are illustrations of mirth and anguish. 
They do “show” emotion—we perceive their expressions and think “happiness” 
and “sadness.” In this case, we are operating on the reflective plane, the plane of 
perception and self-aware thought. But a well-constructed mask animated by an 
actor in performance does not operate purely on a perceptive level. As an 
analogon, it operates in a more imaginative way. We, as the audience, no longer 
“think about” the emotions, but instead, have them given to us as an image, 
already filled with meanings and properties.  
Boada says that masks are always in action, always suggesting something 
to the audience, including emotions (169). But of course, a mask, even an 
animated one, is merely an analogon. But the suggestions of which Boada speaks 
come not from the masks, but from the imagination. The ambiguous nature of 
the masks invite the audience to imagine these “suggestions” which come from 
their own knowledge. Part of the mask performing process is for the actor to find 
the sens of the character of the mask and then bring that sens into his or her body 
for the audience. Once there, in the spontaneous synthesis of the imagination, the 
sens is reconstructed by the audience and the mask comes alive with a life that 
they give to it. 
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Thus, we have returned to the idea that audiences must believe in the mask 
and this belief cannot be excluded from the aesthetic evaluation of the mask 
itself. Just as it is difficult for the audience to spontaneously believe that Chris’ 
wagon is a baby, the wrong mask in the wrong context makes it difficult for the 
audience to spontaneously synthesize the sens of the character. If, for instance, 
Benda’s “Golden Beauty” mask appeared in the midst of Appel’s rough and 
primal faces, we might be jolted from our imaginary synthesis at the jarring 
difference between them. Benda’s mask carries a very different sens from Appel’s 
masks. We might feel she “doesn’t belong” with the others. We might take pause 
and try to reconcile the differences between them, looking for clues in 
performance context or explanation from the text. Such a pause would be more 
perceptive in nature, and sacrificing the imaginary attitude which is required for 
spontaneous, prereflective synthesis. That is not to say it is impossible to 
construct a performance context where Benda’s and Appel’s masks could not 
appear side by side without sacrificing spontaneity; however, the choices made 
by their respective mask-makers place the masks in different performance 
“worlds,” or better, different games. The performers must understand that to 
throw together masks of very different styles— that do not share common sens 
elements— threatens to disrupt the imaginative synthesis of the audience. Taken 
to a more perceptive attitude of consciousness, the audience thinks about the 




The role of the audience in the constitution of the personage of the mask 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. However, no 
discussion of mask aesthetics can neglect the audience’s contributory role in the 
effectiveness of a given mask in a given performance. The audience participates 
in the collective game of the performance and is invited to “play along.” An 
effective mask, effectively animated, makes this collaborative play easy. 
 
Conclusion 
A mask is a prop in a game of performance. Whether or not the mask 
“works” for the game depends on at least three factors: the context in which the 
particular mask is used (performance circumstance, performance text, etc.), the 
manner in which the mask is animated (actor movement and characterization), 
and the capacity of the mask to carry the sens of the personage made present 
(mask construction and appearance). While this does allow for a wide variety of 
possibility in whether or not a particular mask is effective, we can come to the 
following conclusions: 
(1) Even though Sartre had his own personal ideas about what makes art 
effective, and this bias is reflected in his evaluations of art, we nevertheless agree 
with him that a mask which aims at verisimilitude or mimesis is less likely to be 
aesthetically valuable than a mask which abstracts form to express sens. This is 
because realism invites a more perceptive attitude of consciousness, whereas 
abstraction relies on the imagination to synthesize the sens of the personage in 
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the consciousness of the audience member. It is only through the imagination 
that the totality— the sens—of the personage can be brought to consciousness. 
That is not to say that all realistic masks are poor in all circumstances; however, 
abstraction expresses the character while a realistic analogon tends to show the 
character. 
(2) In addition to abstraction, aesthetically effective masks tend to employ 
ambiguity. That is, there is a certain poverty of detail which is used in their 
construction. This poverty can be expressed as a poverty of expression (such as 
facial expressions which “hint” at emotional states or personality, but do not 
express them boldly) or as a poverty of facial detail (such as Eldredge’s simple 
character masks). This ambiguity makes a mask more aesthetically valuable 
because it invites the imagination to fill in the gaps left by the absence of detail. 
Further, this allows the mask to have a greater range of possible expression and 
greater possibility for deeper characterization or sens. 
 Ambiguity and abstraction, as qualities which invite and act upon the 
imagination, are fundamental to the aesthetics of masks. But they are also 
fundamental qualities to how masks behave in performance. It is to that end that 
we will turn our discussion in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - Masks, Audiences, and the Imaginary 
In the small town of Arisaig in Scotland, a woman known as “Mrs. 
Cardigan” appeared before a small group of people. Mrs. Cardigan did not 
speak. At times she was aware that there were people watching her; at other 
times, she appeared lost in her own thoughts. She did not do much except dance 
with a broom and sway to some music, but she provoked in those watching an 
emotional response before she left. Mrs. Cardigan was, in fact, a Mask: a 
character brought to life by an actor animating a mask. 
The “Mrs. Cardigan” mask was made by Michael Hickey of Gateway 
Performance Productions. Carved from bass wood and then painted, it was 
made as part of a pair, dubbed “Mr. and Mrs. Cardigan” because the initial 
impression of the masks reminded the performers of 1950s personae that should 
be “sitting at home in their cardigans.” In truth, Hickey was relying on 1940s film 
as the inspiration for the masks (Hickey, Personal Interview 2004). Like most of 
Hickey’s masks, Mrs. Cardigan has a largely neutral expression with hints of 
characterizations in certain directions. She has a quietly wistful expression, with 
a small smile, painted pale colors to suggest a classic film glow. 
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The actor was Sandra Hughes, also of Gateway. The performance of “Mrs. 
Cardigan” was developed as part of a tour that Gateway did with musicians 
Heather Innes and Ciaran Dorris in a tour through Scotland. As part of the 
performance, Innes and Dorris performed the song “Old Fashioned Saturday 
Night,” written by Mike Silver. To this music (which recounts how life’s troubles 
seem to fade away when one is home and safe) Hughes, wearing the “Mrs. 
Cardigan” mask and a simple coat, appears on the stage with a broom. She 
sweeps, then dances to the sweetly melancholic music with the broom, 
imagining it is a handsome dance partner. As the song progresses, she turns to 
the audience and reaches out her hand to some of the men in the room, inviting 
them to join her and fulfill her wish of a dancing partner.  Most times one of the 
audience was willing to oblige, and when the dancing was over, “Mrs. Cardigan” 
would seem to blush and fan herself as she led the man back to the audience, 
often to the amusement and laughter of the audience. 
However, the Arisaig performance was particularly memorable: no man 
came up. At her failure to find a dancing partner, “Mrs. Cardigan” slumped, 
crestfallen, and such was the sadness that she projected that many of the 
audience made an audible sympathetic “Awww…” How could a mask with a 
fixed facial expression seemingly project a range of emotions from wistfulness to 
giddiness to melancholy? 
 Thus, we see illustrated one of the wonders of working with masks: how 
is it that audiences apprehend a fixed wooden object attached to the face of a 
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moving body, and yet find themselves responding in emotionally varied ways? 
Conventional wisdom tells us that the face is one of the most expressive parts of 
our bodies. Yet, a masked actor seems to be able to communicate a variety of 
emotional moods and expressions without the plasticity of the face. How is this 
so? 
 We have previously discussed that mask has the potential to capture the 
“totality” or sens of a character through particular construction and abstraction. 
We have also discussed how an actor may engage with a mask to create a 
character imaginatively and spontaneously, avoiding reflective thought. But the 
imaginative synthesis is not limited to the actor. Let us pick up where we left off 
last chapter and remind ourselves that audiences, too, apprehend 
characterizations on stage imaginatively. In fact, speaking generally, the presence 
of a mask causes an audience to apprehend the characterizations in a more 
imaginative way. As a result, audiences read their own intentions into the 
characterizations presented by the actors. Audiences see what they intend to 
see—which is not the same as saying audiences see what they want to see. 
Characterizations that are disturbing, shocking, unpleasant—unwanted – still 
come, unbidden, in the synthesis of the imagination. But just as the particular 
brush strokes and color choices of a painter unite with the intentions of the 
viewer of her painting to create the image of the subject of that painting, so, too 
does the audience’s intentions synthesize spontaneously with the mask and 
movements of the actor to make present the character. The seemingly miraculous 
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transformations of the inflexible face of the mask are a result of a more imaginary 
state of apprehension in the audience.  
 In this chapter, we will revisit the Sartrean idea of a continuum between 
perception and imagination and how masks encourage a more imaginative state 
in the audience. We will examine the writings of Benda, Emigh, and LeCoq as 
they explore the relationship between masks and the imagination and how these 
explorations intersect with Sartre’s philosophy. We will find that in masked 
performance the imaginative state pulls, ontologically, on the audience, who in 
turn make real the personages of the mask through the elements of the 
performance. Finally, I will suggest a particular aesthetic style—purposeful 
ambiguity—that exploits this imaginative pull through the use of masks. 
 
Perception/Imagination 
 We have discussed that in Sartrean thought there exists continuum 
between a consciousness that perceives and a consciousness that imagines. To 
briefly review, a perceptive consciousness attends to the “real” world; it is 
reflective and self-aware. Imagination, on the other hand, is complete and 
prereflective. It dwells in the realm of the irreal: the absent, missing, elsewhere, 
or non-existent. 
 Thus, perception is about existing, while imagination is about being. 
Perception is about how we exist in the world: The tabletop is two feet before me, 
the pen in my hand has a certain weight, the letters I am writing have a 
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particular shape and appearance on the page. Imagination is about how we 
attempt to understand the nature of those things we encounter in the world—
from furniture to people to emotions and ideas. Such understanding comes to us 
seemingly intuitively, spontaneously and prereflectively. The tabletop is before 
me, but I can imagine the legs of the table even thought I don’t see them. I can 
imagine the entire room around me, and I have feelings about this particular 
place where I do my work. I don’t particularly think about the pen as I am 
writing; instead, it is an extension of my hand which realizes (“makes real”) the 
ideas that come to me as I write. The letters and words and sentences that appear 
on the page are not directly thought of as letters, words, or sentences in my 
imagination. They are instead synthesized into ideas, feelings, emotions. I could 
take a moment and take note of the style of the letters, the color of the ink, the 
smudges or heavy lines. In this case, I am perceiving. But when I actually read 
the words, they point to something more than themselves. This something is 
brought forth in my imagination in an object which is complete and total based 
on my knowledge and intention toward it. It is this totality which is the quality 
of being which imaginary objects possess, and the quality that we humans lack as 
part of our existential condition. To be is to have a “completeness”, and such 
completeness can only exist in the imagination. We will explore the human 
existential lack of “completeness” in greater detail later in this chapter as it plays 
a part in how masks are apprehended by audiences. 
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 We know one does not have to be either perceiving or imagining; one can 
be doing both. We constantly move along this continuum, now more imaginative 
when engrossed in our writing, now more perceptive when the phone rings and 
interrupts us or when fatigue sets in and our fingers begin to ache. 
 This also applies to watching a theatrical performance. When involved in 
the action, the audience surrenders some perception and begins to imagine. The 
actors on the stage become analoga for the characters depicted and their 
performances make present these absent objects (people). But such imaginative 
apprehension occurs whether the actors are masked or not. What is it about the 
presence of the mask that, as I assert, causes a more imaginative synthesis to 
occur? 
 Masked performance generally falls further on the imaginary side of the 
perception/imagination continuum than non-masked work because the presence 
of the mask as a functional analogon invites the imaginary state. Further, masks 
carry with them associations of identity and emotion in more immediate ways 
because such associations are, fundamentally, imaginary in nature. The presence 
of the mask points to an “other.” More than other kinds of analoga, masks 
specifically deal with identity. That a mask simultaneously removes some of the 
presence of the actor that wears it and points to the presence of an “Other” is 





The Index of Identity 
 Mask maker W.T. Benda believes masks are effective because human 
beings rely on faces so much as indicators of personality. Benda writes: 
In our inter-human relations, the faces of our fellow men are of 
paramount importance to us. We depend on them to give us the 
information we need about the souls of those with whom we come 
in contact. It is by his face that we know a person – it is his face 
that can reveal to us much of what we want to learn about his 
character, his moods, and his attitude towards us, as well as 
toward the world… we have such implicit trust in their 
correctness, and respond to them so spontaneously, that when a 
living face is replaced by a mask – when a false index is substituted 
for a true one – we still let ourselves be guided by it (2). 
 
Faces, for Benda, are special for humans because they contain the who of the 
person. Cover a person’s face with a hood, and we know very little about him. 
Replace his face with a mask, and you replace his “soul.” Implied in Benda’s 
ideas is that this idea of “soul” is apprehended from the point of view of those 
who observe a particular person’s face. A face is an “index” by which we can 
extrapolate the personality, emotions, and even the very nature of the face’s 
owner.  Benda says this reliance on faces as indicators of identity is so strong that 
in the eyes of the observer the mask-wearer will often seem to change bodies to 
suit their new face*. Benda also says that masks can sometimes seem to change 
expression and emotions through movement: 
We do not realize how little we actually see of the facial expressions 
of an actor when we are sitting in the last row of the theatre. What 
our physical eye really sees is the actor’s movements that express 
certain moods and feelings, and it is our subconscious mind that 
                                                 
*
 Masked performers would likely point out that such transformations of body are not necessarily 
automatic, but often require skill to execute. 
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fills the gap, knowing from experience what facial changes 
accompany these movements. It is in the same way that we see the 
changing expressions of a mask (4). 
 
Benda thus implies that we have a “mental eye” in contrast to our physical eye 
which gives meaning to perceived data based on our knowledge. But when 
perceptions are outside our expectation, or when data is missing from one 
source, we tend to “overlook” inconsistencies to bring our perceptions more in 
line with expectations, relying on other sources. Benda cites movement as one 
possible source. But there is also the knowledge and intentionality of the person 
apprehending the mask that are other sources.  Sartre would take issue with the 
term “subconscious.” Rather, it is the imagination which fills in the gaps missing 
from perception to effect the facial transformations indicated, though admittedly 
the imaging consciousness is intuitive and prereflective, which is what I believe 
Benda intends. Sartre would say that we are not “adjusting perceptions;” rather, 
we are imagining. 
 But Benda has presented us with a kind of paradox. One the one hand, he 
says that for human beings, faces are the “paramount index” we rely on for 
determining the identity of another human being. But on the other hand, he says 
that often we don’t really need to see the face at all, that we see bits of movement 
and “fill in the gap” where we lack information. How can we rely on a face to tell 
us personality, but ultimately not need that face at all to determine identity? 
 While Benda does not explicitly resolve this paradox, the answer lies in 
his intuitive understanding of the imaginary operation of the mask, suggested in 
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his writings though not expressed in Sartrean terms. The face is indeed an 
“index” for identity. It is not the only reference to identity, but it is a primary one. 
It is the primary way we differentiate between one person and the next; which is 
why portraits—works of art designed to represent a particular person—usually 
feature that person’s face prominently. As such, the face carries with it powerful 
associations of identity. Such is the power of this association that where the 
necessary data to establish identity is missing, consciousness will complete the 
missing data imaginatively using whatever data it has available. Often this is 
movement and posture, physical shape and color, but the imaginary synthesis is 
always done from the particular point of view of the consciousness that 
apprehends the other person. As a result, the viewer’s own expectations, 
associations, history, and knowledge provide the filter through which the “gaps” 
are filled. 
 An actor wearing gloves is unlikely to draw much attention from the 
audience, depending on the gloves and the context of their appearance. But 
while costume choices play a part in creating the analogon of the actor, our hands 
are not a primary index of personality. Cover the hands, and we will still look to 
the face as the primary means for determining who this person is. Cover the face, 
and things change dramatically. In the case of a well-animated mask that 
captures the sens of the personage represented, the audience is drawn to the face 
to try to determine the identity of the person appearing before them. Confronted 
with a mask, the audience knows that the mask is artificial. But because the mask 
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replaces the face, it immediately suggests an identity through its construction and 
animation. But because a mask abstracts the appearance of the face, the spectator 
is not given the same level of information as with a real face. This abstraction 
thus invites the imagination to fill in the gaps. So, while we do use faces as an 
index of personality, it is our own knowledge, expectation, and imagination 
which constitutes our understanding of this personality.  
 All faces, to a certain extent, are analoga pointing to a complete object of 
identity. We constantly accumulate new knowledge which changes the 
imaginative synthesis that apprehends the face. For example, when I see 
someone for the first time, the image of their face provides the primary index by 
which I “realize” (make real) their personality. Even though I may know nothing 
of them, I nevertheless prereflectively create an image of them in my 
imagination. For me, that is who they are, in their total being. However, if I begin 
to talk with them, and to know them better, I begin to accumulate knowledge 
about them and form different intentions toward them. Their face still serves as 
the primary index by which I know “them,” but now the “them” has changed 
because of the new knowledge and different intentions. 
 But that is not to say that a real face and a mask operate in the same 
manner. The real, physical face is not an analogon in the sense of “an equivalent 
of perception.” As a real object, a face is primarily apprehended in a perceptual 
mode: it is an object of perception which has the potential to activate the imaging 
consciousness in the same way that any interaction with the real can activate the 
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imaging consciousness. But a mask, as a physical analogon of identity, invites the 
viewer to imagine. The abstraction of the mask pulls the viewer into a more 
imaginative state as the viewer attempts to make real the personage it represents. 
The mask loses its sense as an object of the real world—a piece of carved wood—
and instead takes on the qualities of identity which the spectator synthesizes 
imaginatively. 
 
The Pull of the Imaginary 
 What is it that causes this “pull” toward the imaginary? Why does our 
consciousness seem to need to “fill in the gaps” presented by an abstracted face? 
We watch Mrs. Cardigan and feel her melancholy. How does this happen? We 
have discussed in general terms how such qualities as personality, identity, even 
emotion are created through the imaginative synthesis. But why does a mask 
seem to evoke melancholy at all? Before we can understand how masks invite the 
imagination, we must understand how masks can come to have the properties 
and emotional qualities that we imagine they do. 
 The truth is masks do not provoke emotional or affective responses at all. 
Remember that an imaged object gives all it has – emotional quality included – 
when it is given to consciousness and at the same time. Sartre, using a mask as an 
example, writes, 
It is things which abruptly unveil themselves to us as 
hateful, sympathetic, horrible, lovable. Being dreadful is a 
property of this Japanese mask, an inexhaustible and 
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irreducible property which constitutes its very nature – 
and not the sum of our subjective reactions to a piece of 
sculptured wood (Intentionality, 5).(Emphasis added.) 
 
Sartre does not mean that every person will see the mask as dreadful in the same 
way. Rather, he means we do not view the mask first and decide it is dreadful 
subsequently. We view the mask, and the dreadfulness is already there, as well 
as all other properties the mask may possess for us. If at one moment the 
Japanese mask appears dreadful and the next pensive, it does not mean that the 
mask had the property of pensiveness all along. Rather, we synthesize anew the 
pensive quality based upon changes with our experience with the mask: 
knowledge of it, events that have transpired, changes in the movement of the 
actor animating the mask, changes in the way light and shadow fall across the 
mask, etc. We can perceive the appearance of the mask, but we imagine the 
qualities we ascribe to it. 
 That is not to say that these qualities are somehow limited to an 
individual’s interpretation. In fact, this process is not interpretation at all; nor is it 
solipsism. Interpretation implies a thoughtfulness which does not exist in the 
prereflective plane: a kind of cause and effect. Certainly our intentions toward 
the object play a key part of the imaginative synthesis that constitutes the object 
for us. Likewise, one person’s image of the mask may be different than another’s. 
But imagination cannot teach us anything new. We cannot “discover” anything 
new in an image; there cannot be an interpretation. Therefore the imagination 
synthesizes the properties of the object which it has available. The properties of 
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the mask exist in the mask, not in our minds. This is an important distinction 
because even though it is our own personal intention that guides the synthesis of 
imaginary objects, it still puts the properties we ascribe to those objects in the 
objects themselves. Thus it is fair to say, as Sartre does, that the hypothetical 
Japanese mask is dreadful because the dreadfulness a person imagines is in the 
mask itself. 
 And so we have a tendency to transfer our feelings about the object to the 
analogon. Writes Sartre, “The emotional subject and the object of the emotion are 
united in an indissoluble synthesis” (Sketch 35). The Japanese mask is dreadful. A 
photograph of a lost loved one is sad. We are aware, of course, that the mask and 
photograph are merely standing in for the absent objects they represent. But 
nevertheless, the emotions we feel for these objects is transferred at some level to 
the analoga themselves. 
 Because our feelings appear to reside in objects, objects themselves seem to 
have a kind of transformational power. This is why an analogon can stand in for 
something else: it points to the other, absent object, and our imaginations conjure 
up all the properties we associate with that object and place some of those 
properties in the analogon itself. So it is not the analogon which has power; rather, 
the analogon invites the imaging consciousness in which this transformational 
power resides. 
 Emotional behavior itself is also transformational in nature. Emotional 
behavior, according to Sartre, seeks to add new qualities to the objects of the 
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emotion (Sketch 41). It is a changing of the world: making the object “magically” 
different in order for us to deal with it (Sketch 39). Because we cannot truly 
change the nature of the object (save by altering it physically, which would 
change it into a different object,) emotional behavior changes our bodies so that 
our relationship to the object and the rest of the world changes (Sketch 40). 
 For Sartre, emotional behavior is a kind of baser, lesser behavior which is 
called up when we face a situation which we have no normal or immediate 
means of resolving. For example: Someone acts rudely to me. In my imagination, 
the person is rude. The quality of rudeness resides in the person himself. I may 
take offense, but find my recourse limited by social pressures, time and place, or 
the fact that the other person may be stronger than I. Whatever resolution I seek 
is blocked to me. So, Sartre would say that I will resort to emotional behavior in 
order to seek resolution. I will elevate my posture, intensify my breathing, 
tighten my fists. I cannot transform my enemy, but I can transform myself—the 
bodily aspect of my emotive consciousness— so that my relationship to him is 
different. In my new body, I feel strong, aggressive, and powerful. My 
relationship with him and the rest of the world is no longer the same because I 
am apprehending it through a new body. In this way, because I am prohibited 
from a resolution, I transform him by transforming myself. 
 It is important to note that emotional behavior is prereflective. It is 
imaginative behavior, in that it happens at the directive of the consciousness but 
one need not be aware that one is engaging in it to do it. Like the “dark 
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consciousness” of which Eldredge wrote, emotional behavior often happens 
spontaneously with the engagement of the imagination. One can be aware of it, 
just as an actor can be aware of elements of his performance apart from his 
characterization; however, such awareness is not necessary. 
 What this tells us is that emotions are like any other property of an object 
which is imagined. They exist in the object themselves, given to us 
spontaneously with the object themselves, and are a way by which we attempt to 
understand and deal with the nature of the object itself. I view the Japanese 
mask, and through my own knowledge and intention toward it, I find it horrible. 
In my attempt to deal with this horrible quality, I may change my own body: 
cringe, look away, increase my heart rate, etc. But again, this is not a reaction to 
the mask. There is no cause and effect. A mask has no power in and of itself; 
therefore, it has no means to “cause” any “effect” in me. Rather, the mask is: I 
view the mask and in my imagination, I transform the sculptured wood so that it 
is horrible at the same time that I view it. This is important for understanding 
masks in performance, for we must accept while the choices the masked 
performer makes affect the imaginary synthesis, ultimately the imaginary 
synthesis belongs to the consciousness of the individual audience member. A 
performer cannot affect an audience member by her performance.* A performer 
can, however, by means of her performance choices, more easily and readily 
                                                 
*
 We will exclude more extreme forms of performance where the artist physically affects the audience 
member, e.g. throwing water on them, hitting them, etc. 
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encourage the audience member into a more imaginary state and thus strengthen 
the vivacity of the collective imagining of the performance. A discussion of these 
choices will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter. For now, we 
understand that consciousness transforms the world to realize it. 
 Why does consciousness operate this way? Sartre suggests that driving 
this imaginary process is a need we have to realize the objects in our world. Sartre 
writes of the objects in our world appearing to us incomplete and mysterious. 
These objects “pull” on us because we seek to make them real and complete. “… 
in a normal and well-adapted activity,” writes Sartre, “the objects ‘to be realized’ 
present themselves as needing to be realized in specific ways” (Sketch, 38) So we 
realize them with whatever tools we have at hand, namely the knowledge, 
intention, and movement components of the imaginary process. This is not 
necessarily a reflective process; it can happen without our being aware that we 
are doing it. Still, a mask appears to us in perception, and we feel it pull on our 
consciousness, seeking realization. Not only this, but the mask presents itself to 
us as needing to be realized in a specific way, and that way is as a face, an index of 
a “whole” identity.  
 Sartre says our world is “difficult” (Sketch 39). It is a world we are cast into 
without any guidance but that which we choose to accept or reject from the other 
people in it. It is a world where we want to understand the essences of the objects 
around us, yet our perceptions are limited and incomplete. Thus we rely on the 
other tool at our disposal: the imagination. As Sartre has said, the imagination is 
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not something added to consciousness; rather, it is a fundamental ability that is 
part of our basic ontological state. 
 Thus, returning to masks, we find that a mask is more than a mere 
analogon: it points the way to the realization of the character it represents. The 
mask appears, animated, and the audience feels the pull of its presence and seeks 
to make real the character it represents. It can, of course, be said that this pull can 
seem to come from any object—this is why any encounter with the real has the 
potential to activate the imaging consciousness. But masks are a special kind of 
analogon: one that has specific ties to identity. A pen could be an analogon if it has 
special significance to me, but it could also simply be a pen and its existence 
remains in a more utilitarian mode.  I could animate the pen, moving it through 
space in a long horizontal trajectory, and the pen could then become an analogon 
for, say, an airplane. Children frequently make this sort of transformation in their 
play. But it is the abstract resemblance of a pen to an airplane, the movement of 
the pen, and shift in the attitude of my consciousness that transforms the pen 
into the analogon, pointing to the airplane. And for as long as I play the game, the 
pen itself soars, banks, turns, and defies gravity in the same way that I imagine a 
plane does; not literally, but the qualities of soaring, turning, and flying are given 
to the pen through my imagination. 
 Masks, like the pen, do require certain visual qualities, particular 
movement, and a shift in the attitude of consciousness toward the imaginary. 
However, masks are more readily apprehended in imaginary ways. When the 
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mask appears we already understand that it represents an “Other” by virtue of 
its associations with identity. Unlike the pen, which we first apprehend in a more 
perceptual manner as a pen when it appears and then apprehend in a more 
imaginative manner as an airplane as it is animated to give it new qualities, the 
mask appears to us immediately pointing to someone else. Certainly we perceive 
the mask as it appears, but the qualities of personality which come with the mask 
invite the attitude of consciousness to shift to a more imaginary mode as it 
attempts to realize the object represented by the mask. This object, this “someone 
else,” must be realized in the audience’s imagination through the analogon 
presented by the masked performer. As a functional analogon, masks in 
performance are already inviting the audience to imagine. 
 
The “Power” of the Mask 
 But more than other analoga, masks seem to have a kind of “power.” There 
is something compelling in them that draws the eye of the audience. Well-
animated masks seem to take on a life which other analoga do not always have.  
Because of these seeming qualities of masks, let us discuss how consciousness 
comes to give masks this “power.” 
  One might, as Ron J. Popenhagen does, call masks “instruments of 
imagination” (23).  This is another way of calling a mask an analogon. But 
Popenhagen’s intent is also to show that masks seem to have the ability to project 
and enclose space within which the persona of the mask is made present: “A 
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mask exists outside the limitations of its own physical form; its essence is in the 
space it projects and not in its solid, tangible form.” (23). Popenhagen finds 
something mystical and compelling about the nature of masks: 
Great masks surpass the ordinary, becoming magic, 
powerful objects. They are more than theatrical properties, 
costumes, or maquillage. They are more than ceremonial 
objects or fine art objects. Yet, they are almost all of these 
things. Their interest and their poetry, in fact, rests in their 
“almost-ness…” (23). 
 
“Almost-ness” here refers to what seems to be a mask’s multiple levels of 
existence: as a sculpted piece of wood, as an analogon for an absent personage, 
and even as the personage itself. It is not quite any of these things—not by virtue 
of it existential condition, but by the kinds of imaginary transformations we 
make with it, often prereflectively. When Popenhagen discusses a mask’s 
“almost-ness,” what he identifies as multiple levels of existence is more 
accurately identified as a more imaginary attitudes of consciousness. The mask 
appears and the movements, shapes, expressions, and lines are already pointing 
us at something “more” or “beyond” the mask itself. This “more” is really our 
attempt to realize the character of the mask through its analogon. Popenhagen is 
correct, in a sense, that a mask is “almost,” but it would be better to say that a 
mask is apprehended somewhere between perception and imagination. 
 Thus, Popenhagen is correct in stating that masks are “instruments of the 
imagination” in the sense that they are objects that invite the imaginary state. We 
can forgive Popenhagen’s desire to place the “power” of masks in the masks 
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themselves because, as discussed, we place our feelings about an object in the 
object itself. It is easy to feel that masks have a kind of greater existence than 
other objects because of the kinds of transformations that seem to occur with 
their use. But this seeming power is only partly about the mask itself. Just as 
important, if not more so, the power comes from how the mask is used.  
Performance masks typically are used in specific performance contexts, with the 
actors uniting their bodies with the face of the mask to make present new 
personae. When a mask appears, it is a replacement face on a body, an analogon 
that moves, breathes, and may even speak.  This gives the mask an immediacy 
and lifelike quality that is often missing in other analoga, such as a painting or 
photograph. Masked performers make present the personage of the mask, and 
this seems to make the masks “powerful.” 
 To call masks “almost” hints at this “between” nature that masks (and 
other analoga) possess: being apprehended between perception and imagination. 
In fact, John Emigh defines masks not as “almost” but as “transitional” objects 
(3). They are between states, faces but not faces, objects but animated; we know 
there is an actor behind the mask, but we do not always sense the identity of that 
actor. It is this “transitional” quality, Emigh argues, that gives masks their special 
status and power.  
 But “between” what, exactly? Emigh cites the work of psychologist D.W. 
Winnicott and his work with infants playing “peek-a-boo.” As the adult hides 
her face, the infant experiences a gap in the continuity of his perception: the adult 
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was present, and now is absent. This gap in continuity produces anxiety, which 
is relieved when the adult’s face reappears. Eventually the infant learns this 
game can be played over and over, with pleasure in the play replacing the 
anxiety of the absences. Further still, the child learns “to employ ‘illusion’ in 
order to sustain pleasure through longer periods of discontinuity—longer 
absences on the part of the attending adult” (2). That is, the child invests 
imaginary qualities into objects of her environment—toys, for example—and 
plays with them to fill the gap in the periods of discontinuity. Emigh concludes: 
Thus the child’s capacity for imaginative creation and play are 
called into being at times when a developing sense of continuity is 
threatened; but what begins in apprehension and anxiety is 
transformed into a pleasurable and highly charged activity, eagerly 
sought after, involving the presence, animation, and 
“participation” of chosen objects (2). 
 
So Emigh sees the “transitional” nature of masks, like children’s toys, as an 
investment of imagination into an object which is used to bridge the gap between 
moments of continuity in one’s experience. Emigh believed, as did Victor Turner, 
who believed that moments of ceremony and performance such as weddings, 
funerals, religious observances, etc. (and at which masks are likely to appear in 
some cultures) occur “between” (Turner’s term: “liminal”, meaning “on the 
threshold”) the everyday moments that form the continuum of the life of a 
culture (Emigh, 1). In short, part of what makes masks “powerful” is that they 
are present at transitional times in our lives and carry with them an investment 
of imagination that helps bridge the gaps in these transitional times. 
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 However, to say that a mask has power because it appears at “liminal” 
times in a culture’s continuum is to deny masks affective power outside of these 
events. It also begs the question of what qualifies as a “liminal” moment and 
what is the “everyday,” and what makes “liminal” moments special from others. 
I do not dispute Turner’s observation that ceremonial performances tend to occur 
around times of change: on the threshold (Qtd. in Emigh, 1). But again, we return 
to Sartre who said that any engagement with the real world has the potential to 
activate the imaging consciousness. A liminal event—a wedding or religious 
dance—may affect the imaging synthesis as the individual may have certain 
knowledge about the event or expectations toward it. The mask appearing at a 
special ceremony may make it easier for the individual to activate the imaging 
consciousness when the mask appears; likewise, the image may be different 
within the circumstances of the ceremony than outside of it. However, the 
imaging consciousness created by the mask is not limited to being activated only 
at such times. 
 Nevertheless, to call masks transitional objects is another way of 
explaining how they function as an analogon. A mask does carry with it an 
investment of the imagination. If a person has a great deal of knowledge about 
the personage represented by the mask, then his image of that mask will be 
shaped by that knowledge. If the mask is unknown to the viewer, then the 
viewer will take what knowledge she has available to her—facial expression, 
color, movement, features, etc.— and synthesize the persona from that. In either 
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case, there is an investment of imagination in the mask that realizes the 
personage to which it points. Masks are transitional, but not as a transition 
between gaps in continuity, but as a transition between perception and 
imagination. All the factors of a particular mask’s appearance at a particular 
moment will affect to what degree the imaging consciousness is activated. 
 So, in a certain sense, masks are “between.” That is to say they have the 
qualities of any analogon by being one thing and simultaneously pointing to 
something else. They are perceived and understood to be masks: carved wood, 
an object of the real world, an adornment. But because they are also an 
“equivalent of perception” they are gifted with emotions, feelings, personality 
and identity. We never fully believe them to become the personage they point to; 
some part of us is always resists the delusion. But likewise, we can easily let the 
masks take on the qualities we imagine them to have and forget for a while their 
utilitarian, perceptive qualities.  
 In fact, it may even seem difficult to resist the process. Mask teacher Sears 
Eldredge even uses the term “compelling image” to describe what it is that 
masks do. Eldredge cites Ariane Mnouchkine as she says that any actor’s role is 
to “show the inside;” to “give form to a passion” and “to exteriorize without 
falling into exteriority” (Mnouchkine qtd. in Eldredge 18). For Mnouchkine and 
Eldredge alike, this process of “showing the inside” represents a kind of mystery. 
Eldredge places the resolution to the mystery in the imagination: 
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 What resolves this mystery between the inside and the outside is the 
metamorphosis effected through the actor’s identification with an image: 
the compelling image of the mask (18).  
 
What is compelling about the image of the mask? The answer must lie in the 
image of the mask, not the mask itself; that is, the imaged apprehension of the 
mask as opposed to the perceived apprehension.  Certainly some masks are 
better than others as we discussed in Chapter 5. However, Eldredge is correct 
that it is the actor’s identification with the image of the mask and not the mask 
itself. The physical mask, the analogon, points to the personage it represents. The 
personage appears in the imagination of the actor. But this same engagement 
occurs for the audience as well. Moreover, the “mystery,” caused by the presence 
of the mask may be difficult for the audience to resist. 
For example: A man walks out onto the stage before an audience. Is the 
man an actor? A stagehand? Someone making an announcement? Perhaps some 
context clues could answer this question, but ultimately, the man is apprehended 
first as a man. From there, elements such as costuming, lighting changes, etc. 
could identify the man as a character, at which point the audience will begin to 
read the signs of his performance to identify the personage which he represents. 
To be sure, they do enter a more imaginary state. However, generally speaking, 
they are still likely to be closer to the perceptive side of the continuum, especially 
if the performance is representational in style. The audience watches; that is, 
while the audience is certainly using their imaginations to some degree, their 
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engagement with the action on the stage is more passive than active, more 
observational than participatory.  
A man walks out onto the stage before an audience wearing a mask. Who 
is this man? We likely do not know for certain, but the presence of the mask 
already is inviting us to imagine. We know it is a man in a mask, but we also 
begin to feel the pull to make real the personage which is represented in the 
analogon of the mask. We know he is an “other.” If the mask is properly 
animated, we are already making present the character of the mask because our 
consciousness has changed to a more imaginative attitude. The audience reads 
themselves into the masked performance because their own intentions and 
knowledge create the characters. Because the mask is associated with identity, 
the characterizations become a kind of prereflective collaboration between the 
actor and the audience: the actor brings forth the presence of the personage, and 
the audience “fills in the gaps” of this presence with their own intentions.  
 But beyond the initial appearance of a man on stage, the masks continue 
to invite the audience into a more imaginative state. This is because masks not 
only place a new identity index on the actor wearing it, but they also remove the 
identity index of the actor herself. Stripped of this basic index, the personage of 
the actor becomes even more enigmatic, even more of a mystery. In a skilled 
performance, the sens of the actor vanishes and is replaced by the sens of the 
personage. In a non-masked play, once the play is underway the audience no 
longer has any confusion about whether or not the man on the stage is a 
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character or not. And yet, the audience is likely to continue to be closer to the 
perceptive side of the continuum. The fact remains that an unmasked actor still 
wears his or her own face. While the actor may be highly skilled, the audience 
still apprehends the actor as an actor first—a real person, in the real world, albeit 
performing in artificial circumstances. Without the mask, the pull of the 
imaginary is not as strong because the events shown to the audience are 
grounded in the real, and the real is the domain of perception. But with a mask, 
suddenly the person before us might not seem like a person at all. The abstraction 
of the mask and the sens of the character created by the movement of the actor 
creates an ambiguous form: something which we recognize as human, or, to 
borrow Popenhagen’s term, “almost” human. Further, with the mask on her face 
and a body in harmony with it, the actor has removed her presence from the 
stage, leaving behind the presence of the personage of the mask. This ambiguous 
form pulls on the audience, and they seek to complete it imaginatively.  
 So, although masks are, in some sense, “instruments of imagination,” in 
another sense “transitional objects” and do present a “compelling image,” it is 
important to remember that masks do not have power per se. Rather, the seeming 
power comes from how our consciousness needs to process and understand 
identity, even when presented with such identity in an abstract and ambiguous 
way. 
 But Sartre’s philosophy points to an even stronger reason why masks, in 
particular, have such a strong pull upon us. That reason is that masks are analoga 
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for the existential Other: another consciousness with its own projects that 
represent the only true limitation to my own ontological freedom. Sartre’s classic 
example is of being in a park, alone. In such a case, the world is organized and 
arranged with myself as its center. This comfortable position means that I am 
surrounded with the objects of the world which have no true limits on me—at 
least, no limits which I do not impose myself. But suppose in this world there is a 
man who is seated on a bench in the park, reading a paper. This man is an object, 
true, but I also recognize him as the Other, a consciousness with its own 
transcendent free will. Suddenly, all relations in the park have changed. The 
objects in the world are now his objects as they relate to him as well as my objects 
as I relate to them. He has come between me and my world, and “I cannot put 
myself at the center of it” (Being and Nothingness, 342). Sartre calls the presence of 
the Other an element of “disintegration” of the relations I have with the objects 
of my world. But the man on the bench is not a man in the same sense that the 
bench is an object. The man is also a subject in that he has a consciousness that 
perceives and judges the world. The presence of the Other turns me into an object 
where I was once a transcendence.  
… if the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as the 
object which sees what I see, then my fundamental connections with the 
Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent 
possibility of being seen by the Other (Being and Nothingness, 344). 
 
And if I can be seen, then I know that I, too, am an object for this Other. And as 
the Other looks at me, the essential nothingness of my existence is made plain 
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(prereflectively) to me. “I am for myself only as I am a pure reference to the 
Other” (Being and Nothingness, 349). 
 Sartre uses this notion of the Other and his gaze to discuss the Other as 
the only true limitation to freedom as well as a source of ontological shame 
which affects us in our interactions with others. For our purposes, however, it is 
important to note that the Other is apprehended differently by consciousness than 
other objects. The Other appears to us and disintegrates our relations to the 
world; as a result, it removes us from a placid, self-created and self-determined 
place in the center of the world to an uncertain, conflicted position with the same 
world. As the only real limit to our freedom, the Other is important to our 
consciousness. I look at a piano and I create it as I intend it to be in a passive, 
objective relationship. I look at an Other, and the Other looks back. 
 It is thus that the appearance of the Other in performance circumstances 
can also trigger this ontological change. That masks represent people makes 
them important to consciousness, because they point to the Other. As Popenhagen 
observed, the mask is capable of returning the spectator’s gaze. “Once face to 
face with the human body—confronted by it, accepted by it, and activated by it—
the eyes [of the mask] begin to look and see” (63). This means that a mask in 
performance has greater potential for affecting the consciousness of the viewer 
than, say, a Van Gogh painting of sunflowers. Of course, one need not wear a 
mask to create this change; unmasked actors represent Others as well. But the 
key difference here lies in how the Other-objects are apprehended in relation to 
213 
 
whether or not I am being watched in return. Sartre uses the example of a man 
peeking through a keyhole. Even though the people on the other side of the door 
are Others, since I am alone and unobserved, those people lose their Other-as-
subject quality and instead are Others-as-objects which I can watch and arrange 
as the center of my world (Being and Nothingness, 348). But suppose I hear 
footsteps in the hall as someone approaches me. Suddenly, I am no longer alone. 
I am seen and the disintegration of my world begins. 
 One can imagine a non-masked, realistic style performance where the 
audience sits in a darkened theatre watching the events unfold on the stage. They 
are alone in their perspective with the events on stage, much like the man 
looking through the keyhole. In such a case, it is easy to transform the actors on 
stage into Others-as-objects, for the actors do not direct their actions to the 
audience. There are, of course, some styles of performance, masked and 
unmasked, where the actors directly address (or look) at the audience. Mrs. 
Cardigan reaches out to the audience, her gaze meeting the men she asks to 
dance with her. But there is more than this involved with masks. Because masks 
invite the imaginary state, audiences place their own intentions into the abstract 
faces they see. They are involved in the realization of the personage of the mask—
at least, more involved than they would be with a non-masked actor. And the 
greater the involvement, the greater is the difficulty of reducing the masked 
figure to an Other-as-object. The mask carries with it my intentions: I make it 
real. And since I make it real, it is difficult for me to avoid the realization of its 
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status as Other-as-subject. I look at the mask and the mask looks back, even if its 
eyes do not turn to me.  
 The audience is “startled” when initially confronted with the mask, much 
like the man discovered peering through the keyhole. Subsequently, depending 
on the style of the performance and the events on the stage, the audience may be 
able to “reposition” themselves behind the metaphorical keyhole to a greater 
degree. But because they constantly read themselves into the performance, the 
audience will find it difficult to become completely complacent thus returning to 
a mostly perceptive and passive point of view, so long as the performance 
continues to support the synthesis of the shared imagining. Masks seem to have 
power not only because they are objects seeking realization, but they are also 
Others who, once realized in performance, look back at us, shaking us from our 
passive position watching through the keyhole and interpose themselves 
between us and the rest of the world. 
 
The Audience in the Performance 
 Thus it would seem that masked theatre, generally speaking, is more 
imaginary than non-masked—at least, the presence of the mask analogon invites 
the imaginary state, while the unmasked actor may be apprehended in a more 
perceptual manner. Let us clarify and in doing so, admit to certain biases as to 
the style and type of masked theatre we seek to explore. 
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 It is true that all acting requires imaginary acts. To say that a particular 
mask in performance always induces a more imaginary state when compared 
with a particular non-masked figure would be incorrect. An excellent 
performance by a non-masked actor will be superior to a poor performance by a 
masked actor and more imaginary as well. But what we find is that masks, when 
used in a context which supports their imaginary natures, create shared 
imaginings of great vivacity and spontaneity. We are particularly interested in 
performances of these types where masks shine. We will discuss the particulars 
of this context in greater detail shortly; however, that masks “work well” in 
particular contexts can also teach us about the contexts in which they may work 
not as well. The fundamental dynamic between these contexts is, as expected, 
between attitudes of perception or imagination; but it is also along the aesthetic 
divide of mimesis and expression*. 
  If the aim of psychological realism is mimesis, then that choice moves the 
actors and the audience toward the “perception” side of the continuum. In this 
case, the attitude of the consciousness of the viewers is more like that of 
observation and thought. It is a more passive position. In masked acting, which 
relies on expression instead of mimesis, the audience is moved closer to the 
“imagination” side of the continuum by the presence of the mask analogon, the 
specific movement choices made by the actors, and the imaginary state of the 
characterizations. We can say that mask acting at least partly relies on expression 
                                                 
*
 See my discussion about Imamichi, Chapter 5. 
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instead of mimesis because the use of the mask itself is a means of expressing a 
personage. In this way, the audience uses their imagination to complete the 
personage through the expression of the character’s sens (see last chapter); thus, 
they understand the action of the scene through a synthesis of knowledge and 
intention. Imagination is not passive; it is an act. The audience puts themselves 
into the performance. The rigid mask cannot weep, smile, and frown: it can only 
show what it was carved to be. But the mask can seem to do these things. Mrs. 
Cardigan can seem wistful, thoughtful, giddy, and crestfallen all because the 
analogon of mask and actor unites with the knowledge and intention of the 
audience. The actor provides the sens, and the audience transforms the mask. 
 The presence of a new character is not accomplished merely by putting on 
a mask, even though wearing a mask generally invites a more imaginary mode 
of apprehension. Ultimately, the audience must believe in the presence that they 
see. Observe Joachin Phoenix playing Johnny Cash, and some may be so 
convinced by his performance they fleetingly feel they are in the presence of 
Cash himself; others may find nothing of Cash in Phoenix’s portrayal. Perhaps 
the disagreeing audience has seen Cash in person or grown up with Cash’s songs 
and heard about his life in the media. If the signs the performer uses do not 
match the knowledge in the mind of the spectator, then the analogon fails on 
some level to create the imaginative consciousness. Belief comes not just from 
knowledge, however, but also from intentionality. A member of the audience has 
an expectation, however small or degraded, toward the imaginary object 
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presented by the analogon. If the performance signs synthesize with the 
knowledge and intention, then the image in the spectator’s consciousness 
appears and is believed. The presence of actor fades and the presence of the 
character appears. We believe that Joachin Phoenix is Johnny Cash. We believe that 
Sandra Hughes is Mrs. Cardigan—or more precisely, we believe that Mrs. 
Cardigan is real despite her false face. Failing this, then we see only an actor 
pretending to be Johnny Cash or an actor in a wooden mask dancing with a 
broom.  As Popenhagen says, “Through the mask, the spectator sees every 
person who bears the merest resemblance to the character” (81). The skilled actor 
brings out the “signs” of the character, which unite with the analogon of the mask 
– the “harmony” that Eldredge discusses – and the presence of the character is 
realized in the consciousness of the audience through the synthesis of the 
imagination. In as much as the mask actor must “animate” the mask, the 
audience also “animates” the mask in their own imaging consciousness. 
 
Purposeful Ambiguity 
 Of course, it is impossible to build a performance which attempts to meet 
every possible expectation of the audience. LeCoq believed that there was such a 
thing as the “universal poetic sense” (46). That is, a kind of immediate 
expressivity in the moving body that was understood on some level by the 
audience. It would be difficult to argue that a particular gesture or mask means 
the same thing to everyone that might see it. But LeCoq was aiming at trying to 
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find a way of moving that conveyed the essence (similar to sens) of the thing 
being depicted in movement. This process was distilling the movement of the 
actor to just its essence without being illustrative. LeCoq identifies a difference 
between “Mimism,” (his term) which is the search for internal dynamics of 
meaning, and mimicry, which is just representation of form (22). In other words, 
LeCoq was more interested in movement that expresses than movement that is 
mimetic. The universal poetic sense, then, would be about finding the “meaning” 
of particular movement qualities which register, at some level, with everyone, 
then paring away excess movement elements until just the “essence” of the 
movement remained.  
 But is such a universal aesthetic possible? In his The Critique of Judgment, 
Immanuel Kant argued that it was. Kant differentiated between objects that are 
deemed “pleasant,” “good,” and “beautiful” (45-58). That which is “pleasant” is 
deemed so by my own self-interest; therefore, I do not have an expectation that 
others will necessarily share my judgment. For example,  I find this sort of wine 
to be pleasant, but I don’t expect everyone to feel the same way. That which is 
“good” is likewise tied to self-interest, but it also has a mode of “utility” which 
the pleasant does not. To be called “good” I must have a concept of what that 
object is so that it can be used. I can say “this piano is good” because I have made 
a judgment about what I believe the nature and use of pianos is. This is 
contrasted to a simple enjoyment of a glass of wine, which does not require I 
make a cognitive evaluation of the wine itself. If I were a sommelier, I may say a 
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particular wine is “good” in my logical consideration of the function and utility 
of wine. But while objects “pleasant” and “good” share a common bond of self-
interest, that which is “good” is a cognitive judgment, while that which is 
pleasant is a more sensory, thus, prereflective judgment which does not require 
cognition. 
 But Kant found that judgments of “beauty” (and we will continue to argue 
that “beauty” is but one of many possible aesthetic qualities an object can 
possess) were not motivated by self-interest. We may enjoy the taste of this kind 
of wine, or may wish to own this brand of piano because of its quality—such 
judgments are motivated by self-interest. But what benefit does admiring Van 
Gogh’s Sunflowers afford me? Certainly there may be some “pleasure” involved 
in the viewing, the colors and lines may appeal to my senses, and if that is the 
limit of my appreciation of Sunflowers, then the painting is only “pleasant.” In 
order to be “beautiful,” argued Kant, then I must find in the painting some 
qualities which are beyond my own personal self-interest. “Taste,” he wrote, “is 
the faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing it by an entirely 
disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called 
beautiful” (55). Neither does the beautiful object require a cognition, such as object 
that are “good.” One need not make a cognitive (i.e. reflective) judgment about 
the nature of sunflowers to find Sunflowers beautiful (or ugly, or angry, or hot, 
etc.)  In fact, because we are disinterested in the object, and because we make 
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beauty judgments prereflectively, we expect others to share our evaluation. 
Beauty becomes universal.  Kant writes: 
Consequently, the judgment of taste, accompanied with the consciousness 
of separation from all interest, must claim validity for every man, without 
this universality depending on Objects. That is, there must be bound up 
with it a title to subjective universality (56). 
 
For Kant, judgments of beauty were not the results of individual taste. After all, 
to judge something as beautiful is not a judgment made from self-interest or 
objective utility. Further, we “demand” that others share our view of the 
beautiful where we do not require such agreement with things that are merely 
pleasant (58). Thus, Kant seeks to find what this universal aesthetic is. 
 Ultimately, Kant turns to a fourth category, the “Sublime,” which is an 
object that “pleases immediately through its opposition to the interest of sense” 
(134). The sublime has ties to nature, implying that there is a natural and moral 
harmony in the world and it is this which provides the basis for a universal 
aesthetic. However, we will not follow Kant here, for it on this fundamental 
point that Sartre and Kant have strong disagreement. Sartre writes: 
We shall, however, find little help from the Kantians. In fact they, 
preoccupied with establishing the universal laws of subjectivity which are 
the same for all, never dealt with the question of persons (Being and 
Nothingness, 306). 
 
Sartre rightly points out that no universal law can define an individual person. 
Intentionality is different than self-interest. The individual’s intentions forever 
shape and color how he apprehends an object. Self-interest is but one of the 
components of intentionality, one of many factors, but certainly not the only one, 
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that define the world for a given man. Thus, we must agree with Sartre and 
conclude that the universal poetic sense sought by LeCoq is not possible. Such a 
universal sense is cannot be codified, for everyone has different knowledge and 
intentions about particular movements and the context of their use. 
 But need we completely abandon LeCoq’s attempts? Perhaps we need 
only consider them in a different light. It is impossible to create a performance 
style that captures all audiences in its aesthetic net; however, that does not mean 
that it is impossible to construct a wide net, capturing as many as possible. If we 
know that intentionality will always influence and affect aesthetic appreciation, 
then we know that no one can create a mask that points to a particular personage 
in the same way for everyone viewing it. But as we discussed in Chapter 5, a mask 
that is ambiguous and abstract becomes more effective at a wider range of 
expressions and personage possibilities. This is so because by inviting the 
imaginations, we exploit intentionality so that the audience sees the character 
they intend to see. We sacrifice, as LeCoq did, mimesis for expression, and the 
audience’s imagination fills in the missing details. 
 So we can also speak about presenting performances in such a way that 
audiences can read more of themselves into the performance itself, and thus, 
respond to the performance because of this involvement. We cannot quantify 
such an aesthetic style as a particular code of movement or gesture style. We 
have already seen that the performance context greatly changes the value of an 
aesthetic object in that context, and to attempt to codify a specific quality of 
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movement or speech will affix the effectiveness of that code within the context in 
which it was created. The lessons of the masks do not lead us to seek a particular 
style, rather, it is an overall aesthetic style which can be used in different contexts 
which aims at encouraging the audience to strongly imagine. We again 
acknowledge that there is no single style which ensures universal understanding 
and aesthetic appreciation. But perhaps it may be possible to use intentionality to 
our own aims. 
 Here is what we know: We are seeking a style that both invites and 
sustains the imaginary state. The style would employ masks, for their ability to 
remove the presence of the actor and bring out the presence of the “Other” 
suggested by the mask. It would rely on movement, for, as discussed, movement 
is tied to the imaginary. Ambiguity would also play an integral part in this style, 
for ambiguity invites the imagination. These elements would have to be brought 
into a kind of balance: too much ambiguity, and the audience has too little 
knowledge to activate the imaging consciousness; not enough ambiguity, and the 
audience will slip further from the imaging consciousness and rely on more 
passive perception.  
 But how do we define this balance? Roy Behrens sought to express this 
sort of balance in print when he compared concepts of the “esthetic” versus the 
“anesthetic.” Returning to the roots of the words, he writes, “Any experience 
could be regarded as esthetic if provocative, striking, and stirringly felt, whereas 
anesthetic experiences were benumbing or stupefying” (Behrens). Behrens 
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acknowledges the modern, common meaning of “anesthetic” in a medical and 
chemical sense. But, he points out, an anesthetic experience could also be 
 …a non-chemical loss of sensation, as when, for example a person 
experiences a meditative trance, brought on by exposure to extreme 
similarity (or humdrum), such as monotonous chanting, resulting in 
“hypoarousal”; or an ecstatic trance, brought on by sustained exposure to 
extreme diversity (or hodgepodge), such as spasmodic song and dance, 
resulting in “hyperarousal.” (Behrens). 
 
Thus the anesthetic is a state of sensory loss, or more particularly, for our 
purposes, a failure to feel, which is brought on by extreme levels of sensory data 
(information). This failure to feel translates into a failure to imagine, for sensory 
data provide the knowledge required to initiate the imaginative synthesis. We 
will return to this point, shortly. 
 Behrens proposes a continuum or spectrum of sensory experience which 
can produce various degrees of esthetic or anesthetic experience: 
 
 ANESTHETIC     ESTHETIC    ANESTHETIC 
 extreme similarity unity-in-variety extreme difference 
 HUMDRUM strict wildness HODGEPODGE 
 insufficient variety harmonious disarray insufficient unity 
 meditative trance  ecstatic trance 
 hypoarousal  hyperarousal 
 MONOTONY  MAYHEM 
 
 
Thus, we see anesthetic experiences are ones that are “too repetitive” or “too 
diverse” (Behrens). Where does one draw the line, though, between “harmonious 
disarray” and “mayhem,” for example? We understand that that line is different 
for different people. Behrens does likewise, calling his esthetic zone a 
224 
 
“fluctuating” area, with no fixed point where esthetic patterns reside. In fact, he 
states that “some of the most inventive art tends to drift precariously toward the 
edges” (Behrens). Ultimately, these visual patterns are tied to ideas of Gestalt: too 
little or too much information and patterns fail to emerge. Esthetic objects are 
ones which allow the Gestalt syntheses to manifest. 
 But let us return to the idea that a failure to sense produces a failure to 
imagine. If we organize the world according to Gestalt principles (e.g. reification, 
multistability, etc.) then these organizations of information are what provide us 
with the knowledge we require for the imaginative synthesis. But we know that 
complete sensation is unnecessary—in fact, it is impossible. We only need a little 
bit of knowledge to trigger the imaginative synthesis. But the question is to what 
degree is the imagination triggered, and the answer cannot be categorical. 
However, we can, like Behrens, understand that an effective esthetic object 
resides in the “fluctuating” zone between “too much” or “too little” detail. The 
artist must make a determination herself about the level of sensory data 
constitutes “too much” or “too little” if she aims to create an esthetic object. Even 
so, she has no assurances that her choice will produce an esthetic object for all. 
But if she (intuitively or otherwise) understands that there is a balance between 
removing sensory data (and thus moving away from hyperarousal) and adding 
sensory data (and moving away from hypoarousal), then in attempting to find 
that balance, she can create an esthetic object which can serve as an analogon for 
an imaginary synthesis in a wider selection of individual consciousnesses. 
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 In terms of masked performance and the aesthetic style we seek to 
describe, we therefore see again how an ambiguity of form is essential to the 
imaginary process. But we cannot completely sacrifice information for 
ambiguity. We must use ambiguity in specific ways. Because masks in particular 
exploit ambiguity in performance, rather than rely on one of Behren’s terms for 
this balanced aesthetic style (e.g. unity-in-variety, strict wildness, etc.) I prefer to 
use the term purposeful ambiguity. 
 Purposeful ambiguity, as its name implies, employs ambiguity in a 
specific way. The goal would be to present the audience with just enough 
specifics so that an audience member can orient his knowledge toward the 
events on stage, but then allow enough ambiguity so that he fills in the rest with 
his own knowledge and intention. It is important to remember that context is a 
key part of the aesthetic experience. Therefore, the artist must consider how the 
performative objects are presented in that context as part of determining the 
degree of ambiguity. It is also important to remember that this is not a rejection 
of specifics and detail: ambiguity need not be chaotic or random. On the 
contrary, such a style would rely on a poverty of carefully chosen and specific 
signs designed to present the essential elements needed to present and engage 
the knowledge of the spectator. The essential poverty of such signs, however, 
invites the audience to imagine what is missing. 
 Take, for example, the performance of Mrs. Cardigan. Certainly, the mask 
is limited: it can only present one expression. But Sandra Hughes’ performance 
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choices are also essential. When she reaches out her hand toward the various 
men in the audience, she carefully eliminates all other extraneous movement 
from her performance. She steps toward a man, and extends her hand to him, 
palm up, invitingly. But of course, the characterization “invitingly” is one 
assigned to the gesture by the observer. Because the performance is essentialized, 
to borrow from LeCoq, the audience is not distracted from the lines and patterns 
of movement by other movements which do not belong. The movement of the 
actress, the face of the mask, the context of the performance, and the knowledge 
of the spectators are presented in enough detail that an audience member can 
imagine that Mrs. Cardigan is inviting him to dance with her. They may imagine 
they see some eagerness, some hope in her expression, they may imagine her 
eyebrows go up, or even that she smiles at them. But because the events 
presented to them are done so with a degree of ambiguity, they do not merely 
watch the proceedings: they are invited to imagine and they read themselves into 
the performance. Each audience member’s image is likely to be different from 
each other’s due to differences in knowledge and intention, but the audience still 
places the qualities of the imagined Mrs. Cardigan in the analogon of Mrs. 
Cardigan presented by Hughes. Mrs. Cardigan is made present, not solely by the 
purposeful choices of the actor, nor solely by the ambiguity of the performance, 
but through a synthesis of the two, actor and audience collaborating 
imaginatively in an prereflective way. 
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 Of course, even purposeful ambiguity is not necessarily “universal.” Mrs. 
Cardigan’s gesture may not always seem to be an invitation. The specific 
elements of each audience member’s knowledge and intention could cause that 
person to interpret a particular movement differently than the actor intended, or 
even to fail to understand what the movement meant. In such a case, the 
confusion—a lack of knowledge—would cause the imaginative state to fail to 
synthesize and the audience member would fall back to a more perceptive state, 
seeking to “figure out” what the gesture meant by gleaning more knowledge 
from the performance. 
 However, what purposeful ambiguity does allow for is the possibility of 
imagination. The ambiguity of the performance leaves room for the audience to 
read themselves into it, whatever the image may be for a particular person. It 
may not be universal, but it has the potential to create a performance style which, 
for the audience, is prereflectively participatory, with characterizations that seem 
intuitively complete, compelling to watch because of the “pull” of ambiguity, 
and above all, imaginary in nature. Certainly, a style of “purposeful ambiguity” 
is desirous for masked performance. But more than this, masks show us that the 
creation of the aesthetic object depends on a certain level of ambiguity, and that 







 The relationship between the masked actor and the audience is 
collaborative. The ambiguity of the mask in the performance invites the 
imaginary state more so than an unmasked actor, all else being equal. In this 
imaginative state, the audience completes the characterization with their own 
knowledge and intention. Properly animated and performed, the masked actor is 
compelling to watch. The strange, ambiguous “Other” of the mask pulls on the 
audience’s consciousness, seeking realization, and the audience gives it such to 
the extent it can imagine. Such is the pull that an audience member will even 
transform the image of the mask to see what she intends to see. Mrs. Cardigan is 
sad because we see her sadness in the image we have of her, and we place that 
sadness in the analogon of the actor/mask before us. We respond with a 
sympathetic “Awww…” because the emotion we feel is genuine. We do not need 
to see the sadness in Mrs. Cardigan’s face. We only need to imagine it. 
Sartre’s ideas of consciousness are based on ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Only through our imaginations can we find a complete and total object, which 
means, of course, that our own point of view is an inextricable part of that 
totality. This is true for how we process identity, in our selves and others. We 
imagine who we are and who the people around us are. Masks take advantage of 
this particular part of human consciousness. They invite us to imagine, and we 
make them real. As a result, masks seem to have this power which has given 
them special status among primal cultures and modern mask teachers alike. But 
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we give them the life they seem to have. In truth, masks operate like most any 
other analogon, with one exception. Masks seem to have power because they play 
effortlessly with one thing we traditionally hold to be fundamental: identity. But 
transformation of identity—even transformation of the world—is how our 
consciousness operates. We imagine the world and transform it over and over as 
we engage with it. Transformation is an imaginative act—the more imaginative a 
particular object appears to us on the perception/imagination continuum, the 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 We began this dissertation curious about the relationship between masks 
and the imagination. We discovered that not only do masks encourage and 
sustain imaginary states in actor and audience alike, but masks as authorized 
props in performance games make plain and illustrate the operation of 
consciousness itself. In order to better understand how masks in performance are 
apprehended by consciousness, we turned to Sartrean thought, and asked some 
particular questions. Let us conclude by answering these questions in 
summation: 
 What would Sartrean philosophy have to say about the role of masks in 
character creation? If we apply the imaginary synthesis to masks, we see that a 
mask is an analogon. It stands in for the absent character. Because faces are the 
key index by which we reference qualities such as personality and identity, 
masks have specific associations with those qualities—more so than most other 
objects. Certainly, photographs and portraits are other identity-related analoga; 
however, masks take on special significance because they are animated with a 
body and because they are abstract. The mask, worn and animated, removes the 
presence of the actor and brings out the presence of the personage to which it 
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points. This removal of the presence of the actor can manifest itself as what is 
referred to as “trance” by mask scholars and performers: a kind of committed 
imaginary state where the actor spontaneously synthesizes the personage of the 
character out of her imagination. 
 What might Sartrean concepts have to say about how audiences 
apprehend a masked performer compared to an unmasked performer? Like the 
actor, the audience contributes to the presence of the personage inasmuch as 
their own intentions and knowledge synthesize with the choices of the actor to 
realize the absent character. If this personage appears to us in a manner more like 
perception— as a “real” person with a real face— then audiences are more likely 
to apprehend the personage in a more perceptive way. But the appearance of the 
mask invites the audience to imagine. The strange and ambiguous figure in the 
mask pulls on the audience’s consciousness, shocking them from a vantage 
where they objectify and merely watch the events on the stage. The audience 
realizes the personage of the mask themselves in a more imaginary way than 
they would with a non-masked actor. 
 What are the aesthetic qualities that make a particular mask/performance 
more effective from a Sartrean point of view? How might Sartre’s ideas of the 
imagination be used to construct an aesthetic for masked performance? Some 
masks are better than others, and masks which capture the sens—the totality—of 
the personage tend to be stronger than those who do not. But sens does not come 
from lifelikeness. Rather, sens comes through abstraction and ambiguity, 
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sacrificing some mimetic choices for expressive ones. This is because we can only 
apprehend something in its totality in our imaginations. Ambiguity invites the 
imagination, which in turn completes the ambiguous object. This is why a more 
imaginative apprehension of events in performance is stronger than a more 
perceptive mode: imagination is an act, pulling the consciousness into the 
performance, actively realizing the events. The audience does not merely watch; 
it participates. But neither is complete abstraction useful in the imaginative 
synthesis. Without some knowledge about the object, the imaginative synthesis 
fails. That is why the most effective masks and masked performances employ 
purposeful ambiguity: enough knowledge to engage the imaginative synthesis, 
and enough ambiguity to allow the audience to imagine the rest. 
 
Masks and Faces 
 Sartre’s writings about the imagination shed specific light on how 
audiences and actors approach the process of acting itself. Because acting is 
essentially about the play of identity, then the question of how identity is formed 
becomes important. We know that Sartre believed our identity was constructed 
imaginatively. For the actor, if identity can likewise be constructed freely through 
the imagination, then characterizations can likewise be freely constructed. 
However, the actor must always be aware of how his own intentions and 
knowledge affect the characterizations so constructed. If the imaginative process 
is the basis for identity, then actor training must include training of the 
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imagination, including circumventing the “bad faith” that would keep the actor 
from recognizing his own intentions and assumptions in his understanding of 
identity. The moment an actor believes she perceptually understands who her 
character is, she risks falling into the trap of bad faith: Mrs. Cardigan is sad or 
melancholy or hopeful or wistful. The character has been reduced to traits, 
fundamental “qualities” which “define” her, limit her, and for the actor, make 
her unplayable. One cannot “be sad” as an actor except in a superficial or 
illustrative way. Rather, the sadness is a result of the character’s choices and how 
she deals with the consequences of those choices. To say a character “is” such 
and such a person or “has” certain qualities is to remove that character from 
action: to remove choice. This is so because a character can no longer choose her 
actions, only respond as her traits dictate. For Sartre, a character, like any human, 
is defined not by who she is, but by how she chooses. It was for this reason that 
Sartre created his theatre de situations to show characters in action, not in the 
passive grip of forces beyond their control. Sartre believed this freedom was a 
part of human identity, and his characters reflected this belief. 
 We admit that such choices can apply to non-masked acting as well. But 
masks in particular illustrate this fundamental working of identity. It is a mask’s 
ambiguity which points out how we assign qualities of identity and personality 
to others around us. A mask is quite clearly not a face. And yet, whether we are 
an actor contemplating a mask to find the personage it points to, or an audience 
member witnessing the face in motion, we bring our perceptions, ideas, 
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memories, and expectations to bear on this false face seeking to discover who is 
there. Consider the conversation between mime performer Andres Bossard of 
the group Mummenschanz and interviewer Bari Rolf about working with masks: 
BR: You make me think of a paradox of the mask: it hides in order to 
reveal. People often feel safe hiding behind a mask, thinking that the face, 
that most expressive feature, is well-covered. But then the mask directs 
expression into the body. 
 
Andres: The face – okay, it’s the most important feature but it’s not 
absolutely the most truthful. It’s very cheating; we can always cheat with 
our faces. But with the body, we cannot cheat. So we should look more at 
bodies when we are meeting people, we would learn more. 
 
BR: The mask hides the lie and shows the truth (Rolf, 30). 
 
 What is the “truth” of which Rolf speaks? It is implied through the 
conversation that the “truth” here means one’s inner feelings or beliefs—that 
masks affect the wearer and somehow coerce the wearer into directing the facial 
expression into the body. While it may be true that some actors, on donning a 
mask, may feel the need to indicate their character’s inner feelings physically 
since they are deprived of facial expression, I do not think that we can say that 
masks have a special ability that causes this to be so. Still, I believe Rolf’s 
assertion that masks hide lies and show “truths” has merit for other reasons. 
 Rather than questions of internal versus external honesty, consider instead 
that the “truth” can be defined, in this case, as the character represented in the 
mask:  the truth which we constitute in our imaginations, the “totality” of the 
personage. If an actor is to appear believable while wearing a mask, the actor 
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must remove her sense of self from the performance and instead focus on the 
sense of self pointed to by the mask. A “truthful” performance is one in which 
the sens of the character is made present without breaking the imaginative 
synthesis either by unauthorized behavior within the context of the game being 
played, or too much/too little sensory data. The human face can put on 
expressions of all sorts. The fixed mask can only be what it “is,” and the actor’s 
responsibility is to create imaginatively the personage of the mask: the “is” 
which only exists in the imagination. A mask is horrible or lively or melancholy 
not merely because it was sculpted that way, but because we place those 
qualities in the mask when we view it. Rolf’s observation shows us that the 
mutable face we show to the world, the face we associate with “us,” is ripe with 
possibilities for deception, even to ourselves. We may even lie to ourselves about 
who we are, or we may play different roles at different times of our lives, show 
different sides of ourselves to different people. But the mask is what it is, i.e. it 
cannot pretend to be anything other than how it was sculpted. It cannot be 
otherwise. We gift the mask with its identity, even as it seems to change. Identity 
is created not in the psyche, but in the imagination for both the actor and the 
audience.  
 
Making Presence  
 In the last chapter, we attempted to briefly outline a performance style 
which not only is beneficial when using masks, but uses masks to illustrate the 
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operation of aesthetics in performance. But I believe that from these lessons we 
can ask a more fundamental question in the light of the mask: what is acting? 
Such an enormous question will not receive a complete answer in this 
dissertation; we leave that for another time. However, there are some ideas 
which our examination has brought to light that should be mentioned as possible 
realms of further scholarship. 
 There have been many definitions of acting, of course, so long as there 
have been theories of acting. Stanislavski – here paraphrased by Sanford 
Meisner— said that a major component of acting is “living truthfully in 
imaginary circumstances” (Daw, 78). By this, Stanislavski (and Meisner) wanted 
actors to react as if they were real people to the imaginary conditions on the 
stage. “Truthfully” here means authentic and believable, not mannered or 
artificial—engaging one’s imagination on the stage to the point where the 
imaginary stimuli of the play create authentic-seeming reactions. It is like 
Walton’s ideas of communal imagining, with certain behaviors authorized 
within the context of the game of make-believe that is the performance. While 
this idea certainly suited Stanislavski’s aims, this definition leaves certain holes.  
For instance, what about certain stylized performance modes where the aim is 
not realistic characterization but something more mannered or presentational? 
Or what if the character is not strictly speaking a human being, instead being a 
god, animal, spirit, ghost, and so on? While Stanislavski’s definition recognizes 
the fundamentally imaginary nature of the acting process, I prefer to think of 
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acting in more basic terms: acting is making presence. That is, the function of the 
actor is to “make present” the “other,” the character, god, animal, spirit, 
personage which is called for in the circumstances of the performance. 
 In order to make presence, the actor must first remove her own sense of 
presence from the performance space. Presence is physical to begin with. She 
must change her body so that all traces of her vanish, and replacing them with 
those appropriate to the personage she is to play. From there, the actor uses her 
imagination to synthesize the character in a way that sustains the presence. Even 
if the character is mannered or unrealistic (stylistically speaking), there are still 
qualities which can be made present by the actor. At its most basic, acting is 
bringing forth someone or something else in the place where the actor was 
previously. Obviously this is not a literal transfiguration. However, because 
identity is created imaginatively, the transformation becomes possible in an 
imaginary way. Acting is possible because we do not construct identity solely 
through perception. Whether I am an actor playing a role or simply thinking 
about my own identity, it is my imagination that constitutes my understanding 
of that identity. Whether it is an actor on a stage or a person we meet on the 
street, it is our imaginations that tell us who they are. 
 Masks facilitate the imaginary transformation of acting. They remove the 
face of the actor, and thus the primary index of his presence. As indicated by the 
mask theorists we have reviewed here, mask work is physical work, 
transforming the body to suit the new face. Masks invite the imagination. If 
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acting is making presence, then masked acting is a way to more intuitively make 
present the “Other” in a more imaginative mode. When Rolf says masks hide the 
lie and show the truth, she may not have realized the full scope of what she 
meant. Masks hide the lie of innate properties that determine who we are, and 
instead reveal the truth that we are our masks. 
 
Towards Sartrean Theatre 
 Sartre rarely used masks himself*. Neither are his plays particularly 
abstract in their dialog and construction as, say, the Absurdists who followed 
him. As such, they are often performed in a more traditionally realistic style 
suitable for the text. This choice seems at odds with his preferred aesthetic 
choices of visual art. But then, Sartre did not approve of all activities of the 
imagination. In fact the very name “bad faith” Sartre applies to this particular 
operation of the imagination speaks to his disapproval of its ends. Sartre 
preferred, instead, that human beings should adopt “candor” and “authenticity” 
as values (Being and Nothingness, 101).  
 However, his plays did attempt to illustrate the ambiguous nature of 
consciousness. His theatre de situations attempted to show human beings at 
moments when their choices, not some fundamental properties, define who they 
                                                 
*
 Sartre’s initial production of The Flies (Les Mouches) used masks designed by Henri-Georges Adam, 
though there is little scholarship on the production directly pertaining to the masks themselves. Images of 
the masks can be found in Album Jean-Paul Sartre, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, Paris: Gallimard, pp 76-77. 
240 
 
are. This, he believed, was common to the human existence: outside of certain 
biological factors, we are who we choose to be.  
 Roger Callois identified another artifact common to the human condition: 
masks. He writes:  
It is a fact that all mankind wears or has worn a mask. This enigmatic 
accessory, with no obvious utility, is commoner than the lever, the bow, 
the harpoon, or the plough. Whole peoples have been ignorant of the most 
ordinary tools. They knew the mask. Complete civilizations, some of them 
most remarkable, have prospered without having conceived of the wheel, or 
what is worse, without using it even though it was known to them. But 
they were familiar with the mask… There is no tool, no invention, no 
belief, custom, or institution which unites mankind so much as does the 
habit of wearing a mask (qtd. in Eldredge 3). 
 
Callois’ observation wants to find something universal about the mask and the 
human condition. Callois’ does not mean that masks serve the same purpose in 
every culture and are used the same way. Rather, the construction of masks and 
their use—masking—seems to be an expression of something innately human. 
We have already found that a universal mask sense is not possible. But if, as 
Sartre suggests, our ontological freedom is due to our capacity to imagine, then 
one of the ways we can exercise that freedom is to change our identity—our 
imagined natures, our imagined selves. Using a mask is simply employing an 
analogon to effect that change. Perhaps this explains Callois’ observation—masks 
are a common human artifact because they so plainly illustrate how humans 
create their sense of identity. Masks are a tool to change the world and change 
ourselves. If there is something fundamentally human about masks, it is not 
merely something culturally expressed: it is ontologically expressed. 
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 Though Sartre may not have utilized masks extensively in his own 
dramas, I believe that masks are a uniquely Sartrean approach to theatre: a 
theatre that is rooted in the imagination of both actor and audience, and one that 
truly reflects the indeterminate nature of mankind’s consciousness. One must 
wonder if Sartre would have approved of the techniques used by the mask 
theorists discussed herein. After all, these techniques exploit the imaginative 
process to their own ends, often substituting one sort of bad faith for another. But 
if acting is “making presence” then the use of a mask is an excellent tool toward 
that end. 
 Sartre’s theatre de situations sought to illustrate his ideas, to depict human 
beings making choices that define their natures, to give examples of the freedom 
of humanity. A performance where masks are a primary part of the 
characterization cannot be stylistically realistic: masks are rarely mistaken for 
real faces. But just as Sartre found value in abstraction, in that it invites the 
imagination, so too do masks abstract the characterizations and invite 
imagination. Sartre’s theatre de situations illustrated Sartre’s philosophy. Masked 
theatre, on the other hand, is Sartre’s philosophy in action—though perhaps not 
to the ends he would have desired. But in masks we see clearly how Sartre 
himself outlined the functioning of consciousness. Non-masked theatre shows 
these functions as well, but the presence of the mask, the “instrument of the 
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